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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Zhuo Chen 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Psychology 
 
September 2017 
 
Title: Violation of Sacredness and Violence 
 
 
This dissertation aims to present a model of sacredness – MAPR – that emphasizes 
four components to empirically study sacredness: source of meaning (M), experience of 
awe (A), protection against the profane (P), and relationship to religion (R). The empirical 
studies focus on the psychological mechanisms of protecting, and examine the association 
of violence and violation of sacredness.  
Five studies examined the hypothesized effect of violating sacredness on moral 
judgment and support for war. Hypothetical and semi-real scenarios were created in which 
a sacred site (versus a military site) is attacked and participants report the degree to which 
they support war as counterattack. Results showed no effects of sacredness in eliciting 
violence (Study 1). The proposed effect did not show either with fine-tuned aspects of 
sacredness: religious sacredness and ethnonational sacredness (Study 2), or under feeling 
prime (Study 3). This effect did not show with an Iranian sample either (Study 4).  
To address possible methodological challenges, we checked the manipulation 
scenarios by changing the non-sacred condition into a manufacture plant (previously a 
military site). The null results remained unchallenged (Study 5a). We also examined 
individuals’ attitudes toward attacking the sacred site in Study 2, and counterattacking for 
the sacred site in Study 3. In addition, some personality variables were included to index 
 v 
 
the characteristics of individuals who support protecting the sacredness. No clear pattern 
was observed.  
The results suggest the possibility that the connection of sacredness and violence 
may be a misconception. The null finding has significant implications in today’s 
tumultuous world, where dialogue is needed between different faith communities, and 
terrorism can and should be distinguished from religious commitment.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF SACREDNESS 
Interests in studying sacredness have a long past (e.g., Otto, 1917; Durkheim, 
1912; James, 1902; Weber, 1922), but only a short history in psychology (e.g., Atran & 
Axelrod, 2008; Baron & Spranca, 1997; Pargament & Mahoney, 2005; Tetlock et al., 
2000). The rising attention to perception of sacredness as a consequential psychological 
process has resulted in fruitful models and typologies (Demerath, 2000; Evans, 2014; 
Pargament & Mahoney, 2005; Tetlock et al., 2000). Accumulating evidence shows that 
not only can sacredness be manipulated, but dramatic consequences can follow when 
sacredness is violated (Ginges & Atran, 2013).  
Despite these theoretical and empirical accomplishments, extant psychological 
research stands without a straightforward, descriptive, and explicit definition of 
sacredness. Particularly, the obvious question “what constitutes sacredness” is not 
answered. Dictionary definitions of sacredness focus primarily on its relation to religion 
and the deity. Secondary meaning has to do with veneration and being “set apart”. As an 
example, the fourth edition of American Heritage Dictionary defines sacred as “(a) 
Dedicated to or set apart for the worship of a deity; (b) Worthy of religious veneration; 
(c) Made or declared holy; (d) Dedicated or devoted exclusively to a single use, purpose, 
or person; and (e) Worthy of respect, venerable.” 
However, sociological and religious studies perspectives suggest that such a 
definition can be too narrow. A close reading of classical texts written by prominent 
theorists such as Émile Durkheim, Mircea Eliade, and their followers reveals 12 major 
themes identified with sacredness, whose scope goes far beyond religion. These themes 
are hierophany (i.e., manifestation of the sacred that gives the world meaning), 
kratophany (i.e., manifestation of power), opposition to the profane, contamination, 
sacrifice, commitment, objectification, ritual, mystery, communitas, myth, ecstasy, and 
flow (Belk, Wallendorf & Sherry, 1989).  
Through field work with indigenous cultures, anthropologists have revealed both 
diversities and patterns in how traditional societies construct sacredness. For instance, 
Studley (2010) summarizes characteristics of sacred sites for Kham people living in 
Eastern Tibet. A site tends to be sacred if it is presided over or embodied by a divinity; 
has low thresholds in its access to the world of spirits; provides an ideal locale to worship 
gods and ancestors; has associations with supernatural phenomena (e.g., trance, vision, 
vision quest, enlightenment, miracle); is a conduit of blessing or healing; or is related to 
the origin stories of a people. Although this list comes from observation of a particular 
and somewhat isolated group of people, it readily generalizes to other cultures whose 
people may deal with different objects and spirits, but nevertheless use similar concepts 
in constructing sacredness.   
Geography also contributes to our understanding of sacredness, for the mere fact 
that sacred natural sites and objects abound across the globe. Many cultures revere 
mountains (Bernbaum, 1997). Mountains are sacred because their elevation and size 
make them seem likely as a center and place of power; an ideal place for a deity, 
ancestors or the dead to dwell; a place of revelation, inspiration, or transformation; and 
also as a source of water and thus life. Natural objects can be sacred too. Trees are often 
sacred for their longevity, multitude of uses and as a residence of spirits (Porteus, 1996). 
Trees can often represent a tradition and identity. Homage has been paid to the fig tree in 
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many major religions. Certain trees serve as a national icon, such as the cedar of 
Lebanon, Canada’s maple tree, and for Chile the Monkey Puzzle tree (Barrow, 2010).  
One can find sacredness among incorporeal ideas as much as in physical matters. 
Freedom, democracy, and human rights are no less sacred than holy land, ancestor burial 
sites, or enchanted forests. Ideas of harming the environment for greater economic gains 
(Tetlock, 2003), trading organs for money (Baron & Leshner, 2000), or accepting a 
demonized out-group (Atran, Axelrod, & Davis, 2007) can all trigger people’s awareness 
of sacredness and corresponding reactions to protect the sacred from being compromised. 
Back to an urban, less dramatic setting, based on free-response descriptions of what s/he 
finds sacred, a college student will tell you that friendship, love, and family are what are 
sacred to him or her (Saucier, personal communication, 2014). 
The above snapshot depicts no more than a tip of the iceberg for the rich 
meanings embedded in sacredness. It is not hard to see that, given such complexity, a 
wholesale use of the term sacredness without first specifying its possible components can 
conceal more than what is manifest. On the other hand, a clearer focus on a certain aspect 
of sacredness can exclude confounding variables by confining objects of investigation 
within a manageable domain. Given the wide scope and cultural diversity in sacredness, 
it is unlikely for any single model to comprehensively explain and describe all aspects of 
sacredness. The current project, instead, reviews the major empirical literature on 
sacredness and describes patterns that emerge from those findings. Emphasis is given to 
psychologically testable ideas.  
Specifically, the current paper suggests four components that help explain what 
sacredness is: source of meaning, experience of awe, protection against the profane, and 
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religion and spirituality. Taking a tentative, but intuitive approach, this review organizes 
findings into these four components. In the treatment of each component, I first 
summarize major tenets whose views support understanding sacredness as such. I then 
review relevant empirical findings. Lastly I offer some testable hypotheses and directions 
for future research within each perspective. The current paper suggests that these four 
perspectives will not only enhance our understanding of sacredness, but open doors for 
empirical research to examine psychological implications of sacredness.  
Sacredness as Source of Meaning  
Some of the most powerful accounts of how sacredness is related to identity and 
meaning are given by indigenous people who maintain lasting attachment to their land. 
“The limitations of my land are clear to me. The area of my existence, where I derive my 
existence from, is clear to me and clear to those who belong in my group. Land provides 
for my physical needs and my spiritual needs. New stories are sung from contemplation 
of the land. Stories are handed down from spirit men of the past who have deposited the 
riches at various places, the sacred places. These places are not simply geographically 
beautiful: they are holy places, places that are even more holy than shrines. They are not 
commercialized, they are sacred. Veneration is shown to them. They are used for the 
regeneration of our people, the continuation of our life: because that’s where we begin 
and that’s where we return.”(cited in Hubert, 1994, p. 9) 
The above statement was given by Father Patrick Dodson, a Yawuru man from 
Broome in Western Australia, recognized as a leader and representative of many 
Australian aboriginal groups. Like many accounts that could be given by indigenous 
people from all inhabited lands in the world, this paragraph captures the utmost 
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significance of the aboriginal’s sacred sites, and the need to set those sites apart. The 
sacred is a source of identity, from which one derives one’s existence; it satisfies both 
physical and spiritual needs; it is not to be contaminated by commercialization, which is 
instrumental and involves treating everything in terms of its sheer instrumental value; it 
requires veneration; it has the strongest possible meaning for the aborigines as it defines 
the destiny for these people.  
Many of these themes have been discussed in the previous sections, where 
sacredness is constructed in terms of religion, awe, or protection against profaning. What 
is left is sacredness as source of meaning. “Meaning is the web of connections, 
understandings, and interpretations that help us comprehend our experience and 
formulate plans directing our energies to the achievement of our desired future. Meaning 
provides us with the sense that our lives matter, that they make sense, and that they are 
more than the sum of our seconds, days, and years” (Steger, 2012, p. 65). In this 
definition, identity is obviously embedded in this web of understandings, and we discuss 
meaning and identity together as a whole.  
It is obvious that sacredness is a source of meaning. Sacredness furnishes the 
holders of sacredness with the ability to construct and organize subjective and 
interpersonal experiences and reality (LaMothe, 1998). That sacredness is often related to 
religion makes it even more worthy of veneration, and sacredness can become a unique 
source of significance in people’s lives (Silberman, 2005).  
However, sacredness is not confined to religion. As there are religious phenomena 
that are no longer sacred, there are sacred things that are not religious (Demerath, 2000). 
Evans (2003) suggests that the vague definition and often imputed equivalence of 
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sacredness to the supernatural is caused as much by unscrupulous scholarly work as by 
vagaries in the English language. For communication of a religious sense, it is better to 
use the word “holy” in lieu of the word “sacred” (Oxtoby, 1993). Sacredness is better 
defined in reference to things that are set apart with special meaning, which may or may 
not involve the supernatural or be related to religion. 
Evans (2003) defines sacredness as “set apart” based on the non-rational and 
sometimes emotional values carried by the sacred. Part of the “set apart” quality is the 
separation into a different compartment, value-wise. Evans proposes a typology of 
sacredness that cross-tabulates two sources (natural/supernatural) and two holders 
(individual/group), resulting in four types of sacredness – personal, spiritual, civil, and 
religious. Personal sacredness refers to a special meaning in the natural experiences of an 
individual. Such a sacred object often has personal sentimental value. Examples include 
personal sacred places such as childhood homes and personal places of retreat. Spiritual 
sacredness highlights personal connections with the supernatural. Examples often can be 
found with respect to religious artifacts. Civil sacredness recognizes worldly institutions 
or natural artifacts that hold significant meanings among social groups. Examples of such 
forms of sacredness are abundant, such as the Mount Rushmore National Memorial, the 
Pentagon, the US capitol, the US national flag and the Statue of Liberty; they are icons of 
American heritage and power. The last category is religious sacredness which features a 
religious site or artifacts widely recognized and worshipped by a group of devotees.  
Sacredness is embedded in tradition. Durkheim (1912) is among the first to 
establish the social-traditional origin of sacredness. The Durkheimian fusion of tradition 
and sacredness have seen further development in Becker (1950), who goes so far to assert 
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that “a society that endows and sustains an impermeable value-system is sacred; one that 
embodies a permeable value-system is secular” (p. 364). Similarly, Demerath (2000) 
conceives sacredness in terms of a social function. As a type of tradition, sacredness is 
real and unchanging, thus providing a reliable source of meaning. “What we term sacred 
is originally nothing more than what is regarded as more truly real because it is whole 
and self-founded, while the profane is what happens only now and is therefore purely 
contingent” (Dupre, 2000, p. 101). The self-founded nature of sacredness has a family 
resemblance to ‘intrinsic’. 
It is useful to ask how one maintains sacredness, and what happens when 
sacredness is lost. People have a general need for coherence and meaning. “Narrative 
psychology believes that we secretly portray ourselves as living out a sort of preauthored 
screenplay, … one with the promise of an intelligent narrative climax that will eventually 
tie all the loose ends together in some meaningful, coherent way” (Bering, 2011, p. 158). 
As suggested in the narrative psychological perspective, a successful maintenance of 
sacredness produces coherence and self-knowledge. A disrupted sacredness leads to loss 
of meanings. This is probably because when the intrinsic values are taken away, the 
instrumental pursuits in themselves seem unanchored, or become anchored in values like 
wealth, power, or hedonic satisfaction that somehow confer meaning less well. 
Empirical Implications 
There is a rich literature in the study of meaning (c.f., Markman, Proulx, & 
Lindberg, 2013), but very few of these investigations explicitly connects sacredness with 
meaning. We introduce one model of meaning that may be useful for future studies 
associated with sacredness.  
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According to the Meaning Maintenance Model (MMM), meaning is defined as 
the “expected relationships or associations that human beings construct and impose on 
their worlds” (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006, p.90). MMM proposes that people seek 
coherent relations within the external world, within themselves, and between themselves 
and the external world. Disruptions to meaning frameworks lead people to reaffirm 
alternative frameworks. Notably, these efforts need not be directed at the specific domain 
of meaning which has been jeopardized. Four exemplar meaning frameworks are 
proposed by Heine et al. (2006) to capture needs to maintain the coherent relationships: 
self-esteem, feelings of certainty, interpersonal affiliation, and symbolic immortality. A 
fluid compensation model suggests that people whose meaning frameworks have been 
disrupted react by bolstering or reaffirming other meaning frameworks that remain intact. 
Meaning can be constructed as a cognitive process, which provides information about the 
presence of reliable patterns and coherence, thus separated from affect (Heintzelman & 
King, 2014).  
Future Directions 
The primary task is to establish an empirical link between sacredness and 
meaning. People who hold a strong notion of sacredness may attain great coherence of 
meaning, identity and purpose in life. Successful maintenance of sacredness helps an 
individual to cope with pain, failure, and disappointments, while loss of sacredness can 
lead to identity crisis and loss of meaning. The primary hypothesis is that priming 
sacredness increases reported meaning in life (Steger et al., 2006). Sacredness may also 
increase resilience, give meaning to suffering, and help individuals recover from 
disappointment.  
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Investigation of consequences from loss of sacredness can benefit from the fluid 
compensation framework. People who lose sacredness may look into other resources to 
make up for the loss of identity and meaning associated with loss of sacredness. A 
hypothesis states that loss of sacredness leads to a higher need for certainty and 
interpersonal affiliation. People also ground the abstract notion of sacredness in concrete 
matters, such as one’s cultural heritage. Since tradition is often related to one’s identity, a 
hypothesis states that priming sacredness leads to higher levels of traditionalism and 
opposition to transformation. 
There can be other needs that function in fluid compensation in addition to the 
proposed self-esteem, feelings of certainty, interpersonal affiliation, and symbolic 
immortality. For instance, one would tend to hedonic needs, need for wealth or power, or 
a need for autonomy. However, some of these needs may not sufficiently supply 
meaning, if what they emphasize is on instrumental or extrinsic purposes.  It also has to 
be noted that, the sources of meaning may not be necessarily sacred in nature or linked to 
sacredness. Sacredness can be viewed as limiting state of meaning, the meaning at its 
infinity. The basic human needs in certain circumstances may be intermediate goods – 
ranked higher than instrumental ones but not as high as sacred ones. Future research can 
investigate the conditions under which these basic needs are sacred.  
Another implication of the meaning component is that we can identify and 
analyze potentially more sacred objects. Some objects are naturally more sacred because 
they are likely a good source of meaning. Righetti (2013) examines the sacredness of 
books based on this characterization. Experiment with sacredness can construct scenarios 
that take advantage of a concrete sacred matter, such as land, to manipulate various 
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conditions with sacredness. For instance, a sacred loss condition can be constructed in 
terms of a family land being sold to a mining company.   
Sacredness as Experience of Awe 
Awe and religion and spirituality often work together. Awe lies in the root of 
religious experiences (James, 1902), and individuals primed with awe report higher levels 
of spirituality (Saroglou, Buxant, & Tilquin, 2008). Religion facilitates the making of 
awe-inducing artifacts, such as costly and imposing religious monumental architecture 
(Joye & Verpooten, 2013). However, awe is distinct from religion. If religion offers some 
sort of meaning system, awe appeals directly to individual experience. 
There is a long tradition in constructing sacredness with respect to awe. 
Dictionaries in general define sacredness in terms of reverence, which is a feeling of deep 
respect tinged with awe. In one of the most influential accounts of awe, The Idea of the 
Holy, Rudolf Otto (1917) delineates the intense emotional power of the numinous, 
experienced as a mystery (mysterium) that is both terrifying (tremendum) and fascinating 
(fascinans) at the same time. Although titled as the Holy (a more religious term), the 
central topic of Otto’s book is about the numinous, a non-rational, non-sensory 
experience in the presence of God. In a similar rendering, Eliade (1957) coins the terms 
hierophany and kratophany to argue that sacredness is a manifestation of power. Such a 
manifestation can cause an abrupt gap in reality, which results in awe. Philosopher Jean-
Luc Nancy (2013) defines the sacred as “an encounter or a point of intensity via which 
the subject approaches what cannot be grasped in itself, but solely in and as this 
unfinishable approach” (p. 153). In a recent review of sociological works on sacredness, 
Righetti (2014) summarizes sacredness as “an imminent character of social life that is not 
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constrained by the boundaries of religious institutions” (p. 133). This view essentially 
argues that sacredness does not have to be granted solely by religion, and can be derived 
from out of religion, by the fact that sacredness has a unique emotional aspect, that is, the 
feeling of awe and deference.   
Rituals can have the power to generate a strong emotional charge like awe, and 
for this reason, ritual is often a source of sacredness. “Sacred symbols have distinct 
cognitive schema, but their sanctity derives from their emotional meaning. It is the 
emotional significance of the sacred that underlies ‘faith’, and it is ritual participation that 
invests the sacred with emotional meaning” (Alcorta & Sosis, 2005, p. 332). The above 
position implies that sacredness can be no more than a certain kind of emotional attitude. 
This position is analogous to the emotivist account of ethics (e.g., Stevenson, 1937) 
which proposes that moral judgments just state an emotional attitude toward something. 
However, emotivism is only one possible account of sacredness, and much research 
needs to be done in examining how rituals create the relevant emotions that lead to 
sacredness.  
Anthropological work shows a deep link between sacred sites and the perceived 
awe-provoking power of spirits. Across many traditional beliefs, a site is considered as 
sacred when it is inhabited by spirits. Spirits can have an immaterial, hypothetical 
existence, or spirits of ancestors that physically existed in history. The spiritistic 
definition of sacredness was not grouped under the section of religion and spirituality 
mainly because beliefs in spirits are not as institutionalized as are Abrahamic 
monotheistic religions. Admittedly, spirits are not necessarily more awe-inspiring than 
the Christian God. However, spirits invoke sacredness directly through the experience of 
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awe, while people who perceive sacredness in their religion can also derive sacredness 
from non-experiential, interpretative sources such as dogma and liturgy.   
Spirits are often believed to possess certain supernatural power, which can be 
used as a positive resource or avoided by all means. Sometimes the spirits are not feared, 
and there is only a perceived need to respect them. Since awe is defined as a deep respect 
tinged with fear, this section compiles some examples of spirits being respected, though 
not necessarily be held in awe. Sacred places can take different forms, the best known of 
which are sites occupied by chiefs or kings, their ancient palaces, or their places of burial. 
In Madagascar, use of the term sacred sites is connected with vazimba and the ancestors. 
The vazimba are considered earliest inhabitants of the land and they often invoke fear 
because their discontent can cause calamities (Radimilahy, 1994). For Nso people living 
in the Bamenda grass fields of Cameroon, sacred sites are where people make offers to 
please their ancestors in order to obtain blessings from ancestors. These sacred places can 
belong to the entire lineage of a clan (Mumah, 1994). The power of spirits is often a 
source of collective identity for the tribe. Individuals receive power for personal 
protection, and maintain the knowledge of how the whole tribe came to be a people 
(Carmichael, 1994).  
Sacred natural sites also have to do with spirits, and their awe-provoking power. 
Whether they are mountains, trees, or other natural objects, a sacred place is often 
thought to be occupied or constituted by spirits which have certain powers (Byrne, 2010). 
These animist spirits are either “materialized” in some permanent materials such as a 
rock, or “dwelling” in trees, on a hillock, or in a body of water (Thierry, 1993). Many 
sites of unusual configuration, such as distinctive rock outcrops, caves, knolls, whirlpools 
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in a river, and seepage holes, are considered sacred (Theodoratus & LaPena, 1994). The 
numinous character of such sites can possess agency to act upon people and effect 
changes in the real world (Gell, 1998). Such agency often invokes a sense of awe.  
Empirical Implications 
In psychology, awe has recently been constructed as an emotion produced by 
perception of vastness, and a cognitive need for accommodating this experience to 
current mental schemes (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). An interpretative phenomenological 
analysis summarizes ten themes associated with awe: profoundness, connectedness, 
numinous, fear, vastness, existential awareness, openness and acceptance, ineffable 
wonder, presence, and heightened perceptions (Bonner & Friedman, 2011). Vastness is 
particularly studied in relation to awe, perhaps because it is easier to observe and 
operationalize compared to other themes.   
Multiple methods have been applied to experimentally induce awe. One set of 
methods asks participants to recall and write about a relevant awe-inspiring event. 
Another set of methods shows subjects awe-invoking video clips that present vast scenes 
of natural beauty (e.g., BBC’s Planet Earth in Valdesolo & Graham, 2014), seemingly 
realistic but impossible images (Rudd, Vohs, & Aaker, 2012), or the course of childbirth 
(Van Cappellen & Saroglou, 2012). A field approach exposes subjects to real-life 
grandeur such as a full-sized replica of a Tyrannosaurus rex skeleton (Shiota, Keltner, & 
Mossman, 2007), or huge redwood trees. 
Studies corroborate anthropological findings that nature is a reliable source of 
awe even among people living in modern urban settings, and the experience of awe 
promotes a lesser salience of the self (Shiota, Keltner, & Mossman, 2007). Experience of 
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awe can alter subjective time perception by making people focus in the present, develop a 
feeling of having more time at hand, and obtain greater life satisfaction (Rudd, Vohs, & 
Aaker, 2012). Awe also decreases tolerance for uncertainty, which in turn increases the 
tendency to believe in nonhuman agents (Valdesolo & Graham, 2014). 
The link of awe and nature, and the similarity of their effects on well-being is not 
accidental. Sacredness may be the common denominator of both awe and people’s 
appreciation of nature. Literature on nature’s effects on psychological well-being 
coincides with those effects produced by awe. People who are more connected with 
nature and attuned to nature’s beauty report greater subjective well-being (Zhang, 
Howell, & Iyer, 2014), and this correlation is found to be mediated by an elevated 
meaning in life (Howell, Passmore, & Buro, 2013). Exposure to beautiful nature also 
increases prosocial behaviors (Zhang et al., 2014).  
Future Directions 
Psychological research on awe offers multiple options that can reliably prime awe 
experience. With the theoretical connection established between awe and sacredness, 
future investigations into sacredness can benefit from methods that are used to 
manipulate awe. The diverse nature of sacredness poses a challenge to the selection of 
visual materials used for priming. Perhaps the most straightforward and also effective 
way to prime sacredness is to ask participants to recall and write about the matters that 
are sacred to them. Compared to priming materials involving videos and images, 
recalling sacredness is most domain-generic and can exclude many confounds associated 
with visual presentations.  
Awe is essentially an emotion, and emotions are subject to biological constraints. 
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Different people may have different susceptibility to the experience of awe, thus 
sacredness, depending on their biological attributes. Autism is a well known cause of 
emotional disconnection, while on the other end, a schizophrenic can be emotionally 
fanatic. “Patients with schizophrenia seek meaning in the bizarre phenomena of their 
psychoses” (Burns, 2004, p. 840). Their paranoid delusions make schizophrenics more 
apt to see signs and (mis)attribute meanings to them. People with schizophrenia may find 
the world teemed with sacred quality, while an autistic person can even struggle with 
merely comprehending the idea of sacredness. The foregoing supports an emotivist 
conception of sacredness. Appraisal theory (cf. Scherer, Shorr, & Johnstone, 2001) helps 
account for why this might be: We only have emotions about events that are relevant with 
respect to our motives. However, some emotions seem hard to connect with sacredness 
because of instrumental or selfish motives that are largely responsible for their arising.  
Central to the awe component on sacredness is the manifestation, often abrupt, of 
divinity or power. With such manifestation, individuals experience awe and sacredness is 
presented to them. This passive reception of sacredness contrasts with Pargament’s 
sanctification perspective of sacredness, by which people actively search for sacredness. 
Receiving or searching can both be legitimate ways for people to experience sacredness. 
Future research can make further distinction of the two components of sacredness, and 
explore which gives a better account of sacredness or has a stronger impact on behavior. 
Literature shows that priming awe increases intolerance of ambiguity and thereby 
agency detection (Valdesolo & Graham, 2014). It is worth investigating whether priming 
sacredness leads to intolerance of uncertainty, perception of lower mastery and higher 
need for control (Buhr & Dugas, 2006). This hypothesis ties to the relationship of 
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sacredness with religion in terms of agency detection, and to the relationship of 
sacredness with construction of meaning in life. Suggesting that perception of sacredness 
may lead to meaning, agency detection, and/or cognitive states connected with 
uncertainty is not to reduce sacredness into these psychological mechanisms. Obviously 
sacredness has origins that are not in these mechanisms and combination of these 
mechanisms does not fully explain what is sacred.  
Sacredness as Protection against the Profane 
The power of sacredness cannot be fully manifested without the antithetical 
position played by the profane. Durkheim (1912) characterizes the sacred and the profane 
as “two categories of things so profoundly differentiated or so radically opposed to one 
another” (p. 38). The fundamental dichotomy between the sacred and profane perpetuates 
the “ultimate tension”, which “gives rise to images of a great encounter between cosmic 
forces - order versus chaos, good versus evil, truth versus falsehood - which worldly 
struggles mimic” (Juergensmeyer, 2003, p. 172). Yet Durkheim goes on to point out that 
these two categories are not isolated from each other, and under certain conditions what 
is sacred can become profane and vice versa. “While morally and hierarchically set apart, 
the sacred and the abject are in fact close relations. Associated with notions of contagion, 
inspiring fear and awe, the sacred and the abject are productively bound” (Gibson, 2010, 
p. 56). Therefore, separation of the sacred from the profane must preserve the “original 
ambiguity” (Young, 1991, p. 310), otherwise both terms lose their potency. It has to be 
noted that the term “profane” is used to denote both instrumental/extrinsic and abject and 
contaminating. Many research summarized in this section focuses on the conflict between 
an instrumental purpose and a sacred, moral imperative. The instrumental position is not 
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necessarily bad or immoral, but may lie at a different level from the level of sacredness, 
and the in some circumstances levels need to be held in a strict ordering. The term 
profane is nevertheless kept because of its encompassing nature and its long tradition in 
the sociological literature as used in opposition to the sacred.  
One research agenda capitalizes on the dichotomy, tension, and binding between 
the sacred and the profane, to construct sacredness as protection against profaning. Baron 
and Spranca (1997) blaze this trail with their ingenious study of “protected values”, 
which are values “protected against being traded off for other values” (p. 1). Sacred 
values are trade-off resistant, and such resistance blocks any attempt to reason in rational 
terms of cost-benefits. Later, Tetlock et al. (2000) define a sacred value as “any value that 
a moral community implicitly or explicitly treats as possessing infinite or transcendental 
significance that precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with 
bounded or secular values” (p. 853).  
Sacredness is non-utilitarian. Economic decision theory essentially argues that 
instrumentalism or utilitarianism enables all values to be exchangeable under a rational 
calculus of cost and effect (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). However, this rational decision 
theory is not fully suitable to describe situations involving sacred matters. People do not 
trade sacredness for money because monetary gains are considered a serious form of 
profaning. The deep-rooted incompatibility between the sacred and what is instrumental 
as well as what is downright profane anticipates such tradeoff resistance. To better 
capture the unique reasoning process in tradeoff associated with sacredness, an 
alternative rationality is proposed that takes religious experience and emotion into 
account (Jerolmack & Porpora, 2004). Consistent with this new rationality, Tetlock 
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(2003) later found that although trading sacredness for monetary values is prohibited (i.e., 
taboo tradeoff), people do trade their sacred values with other sacred values (i.e., tragic 
tradeoff).  
Not only is sacredness non-utilitarian, but it has moral connotations. Tetlock 
develops the Sacred Value Protection Model (SVPM, Tetlock et al., 2000; Tetlock, 
2003), entailing that “when sacred values come under secular assault, people struggle to 
protect their private selves and public identities from moral contamination by the impure 
thoughts and deeds implied in the taboo proposals” (Tetlock, 2003, p. 320). This model 
describes individuals’ responses when perceiving violation of sacred values, but leaves 
sacred values unspecified. A key response to violation of sacred values is moral outrage. 
Such tradeoffs trigger a “constitutive form of incommensurability”, and are “morally 
corrosive” (Tetlock, 2003, p. 321). Atran and Axelrod (2008) reemphasize this point by 
stating, “Sacred values differ from material or instrumental values in that they 
incorporate moral beliefs that drive action in ways that seem dissociated from prospects 
for success” (p. 222). This is probably because prospects for success are connected with 
an instrumental realm that is fundamentally different, held characteristically in a different 
compartment, from a moral realm.  
The non-utilitarian nature of sacredness makes it a viable candidate to specify 
fundamental principles, in addition to normative rules, to which social order is anchored 
(Durkheim, 1912). Sacredness is crucial for understanding morality since it constitutes 
and characterizes the foundations of morality (Graham & Haidt, 2011). However, not all 
moral things are naturally sacred (Ginges & Atran, 2014). For instance, it is often 
considered immoral to trade human organs, but a kidney is hardly sacred. Functional 
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magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies nevertheless give potentially relevant 
evidence by showing that sacred values are processed in the same circuits used by the 
retrieval and processing of deontological rules (Berns et al., 2012). 
What makes sacredness a deontological morality may lie in the observation that 
sacredness serves no instrumental purpose, but is an end in itself. Sacredness is 
constitutive rather than instrumental (Fowers, 2010). “Activities are called constitutive 
because they help to constitute a certain pattern of living or characterize one as a 
particular kind of person” (p. 116). Consistent with the moral propositions in SVPM, 
constitutive ends justify deontological moral decisions.  An individual motivated by 
constitutive ends would refrain from gaining profits through cheating because honesty 
characterizes him or her as a person, and cheating is not part of a certain desired pattern 
of living. 
Sacredness has clear moral connotations but may not necessarily prescribe 
specific rules. Roy Rappaport (1993) puts sacredness at the top rung of the moral ladder 
in his concept of Ultimate Sacred Postulates (USPs). USPs provide ultimate criteria for 
assessing principles. They are “absolutely authoritative” and are the least variant parts of 
ritual, and this “invariance is associated with sanctity” (p. 275). “Sanctity, once emerged, 
provided a principle upon which the great variety of novel human social organizations 
could rest; it provided the ground from which the innumerable diverse human adaptations 
could subsequently radiate” (p. 429). USPs function to sanctify or certify the whole 
system of understandings. But the fundamental elements are separated from the specific 
or instrumental ones. USPs are often “taken to set the ultimate goals which 
instrumentality serves, but to be themselves devoid of instrumentality or purposefulness” 
19 
(p. 274). 
Empirical Implications 
Research along the line of protected values attempts to identify key features that 
prevent a sacred value to be traded with a secular value, and consequences that follow 
when such violation occurs. A measure is published in German (Geschützte Werte Skala, 
[GWS]; Tanner, Ryf, & Hanselmann, 2009) asking for opinions about morally sensitive 
issues (e.g., organ trade) and whether monetary compensation can be considered in 
solving this issue. A translation of this scale is in Appendix II. Experimental design might 
employ hypothesized scenarios, which often involve a certain degree of moral dilemma, 
to assess participants’ willingness to make a trade-off. A sample scenario is included in 
Appendix III. One problem of these scenarios is that they assess an entity invoked with 
respect to a morally ambiguous issue, while the entity itself may not be necessarily 
deemed as sacred.  
Baron and Spranca (1997) first lay out five key characteristics of protected values: 
quantity insensitivity, agent relativity, moral obligation, anger, and denial of the need for 
tradeoffs. Protected values are amenable to challenge when the tradeoff is also a 
protected value, that is, there is no profaning to protect against. Thinking of 
counterexamples and conflicts between two protected values, some calculus in cost-
effectiveness analysis is used to solve the conflicts involved with protected values (Baron 
& Leshner, 2000).  
Investigating people’s moral judgment in “act versus omission” scenarios helps to 
establish the link between sacredness and a deontological focus. When a decision is 
involved with a possible taboo tradeoff, people tend to judge the right or wrong of the 
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decision by whether an actor acts out of intention, instead of by what follows the actions 
(Tanner, Medin, & Iliev, 2008). The primary rule is that one should not take an action 
against the sacred. When a choice must be made between a harmful act (e.g., kill a 
person) and an otherwise equivalent harmful omission (e.g., let a person die), the decision 
making a harmful act is judged to be more wrong (Ritov & Baron, 1999). The second rule 
demands that there are certain things, which essentially protect and enhance the sacred, 
for which one has moral obligations. One has to act (Tanner & Medin, 2004). Neuro-
functional research also supports the association of sacred values with a deontological 
focus of morality (Duc et al., 2013). 
Built upon Baron’s work, Tetlock (2013) specifies three propositions that come 
with SVPM. First, actions or thought experiments that violate sacredness can invoke 
moral outrage. Second, people engage in symbolic acts of moral cleansing when they 
breach the wall between the sacred and the profane. Third, people transform prohibited 
taboo tradeoffs (secular against sacred) to acceptable routine tradeoffs (secular against 
secular) or tragic tradeoffs (sacred against sacred), when reality constraints demand that a 
tradeoff be made. Among the three propositions, moral outrage is the crux to understand 
non-rational decisions that defy negotiations or tradeoffs. Perception of taboo tradeoffs 
violates one’s sacred values, which triggers a protective, emotional response of moral 
outrage. This emotional response prompts one to make decisions to reject the taboo 
tradeoff in order to protect the sacred. A path analysis supports the above view with 
moral outrage mediating the association between keeping sacredness and a refusal of 
money offerings in trade for the sacred (Chen, 2014).  
The most prominent outcome from SVPM is application of the model to account 
21 
for and provide solutions to extreme versions of conflicts such as suicidal terrorism 
(Atran, 2003) and regional feuds (Atran, Axelrod, & Davis, 2007; Atran & Ginges, 
2012). The moral mandate hypothesis predicts that strong moral convictions lead one to 
treat attitudinally dissimilar others with greater social and physical distance, less 
tolerance, lower levels of good will and cooperativeness, and a greater inability to resolve 
disagreement (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). The association of sacred values with 
moral convictions can spawn intergroup conflict among groups that share different or 
antithetical values. 
Experiments and surveys in Nigeria and the Middle East demonstrate that 
judgments about the use of war to defend sacred values are driven by deontological 
reasoning, instead of utilitarian calculus. The protectors of sacredness are callous to 
quantitative indicators of success, or fail to evaluate their efficacy (Ginges & Atran, 
2011). Religious dogmas are especially deontological in nature; when applied improperly 
they can exacerbate sacredness-driven violence. Studies with Palestinians show that 
attendance at religious services increase support for suicide attacks, but spiritual practices 
such as prayer to God does not (Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009). This suggests a 
social or group-focused, more than a reflective/personal approach to religion, is what 
correlates with support for suicide attacks. 
While taboo tradeoffs are often rejected, symbolic tragic tradeoffs can be useful to 
bypass irrational reactions against profaning and to resolve conflicts. A series of 
experiments carried out with Palestinian and Israeli participants reveals a “backfire 
effect” in that offering material concessions to compromise a sacred value can be 
interpreted as an insult and thus lead to greater opposition to compromise (Ginges et al., 
22 
2007). However, symbolic compromises made by adversaries over their own sacred 
values (i.e., tragic tradeoff) increases chances to negotiate. The same model has also been 
applied to study the sacred values formed around Iran’s nuclear program, which is a more 
temporary issue in contrast to the long-standing nature of the Palestine-Israel conflict 
(Dehghani et al., 2009). Surveys show that a small but non-negligible portion of the 
Iranian population believes that acquiring nuclear energy is sacred such that proposed 
economic incentives and disincentives (more grave sanction) to quit the nuclear program 
result in a backfire effect (Dehghani et al., 2010). Study of Indonesian Madrassah 
students replicates this backfire effect (Ginges & Atran, 2009).  
Note that individual differences in how people identify with the sacred plays a 
role in the effectiveness of tradeoffs. Tragic tradeoffs are more acceptable than taboo 
tradeoffs only when the target issue is considered sacred and identified with by the 
decision makers (Sachdeva & Medin, 2009). Hindu and Muslim populations in North 
India have long fought over various sacred sites including Babri Mosque and Kashmir. 
While both sites are considered sacred to both religious groups, Babri Mosque is more 
salient to Hindu identity and Kashmir is more salient to Muslim identity. Sachdeva and 
Medin (2009) find that the tragic tradeoff scenario, e.g., “In return, Vishra Hindu 
Parishad will recognize the historic and legitimate right of the Muslims/Hindus to the 
Babri Masjid”, wins more approval than does a taboo tradeoff only among Muslims. 
Muslim identity with the site combined with the sacredness of the site makes a taboo 
tradeoff even harder to work. However, since Hindus are not identified with the site, they 
could more easily engage in utilitarian calculus, and more Hindus accept taboo tradeoffs 
over the Babri Masjid issue. In general, use of symbolic tragic tradeoffs may circumvent 
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moral outrage triggered by profaning the sacred, and open doors to understand and settle 
conflicts over sacredness (Atran & Axelrod, 2008). 
Future Directions 
Most people have sacred values, but those values are often implicit until they are 
infringed upon. We can make the sacred aspect of matters explicit by hypothetically 
profaning it. The prediction is that people will be more apt to recognize sacredness and 
therefore invest in efforts to protect it, when facing profaning threats to the sacredness. A 
hundred-year-old grove may not get on an environmentalist’s radar until some lumber 
company decides to fell it. Israel’s hostility toward Palestine can lay dormant for long 
periods of time before it breaks into war when a taboo tradeoff is offered that 
contaminates the sacred.  
Manipulation of sacredness using the taboo and tragic trade-off typology can have 
implications in everyday decisions, such as changing consumer’s behaviors (McGraw & 
Tetlock, 2005). If everyday decisions can indeed be directly influenced by the 
sacredness-driven reasoning, then it may suggest something general about human nature. 
Humans may characteristically have an ordered compartmentalization of instrumental 
values from moral or sacred values, which may be related to the characteristic separation 
of intrinsic from extrinsic goods. 
Tetlock introduces moral outrage as a key consequence when sacredness is 
violated. Is moral outrage an emotion that reliably indicates sacredness? In other words, 
when people are invoked with moral outrage about an object being violated, will they 
then perceive the object as sacred? It also remains an open question whether other 
emotions could also be involved, such as moral disgust and contempt. However, 
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contempt could arise when someone violates an instrumental code, e.g., one does 
something that is stupid (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999).  
Studies should investigate naturally sacred objects, in addition to hypothetical 
scenarios with moral ambiguities. For instance, people demonstrate a naturally high level 
of attachment to land, especially when the land is or when they believe it has been 
inhabited for long periods of time by ancestors of the group to which one belongs. This 
makes protection of native land a naturally sacred idea (Rozin & Wolf, 2008). Field 
studies open new possibilities for psychology to investigate conflicts associated with 
sacredness in real life (Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, & Medin, 2011). Indeed, conflicts over 
sacredness take place across many places and times. As an everyday example to 
American citizens, Republican and Democratic parties constantly fight on sacred grounds 
such as right of fetuses versus right of choice, and limiting the size of government versus 
government taking care of the people.  
People may make huge sacrifices to protect what they deem sacred from being 
profaned, probably because sacredness fulfills fundamental human needs for meaning 
and identity. Sacredness is an end in itself, and a person derives meaning and becomes 
one with the sacred as he sustains and protects the sacred. Consistent with the constitutive 
goals framework, integrity in goal pursuits is associated with greater meaning. 
Constitutive activities such as protecting the sacred from profaning partly constitute one’s 
identity and one’s life. A hypothesis states that people are motivated to protect their 
sacred values experience greater meaning and purpose in life.  
Thinking in terms of sacredness has cognitive benefits. By evaluating a situation 
in terms of its emotional involvedness and decision difficulty, sacredness thinking 
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establishes a system of priorities, and thus enables tough decisions to be made more 
rapidly (Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008). When the decision situation involves only one 
sacred value (e.g., taboo trade-off), people perceive the task as negatively emotion-laden, 
but easy to solve, since they could just make a decision that benefits the sacred value. The 
solution is even easier than routine tradeoffs where extensive calculus of cost and 
benefits are involved. Decisions following moral rules associated with sacredness can 
lead to superior consequences relative to those produced by cost-benefit-maximizing 
calculations, in high-impact low-probability events and when anticipated utility is not 
obvious (Bennis, Medin, & Bartels, 2010). A hypothesis states that priming sacredness 
leads to lower levels of analytic thinking and cost-benefit calculations. Perhaps because 
these kinds of calculations are unnecessary when a clear system of priorities is in place 
and is determinative. A related hypothesis states that people primed with sacredness tend 
to employ less utilitarianism in morally ambiguous situations. Also hypothesized here is 
that sacredness is not in utilitarianism.  
Although what is instrumental/utilitarianism is discussed in opposition to 
sacredness, the profane can be more broadly about impurity, uncleanness, or abjectness, 
such that it can be attached to classes or castes of people, as in India with the more pure 
or sacred Brahmins contrasting with the lowly untouchables, or other forms of sacrilege 
that contaminate the sacred matter. For example, one can profane by making sex-related 
or sarcastic jokes about something. Many of these involve imputing basic instrumental 
motives or characters to personages or things regarded as sacred. In short, there can be 
many ways of profaning that can be used to invoke notion of sacredness.  
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Sacredness as Related to Religion and Spirituality 
Although the experience of sacredness predates religion and spirituality (Eliade, 
1957), religion and spirituality gives rise to many ideas of sacredness (Pargament, 1999). 
The religious and spiritual aspect of sacredness is argued to be irreducible to any other 
more basic psychological processes (Pargament, 2013). Empirical studies also find that 
the more people participate in or think of religious practices, the more likely they are to 
report having sacred values (Sheikh et al., 2012). Religion and spirituality are 
conventionally defined in terms of worshipping God and institutional form, thus 
excluding borderline phenomena such as mystical experience, belief in or communication 
with spirits or ancestors, or big-dream visions. Some of these extraordinary experiences 
and forms of spiritism are categorized under and will be discussed in the section of awe. 
Most of the psychological literature that connects religion and sacredness investigate the 
highly institutionalized Abrahamic religious traditions. It is also clear that not everything 
in religion is sacred on an equal footing. The breaking of bread in a communion is 
deemed more sacred than a fellowship potluck on a Wednesday night. The most sacred 
elements are those related to the worship of God, as often emphasized in a dictionary 
definition of sacredness. 
Can we then sanctify something non-sacred by adding God to it? Working within 
a religious paradigm, Pargament and Mahoney (2005) define sacredness with respect to 
concepts of God, and an object can take on spiritual character and meaning by associating 
with the divine. Sanctification is to “make sacred”, that is, how people “come to sanctify 
objects or perceive aspects of their lives as having divine character and significance” (p. 
180). Sanctification occurs when an individual either perceives an object as a 
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manifestation of the divine or attributes divine (implying God) qualities to an object.  
Of great interest to psychology are benefits of sanctification to one’s character 
and well-being. Major tenets in Christian theology have delineated some effects of 
sanctification. Sanctification generates love, renews the believer, and enables the 
renewed person to choose the right from the wrong (Dieter et al., 1987). Translating and 
expanding these theological terminologies into psychological terms, one finds that 
commitment to sacredness can have observable consequences. Sacred aspects of life elicit 
uplifting emotions such as love and gratitude and trepidations like awe and humility. 
Sacredness can be a valuable personal and social resource, and the loss of sacredness can 
have devastating effects (Pargament & Mahoney, 2005). As will be obvious in later 
sections, these implications are not unique to the religious perspective alone; other 
perspectives on the sacred selectively capitalize on one or more of these implications as 
well.  
Empirical Implications 
The primary empirical implication of the religious and spiritual component is that 
one can manipulate sacredness by sanctifying secular matters, at least among Christian 
believers. A reliable sanctification protocol is to imbue the target of sanctification with 
divine quality. For instance, one can measure the perceived sanctity in marriage using 
scale items written rather specific to followers of Abrahamic religions as, “My marriage 
is a reflection of God’s will”. In the same vein, common family themes such as parenting 
and sexuality are thought to be sanctified by invoking God in the process. Sanctification 
of these processes is associated with report of greater marital satisfaction, less verbal 
aggressions during parenting, and greater pleasure gained in sexual intercourse 
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(Mahoney, Pargament, Murray-Swank, & Murray-Swank, 2003).  
Bad things can also be sanctified, and the results are positive. Davis et al. (2010) 
investigate the effect of seeing divine quality in a transgressor in their Relational 
Engagement of the Sacred for a Transgression Scale (e.g., “I tried to view him/her as a 
child of God”). Praying for the aggressor promotes forgiveness of the aggressor, and such 
an effect remains robust after controlling for religiosity (Davis et al., 2009).  
Nature can be sanctified in statements like, “Nature is sacred because it is created 
by God”. Using samples from members of Presbyterian Church of USA, Tarakeshwar et 
al. (2001) show that belief in sacred nature is associated with stronger pro-environmental 
attitudes and willingness to invest in efforts to protect the environment, and this effect is 
greater among clergy than ordinary members of the church. Clergy may have internalized 
religious beliefs deeper than ordinary members, thus sanctification by God has a greater 
effect on clergy. Clergy are analogous to the ideologically committed voters identified by 
Converse (1964). They are the ones who have the most coherent ideology as opposed to a 
loose amalgamation of beliefs, so their beliefs are more likely to be tightly linked to their 
actions.  
Nontheistic sanctifications (e.g., having transcendent qualities) have similar 
psychological effects as do theistic sanctifications (e.g., connected to God). People invest 
more time and energy in their highly sanctified goals. Greater sanctification of strivings is 
related to a greater sense of life purpose and meaning and joy yielded by strivings 
(Mahoney et al., 2005).  
Some people have a greater aptness to perceive sacredness. The Sacredness in 
Life Scale measures such an aptness (Doehring et al., 2009). Higher scores on this scale 
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are associated with higher intrinsic religiosity, higher mysticism, and more positive 
community service attitudes. Interpretation of this result points towards a distinction and 
synergy between vertical and horizontal transcendence. While vertical transcendence 
goes beyond the limits of subjectivity to some higher forms of being, horizontal 
transcendence focuses on apprehension of the immediate and sense of belonging and 
relatedness (Goodenough, 2001). As suggested by these authors, “Whereas with intrinsic 
religiosity and mysticism one reaches toward the transcendent beyond, a positive 
community service attitude relates to recognizing the penetration of the transcendent into 
the known world” (p. 69). Since the sacredness marks the boundaries of the known and 
the unknown (cf. in many indigenous cultures sacredness is the gate to the spiritual 
world), a person with a high propensity to perceive sacredness is more apt to extend his 
framework to incorporate the unknown.  
A central assumption to Pargament’s thesis is that the boundary is dynamic 
between the secular and sacred (Demerath, 2001), and the secular can be transformed into 
the sacred. Ethnographical studies document useful examples in which a previously 
secular or even profane activity is sanctified and becomes part of the sacred. Pop music 
targeting young people can be used for missionary work and become indispensible for 
spreading the gospel (Chang, 2009). Gift-giving during Christmas is symbolized as 
spreading blessings despite the ‘sin’ of capitalism (Bartunek, 2011). Last but definitely 
not least, churches have long sanctified money. Heuristics such as tithing transform the 
impurity of Mammon into a holy cause that supports Christian stewardship (Mundey, 
Davidson, & Herzog, 2011). 
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Future Directions 
In defining sanctification, Pargament focuses on individuals’ attribution of divine 
quality which downplays the role of social context in the process of consecration. It is 
common that a religious or spiritual authority confers sacredness via ritual action, for 
example by blessing. A priest consecrates the communion wafer, and the worshippers 
observe this ritual and accept that the wafer has now become sacred. The sacred quality 
arises through this social process. Future investigations of the sanctifying process can 
benefit from distinguishing and integrating individual and social sanctification.  
It may be instructive to note that “related to politics or economics” is not a 
reasonable component on sacredness. Religion specializes in certain things that are of 
infinite value, which is pertinent to sacredness, whereas politics and economics specialize 
in things that can be of great importance but whose value is finite. The difference 
between infinite value and great value is that the former carries moral weight and is 
deontological, while the latter is to balance costs and benefits from a utilitarian 
perspective. Political leaders can sanctify their agenda by engaging in sacredness 
heuristics. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), for instance, can hardly attract any 
support outside a certain group of Sunni extremist population when being understood as 
the self-designated caliphate that claims authority over all other Muslim countries. 
However, one would be able to understand and even show some respect to the holy cause 
ISIS invokes for the sake of Islamic religious purity and piety. 
It is evident that religion, or more accurately the idea of God, promotes 
sacredness, but why? What in religion makes people experience sacredness? If religion is 
sacred, then do non-religious people experience sacredness through religion as much as 
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do religious people? A hypothesis states that theistic sanctifying (e.g., holy, heavenly, 
blessed) generates more sacredness among people of higher religiosity than among those 
of lower religiosity, while non-theistic sanctifying (e.g., everlasting, miraculous, 
inspiring) generates more sacredness among people of lower religiosity than among those 
of higher religiosity. 
Does sacredness promote religiosity? If the answer is yes, then what in sacredness 
makes people religious? Pargament (1999) essentially defines spirituality as a search for 
the sacred, and religion can be a viable channel to fulfill this “ultimate concern” 
(Emmons, 1999). One explanation for the association of religion and sacredness is that 
sacredness confers meaning, and religion is a good source of meaning. A hypothesis says 
that priming sacredness could increase levels of religiosity, and such effect is stronger 
among people who find religion meaningful. On the other hand, priming meaning may 
increase perception of sacredness or religiousness. 
A promising area will be to investigate the unique cognitive style associated with 
an aptness to perceive sacredness. Such an aptness often enables a person to transcend 
self-centeredness. A hypothesis states that priming sacredness would increase 
individuals’ preference for long-term to short-term goals, promote altruistic behaviors, 
and enhance sustainable attitudes, such as protecting environment (so that future 
generations can still benefit from it). Given the transcending effect of perceiving 
sacredness, priming sacredness can lead to humility and lower levels of materialism.  
General Limitations and Directions 
The current review summarizes extant research on sacredness under four 
theoretical components: source of meaning, experience of awe, protection from the 
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profane, and relationship to religion. Two routes are clearly worth exploring in the future. 
The first is to discover more specific components of sacredness. The second is to study 
perception of sacredness as a domain general cognitive and psychological process. 
Related to the first direction, there can be many components of sacredness not 
fully captured by the fourfold taxonomy. Sacred values are unchallengeable, but are all 
unchallengeable values sacred? Ideas considered unquestionable, like what is in Nicene 
or Apostles’ Creed in Christianity, can be sacred only to a subgroup of population that 
adheres to Christianity. It is also worth exploring the relationship of sacredness and value 
hierarchy. People have their own tendency to assign relative priority to values; however, 
the value ordering often shows high consistency across cultures. What is high on the 
value hierarchy could assume natural sacredness to people across cultural settings.  
Another component not fully covered is the power of spirits, and by extension 
connection with the dead. In this review, spirits and gods (as in institutionalized 
religions) are intentionally separated in considering their contributions to sacredness. 
Such a separation assumes that Gods in religion refer to an interpretative system, while 
spirits are more aligned with experience and emotion. While it aids in the categorization 
of literature, this way of stating it may apply more to axial-age than to Paleolithic style 
religion/spirituality, assuming gods to be central to religion. In reality, there is no clear 
boundary between spirits and gods. An icon in an orthodox church could act like some 
powerful spirit to be judged sacred. And spirits can assume God-like status in a religion 
with a whole system of theology built around it, consider Holy Ghost.  
Spirits are often sacred because they presumably have power, but the concept of 
power is not easy to convey in empirical terms. “Power is a spiritual energy or life force 
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that enables an individual to interact with the forces of the natural and supernatural 
worlds” (Carmichael, 1994, p. 91). For Mescalero Apache inhabiting in the southwestern 
US, the most sacred and at the same time most powerful sites are where journeys to the 
spirit world are enabled (Carmichael, 1994). These include burial sites and sweat lodges. 
Human burials are thought to present a great potential for visitors to travel to the spiritual 
dimension assisted by the power of deceased. The unique power of burial sites suggests 
some connection of sacredness to altered states of consciousness. Because the power of 
the sacred sites, Native Americans would only visit their sacred sites at times of great 
tribal need, otherwise they respectfully stay away (Price, 1994).  
The power related to sacred sites hinges upon a unique understanding of mythic 
time (Eliade, 1954) – a period of ahistorical time during which the cosmological events 
of religious or spiritual beliefs happened – and accordingly beliefs in the existence of the 
spiritual world parallel to the physical world. This rather ontological stance goes beyond 
the scope of psychological investigations. One can nonetheless measure belief in 
existence of a parallel spiritual world, and using this measure to predict perception of 
sacredness.  
Admittedly, what can be held as sacred has a lot to do with cultural and social 
conditions. What is sacred to a Siberian Shaman can be drastically different from the 
sacredness of an American college student. It would be fruitful to investigate the full 
spectrum of sacredness, by expanding investigations to samples representing a wide 
range of cultures.  
Other components of sacredness not covered by the fourfold taxonomy include 
“connection to striking, dramatic historical events” and “stoppage/transcendence of time” 
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(including the subjective experience thereof). The former, such as a civil war 
battleground and the first plane model Wright Brothers created, can be sacred because of 
its significance in Human civilization that invokes veneration. The latter is a well-defined 
aspect in mysticism and altered state of consciousness which is worth further 
investigation (James, 1902).  
Related to the second direction, the proposed typology contributes to our 
understanding of sacredness in two ways. First, it brings the abstract concept of 
sacredness to life, transforming it into more testable, and psychologically better defined 
dimensions (i.e., religion, awe, meaning, protection against the profane). The effects of 
sacredness on dependent variables may be mediated by one or more of the four 
mechanisms. Second, we have a handy tool to answer natural questions like “what makes 
something sacred” and “how to determine if one thing is more sacred than the other”. We 
can empirically test if an object of sacredness is more sacred with more than one of these 
sacred components present. If an additive effect is supported, experiments can combine 
more than one component of sacredness to produce a stronger effect.  
Manipulation of sacredness can use priming questions as general as “Think about 
something that is sacred to you, and write down why it is sacred to you.” A secondary 
level of manipulation can ask subjects to imagine scenarios where the sacred matter is 
violated or preserved. Similar questions along the line of maintenance versus loss of 
sacredness include whether events in the real life protects the sacredness or infringes 
upon it (e.g., demolition of historical buildings to make room for residence housing), and 
whether one is maintaining a connection, physical or spiritual, with the sacred, or is cut 
off from the sacred (e.g., forced to be away from homeland and family). 
35 
The four components of sacredness summarized in this paper only describe the 
kind of questions into which current literature on sacredness tap. They are not the most 
suitable labels for sacredness itself. The next step would relabel and frame components of 
sacredness in a more characteristic than descriptive way. Some concepts arise in a cross-
cutting way, like what needs to be respected, the distinction between intrinsic and 
instrumental values, an ordered compartmentalization of values that constitutes a priority 
system, with the sacred being related to whatever crowns that system. These concepts are 
more fundamental psychological processes, and could be more easily to operationalize in 
empirical studies.  
In conclusion, the current paper proposes an empirical model that understands 
sacredness from four components: source of meaning, experience of awe, protection from 
the profane, and relationship to religion. This model can be useful in advising 
experimental manipulation with respect to these components of sacredness. Literature 
drawn from these four components implies that many psychological consequences are 
associated with maintenance and loss of sacredness. Future research will first establish a 
reliable and valid method manipulating sacredness and then systematically explore these 
psychological consequences. At a social level, understanding sacredness can shed light to 
decision process involved with moralization and aid in conflict resolution. At a personal 
level, knowing what is sacred, and taking advantage of the motivational power of 
sacredness can help people lead a meaningful and purpose-driven life.  
Violation of Sacredness and Violence 
Many human conflicts and atrocities arise from sacred grounds. This dissertation 
examines people’s endorsement of group-based violence under the influences of sacred 
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concerns, cost-benefit calculations, and individual differences.  
Lethal Conflicts on Sacred Grounds 
Among the myriad reasons for human conflicts (see White, 2017), dispute over 
sacred concerns is one that is not to be neglected. We have observed wars fought in the 
name of religion, from the most recent development of ISIL to the ever recurring duel 
between Palestine and Israel (Juergensmeyer, 2003). Not just in wars, but in daily 
violence between groups, religion is a critical factor: Sunni versus Shiite in Yemen, 
Muslim versus Hindu in India, Buddhist versus Muslim in Myanmar, Muslim versus 
Christian in Nigeria (Hall, Schuyler, & Trinh, 2000). These and many other conflicts 
arise, at least in part, from religious demands that human life conform to some particular 
vision of the sacred. In the broadest of terms, for example, Samuel Huntington (1996) 
stated in The Clash of Civilizations, “A new religious approach took shape, aimed no 
longer at adapting to secular values but at recovering a sacred foundation for the 
organization of society — by changing society if necessary” (p. 96). In other words, the 
“sacred” is at the heart of many of these clashes of civilization. 
Not only religion, but control over lands along with their symbolic meanings is 
also a major cause of fault line conflicts. “The territory at stake often is for one or both 
sides a highly charged symbol of their history and identity, sacred land to which they 
have an inviolable right: the West Bank, Kashmir, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Drina Valley, 
Kosovo” (Huntington, 1996, p.252). Lethal conflicts in response to attack on sacred sites 
are not rare in the history. To name a few, the first Jewish Revolt arose in response to the 
Roman governor raiding the temple treasury in Jerusalem. The attack on the Golden 
Temple in India in the 1980s resulted in the assassination of Indira Gandhi, and 
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subsequent ethnic riots killed thousands of Sikh. The failures to reach settlement at 
Temple Mount/Haram el-Sharif in Jerusalem led to the clashes of 2000 (e.g., Hassner, 
2009). Consequences of territory conflicts often extend to subjugation and extirpation of 
those who do not share the same ethnic and cultural heritage, resulting in large number of 
death. Most generally, this type of conflict makes it clear that the sacred is at the heart of 
ethnonationalism and the violence that accompanies it.  
The list of various aspects of sacredness for which people fight goes beyond 
religion and lands – the fight for ideologies such as communism, democracy and the 
Second Amendment, to name a few, has never ceased. Loosely speaking, religion is an 
ideology and the fight for sacred lands (e.g., religious or historical sites) emphasizes their 
symbolic value as much as the territory itself. These conflicts are often understood as 
ideological in nature. Death tolls for ideologically related genocides are extremely high. 
One estimate is 142 million casualties, of which religion contributes 47 million, and wars 
associated with communism contribute 93 million. In addition, ethnic cleansing has 
resulted in 74 million deaths (White, 2012).  
In all of this, it becomes clear that the sacred is tangible in its historical impact, 
but must also be psychological in its origins. How people understand and feel about the 
sacred makes this violence possible. Understanding sacredness and its association with 
conflicts from a psychological perspective is, therefore, indispensable to understanding 
these conflicts, in hopes of an ultimate resolution of at least this form of violence.  
Link between the MAPR Model of Sacredness and Conflicts 
This dissertation takes on the task of examining the conditions and delimitations 
under which violation of sacredness encourages violence. A review of both theoretical 
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and empirical studies on sacredness has led to the proposal of an MAPR model 
highlighting four key components of what makes sacredness: meaning in life, awe, 
protection from violation, and religion. Sacred, as what gives meaning and subsequently 
confers awe, must be protected from violation, and therefore is a focal point of religion. 
This model has subsequently received some empirical support in correlational data 
collected from American university student samples. While there is room left to capture 
the whole domain of sacredness, the MAPR model has empirical implications on study of 
morality and conflicts.  
A closer look at the MAPR model reveals a reasonable underlying mechanism 
upon which sacred values can aggravate tendencies toward conflict. Note that a conflict 
decision is made as a joint effect of predominant factors that presumably must operate as 
well: cost-benefit analysis (c.f. Rational Choice Model, Fearon, 1995; Mason & Fett, 
1996) and moral judgment (c.f. Intractable Conflict Model, Coleman, 2000; Staub, 1989). 
The latter model can be strongly motivated by sacred concerns (Tetlock, 2003), and can 
overshadow the former economist version of rationality.  
On the one hand, sacredness agitates emotion: awe, among many other emotions 
(e.g., shame in reaction to violations of sacredness), offers an uplifting mood, an 
awareness of something bigger than the self, and eventually gives meaning in life. This 
emotion is so powerful that it can create a halo of good feelings of the outcome, and can 
overshadow a rational calculation of the risks involved. George Orwell (1940) in his 
review of Mein Kampf powerfully summarized this effect. “Human beings don’t only 
want comfort, safety, short working-hours, hygiene, birth-control and, in general, 
common sense; they also, at least intermittently, want struggle and self-sacrifice. Fascism 
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and Nazism are psychologically far sounder than any hedonistic conception of life.” This 
sentiment finds strong echoes in many contemporary terrorist mentalities. Among many, 
deep in the soul of ISIS ideology is the epic battle between the good (e.g., their Islamic 
ideal) and an unmitigated evil (e.g., the Western world), which serve as harbingers of the 
apocalypse and eternal salvation. Suffering and heroism are at the same time the price 
and the reward in these battles. They can provide a great amount of meaning to 
individuals who choose to fight.  
On the other hand, sacredness defines moral boundaries for the believer. What is 
sacred is what cannot be violated, and has to be protected regardless of cost. Saucier and 
Akers (2015) in their study of the democidal (i.e., literally “people murder”) mindset 
summarizes, “Violation of their group’s sacred values, values that prescribe certain 
actions under specific circumstances as a matter of duty, nobility, and honor regardless of 
consequences, is what drives individuals to endorse violence; because the violence has 
doubtful moral justification, this is amoralism in the service of sacred values. These 
values become salient when they are challenged” (p. 17). This circumstance reveals a 
point where the moral and the sacred paradoxically become potentially most dissonant 
and compatible at the same time: individuals would be willing to carry out immoral 
violence by one standard against the violators of sacredness, in the name of morality 
based on a certain sacred standard. 
Violation of Sacredness, Moral Judgment and Endorsement of Violent Warfare  
The myriads of wars arising on sacred grounds suggest that violation of 
sacredness can effectively trigger group-based violence driven by moral judgment of the 
enemies. Empirical studies have indeed found that sacredness has strong moral 
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connotations. Tetlock developed the Sacred Value Protection Model (SVPM, Tetlock et 
al., 2000; Tetlock, 2003), entailing that “when sacred values come under secular assault, 
people struggle to protect their private selves and public identities from moral 
contamination by the impure thoughts and deeds implied in the taboo proposals” 
(Tetlock, 2003, p. 320). Atran and Axelrod (2008) reemphasize this point by stating, 
“Sacred values differ from material or instrumental values in that they incorporate moral 
beliefs that drive action in ways that seem dissociated from prospects for success” (p. 
222). The association of sacred values with moral convictions can spawn intergroup 
conflict among groups that share different or antithetical values (Atran, Axelrod, & 
Davis, 2007). SVPM has proven to be useful in explaining and providing solutions to 
extreme versions of conflicts such as suicidal terrorism (Atran, 2003) and regional feuds 
(Atran & Ginges, 2012).  
What makes violation of sacredness a strong predictor of war has deep 
psychological roots. In his Psychology of War, LeShan (2002) argues that a mental 
shifting from conception of sensory reality to "mythic reality" precedes the war. The 
mythic reality features an unequivocal moral judgment against the enemy that is evil and 
justification of the benevolent “us” using all measures to defeat the enemy to regain order 
and glory. Once this shift has been made, the checks and balances of sensory reality are 
discarded, and humans begin to see reality as a clash of good and evil that allows for no 
shadings or subtlety in judgment. Sacredness similarly involves a kind of mythic reality 
(c.f., Eliade, 1957), and suggests something highly idealized – a world of unmitigated 
absolutes. Such thinking is used to justify initiating war and committing atrocities – acts 
that are unthinkable in other circumstances. The “mythic” thinking pattern shuts off 
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considerations of costs and risks that exist in reality.  
In short, violation of sacredness puts an overwhelming emphasis on a morality 
that undermines the cost-benefit-analysis that is often an important factor in decision-
making. Experiments and surveys in Nigeria and the Middle East demonstrate that 
judgments about the use of war to defend sacred values are driven by deontological 
reasoning, instead of utilitarian calculus. The deontological reasoning in decision-making 
may be different from the deontic reasoning involved in sense of duty to a moral norm. 
But they both involve an absolute that disregards consequences. Research shows that 
judgments about the use of deadly intergroup violence are insensitive to quantitative 
indicators of success or to perceptions of their efficacy (Ginges & Atran, 2011).  
Current Studies 
Both historical incidents and empirical and theoretical studies have suggested that 
violation of sacredness and, in particular, attacks on sacred land, can effectively trigger 
moralization and endorsement of violent warfare. The current study utilizes hypothetical 
vignettes in which a sacred site (vs. a non-sacred military stronghold) of the country of 
“Ourlandia” is attacked, and subsequently examines people’s moral judgment of the 
attacker and endorsement of violent warfare as a counterattack. The major hypothesis is 
that people will be more likely to endorse violent warfare for protecting the sacred land. 
This hypothesis gets at the potential to expose the inherent paradox in the amoral 
violence driven by protecting the morality associated with sacredness. 
Given the importance of cost-benefit-analysis in military decisions, we also 
include a manipulation of perceived cost (high casualties vs. low casualties) as an 
additional independent variable. The past literature has shown that violence driven by 
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protecting the sacred is out of a deontological concern rather than utilitarian consideration 
of cost and benefit (Atran & Axelrod, 2008). Also, the Affect Heuristic Model (AHM, 
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000) suggests an inverse relationship between 
perception of risk and benefit. Since an “absolute” value is attached to the sacred, the 
perceived cost of protecting it will be inhibited. The hypothesis is that violent warfare 
driven by protection of the sacred will not be subject to influence of costs.  
Following the AHM and longstanding theory about hot and cold cognition, we 
further include a priming manipulation to put individuals under either a hot feeling 
condition or a cold calculation condition. We examine if people would be more readily 
influenced by the sacred rhetoric when subjected to their emotional state.   The 
hypothesis is that sacred violence will be more likely following the hot cognition prime. 
Apparently, individual differences may also play a significant role in responding 
to sacredness. In particular, whether an individual takes a sacred or a rational perspective 
of her civilization directly influences whether this individual will have a concern for 
sacredness. Similarly, religion and ethnonationalism are strong motivators for 
moralization and have been found to encourage support for military attacks (Ginges, 
Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009). These variables, along with tendencies to make moral 
judgment and to use military thinking patterns, will be included as important moderators 
of the study.  
One has to note a competing theory that peels through origins of religious wars. 
The book, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern 
Conflict (William T. Cavanaugh), shows that religion is not a universal and 
transhistorical phenomenon. Religious-secular and religion-politics distinctions are 
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modern Western inventions. The book shows that what counts as religious or secular in 
any context corresponds to how power is arranged. The myth of religious violence helps 
to construct a religious Other, prone to fanaticism, to contrast with the rational, peace-
making, secular subject. In domestic politics, the myth underwrites the triumph of the 
state over the church in the early modern period and the nation-state’s subsequent 
monopoly on its citizens’ willingness to sacrifice and kill. In foreign policy, the myth of 
religious violence reinforces the superiority of Western social orders to nonsecular—
especially Muslim—social orders. Their violence is seen as fanatical; our violence is seen 
as rational and peace making. In academic, government, and journalistic sources, the 
book shows how the myth of religious violence is used to justify U.S. diplomatic and 
military actions, including the Iraq War. Peace depends on recognition that so-called 
secular ideologies and institutions can be just as prone to absolutism, divisiveness, and 
irrationality.  
Karen Armstrong made a similar argument in her Fields of Blood: Religion and 
the History of Violence. Religious conflicts often involve other, non-religious factors, and 
the violence of many terrorist groups, including Isis may have little to do with Islam. 
There has been a constant battle, waxing and waning, between secularism and the 
religious, producing a violent fundamentalist backlash.  
There aren’t strong empirical evidence showing the religiosity priming leads to 
violence. Recent meta-analysis showed that religious priming has robust effects across a 
variety of outcome measures—prosocial measures included. Religious priming does not, 
however, reliably affect non-religious participants—suggesting that priming depends on 
the cognitive activation of culturally transmitted religious beliefs (Shariff, Willard, 
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Andersen, & Norenzayan, 2016). 
In two surveys of Palestinians and one cognitive priming experiment with Israeli 
settlers, prayer to God, an index of religious devotion, was unrelated to support for 
suicide attacks. Instead, attendance at religious services, thought to enhance coalitional 
commitment, positively predicted support for suicide attacks. (Ginges, Hansen, & 
Norenzayan, 2009).  
Sacredness is a broader context in the sense that it can include non-religious 
beliefs. However, it is at the same time a more restricted concept that not all religious 
beliefs were sacred. Substituting sacredness for religion was a recent attempt made to 
elucidate what lied behind those monstrous atrocities against the modern society. As 
appealing as it could sound, it may not be logically sound or empirically supported. The 
current study tests this idea using a direct method.  
In what follows, Chapter II studies the effect of violating sacredness on moral 
judgment and support for war with an American sample. Chapter III further examines the 
proposed effect with fine-tuned aspects of sacredness: religious sacredness and 
ethnonational sacredness. Chapter IV designs priming experiments to enhance individuals’ 
emotional involvement, which is hypothesized to amplify the proposed effect of sacred 
violence. Chapter V re-examines this effect with an Iranian sample. To address possible 
methodological challenges, we check the manipulation scenarios in Chapter VI, changing 
the non-sacred condition into a manufacture plant (previously a military site). 
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CHAPTER II  
STUDY 1: MORAL JUDGMENT AND SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT WARFARE 
INFLUENCED BY SACREDNESS AND CASUALTY IN THE USA 
Study 1 explores the degree to which concerns with sacredness influence people’s 
moral judgment and support for violent warfare against a terrorist attack. This study 
answers a need to understand motivations that may exist behind many forms of terrorism. 
Much of terrorist violence is brandished with, if not dictated by, a sacred cause. Such 
causes often encourage violence as a means to restore a sacred religious order, or to 
protect the holiness of a land from being contaminated by groups with whom one does 
not share an identity.  
If concerns with sacredness can stir violence, then sacredness being attacked 
should make the violent reaction even stronger. For this reason, we will manipulate 
sacred concerns with scenarios in which a terrorist group has attacked one’s motherland. 
In one scenario, the terrorists attack a sacred site, and in the control scenario, the attack 
site is related to the military. If people are driven by sacred causes to engage in greater 
violence, we should observe a higher level of support for violence when the sacred site is 
attacked than when the military site is attacked. The study also includes a casualty 
variable to demonstrate that violence driven by sacred causes should be insensitive to 
cost-benefits calculations.  
Rationale and Hypothesis 
In the current study, we adopted attacks on a military stronghold as the control 
group because a military site is a legitimate target in warfare. The Geneva Conventions 
(ICRC, 1977) define a legitimate military target as one “which by nature, location, 
purpose, or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or 
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.” Rado (2011) makes an explicit list of legitimate 
military targets that include “armed forces and persons who take part in the fighting; 
positions or installations occupied by armed forces as well as objectives that are directly 
contested in battle; military installations such as barracks, war ministries, munitions or 
fuel dumps, storage yards for vehicles, airfields, rocket launch ramps, and naval bases”. 
For those sensitive to the rationality of military actions in social life, it is both natural and 
consequential to have a military camp attacked.  
Note that we have included two dependent variables – moral judgment and 
support for violent warfare, with our primary interest on the latter variable. In other 
words, moral judgment is a weaker test of our hypothesis. Our expectation is that, if the 
effect holds for the support for violent warfare, it would have held for moral judgment. 
We have also included two sets of scenarios — hypothetical and semi-real, with the 
expectation that the effects may be stronger in the semi-real scenario.  
As will be detailed in the method section, this study also included several relevant 
covariates. Closely related to the dependent variable – support for violence – is a measure 
of military extremist attitudes. Two variables tap into major components of the MAPR 
model – meaning and religiosity. Another two variables represent different types of 
sacredness. Ethnonationalism refers to sacralization of one’s ethnic and cultural identity, 
whereas sacred views of civilization focus on consecrating the nation and society to 
which one belongs.   
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Hypotheses 
Above all, the sacred site should be rated more sacred than the military site, while 
they should not differ in importance. The MAPR model of sacredness furnished 
Hypotheses 1.1 to 1.4 below. Other hypotheses were formulated based on the natural 
association of the covariates with sacredness motivated violence. We labeled hypotheses 
with study numbers to keep track of them across studies. For instance, “H1.2” indicates 
the second hypothesis of Study 1.  
Hypothesis 1.1: (Main Effect) Attacking the sacred site (vs. military stronghold) 
will cause greater moral judgment and support for violent warfare. This hypothesis, 
central to our interest, follows naturally from the “P” component of MAPR — protection 
against violation. People resort to extreme measures in response to violation of the 
sacred.  
Hypothesis 1.2: (Main Effect) High casualty estimate will lead to lower support 
for violent warfare. This hypothesis taps into an important factor in the cost-benefit 
analysis for warfare.  
Hypothesis 1.3: (Interaction) Support for violent warfare will decrease as 
casualties increase when the military stronghold was attacked. However, when the sacred 
site was attacked, support for violence will not be as influenced by casualty concerns. 
This follows from the argument that the obligation of protecting the sacred overwhelms 
cost-benefits calculations. 
Hypothesis 1.4: (Interaction) The effect in Hypothesis 1 will be stronger for those 
who rate the sacred site sacred. This resonates with the “A” component of MAPR — 
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perceiving the sacredness. It is suggested that those who can perceive sacredness would 
be more likely to respond to the violation of sacredness.  
Hypothesis 1.5: (Interaction) The effect should be stronger for those who are high 
in religiosity. Argued as the “R” component of MAPR, religious people should be more 
familiar with the idea of sacredness. Higher awareness of sacredness, as in Hypothesis 2, 
may enhance a response to violation of the sacred. 
Hypothesis 1.6: (Interaction) The effect will be stronger for those who are high in 
meaning search and low in meaning presence. This is the prediction from the “M” 
component of MAPR, which recapitulates the meaning-offering function of sacredness. A 
meaning searcher would protect the sacred more vehemently as they need to gain 
meaning from it.  
Hypothesis 1.7: (Interaction) The effect would be stronger for those who are high 
in ethnonationalism. Ethnonationalism sacralizes one’s ethnic heritage. High scores on 
this variable would accentuate one’s devotion to sacredness. 
Hypothesis 1.8: (Interaction) The effect would be stronger for those who take a 
sacred duty for their civilization. The variable sacred duty assesses how strongly one 
tends to sacralize one’s cultural identity. High score on this variable would accentuate 
one’s devotion to sacredness. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 425 undergraduate students enrolled at a state university in the 
American South participated. The sample was 64% female, and had an average age of 
18.5 years (SD = 1.1). The sample was predominantly identified as Christians (84%), and 
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44% reported their political affiliation with the Republican Party, 23% as Democrats, and 
22% as independent.  
Experimental Manipulation 
A 2 sacredness (sacred site vs. military site) by 2 casualty (large casualty vs. small 
casualty) by 2 scenario (hypothetical vs. semi-real) mixed design was carried out with 
vignettes. All participants responded to two scenarios in a within-subject design — first a 
hypothetical scenario, followed by individual difference variables, and then a semi-real 
scenario. The hypothetical scenario describes a situation where a hypothetical country of 
the research participants called “Ourlandia” is attacked by a hypothetical enemy called 
“Theirlandia,” and a counterattack is in preparation. The semi-real scenario describes a 
situation where the US is attacked by terrorists, and a counterattack is in preparation. A 
between-subject design randomly assigned individuals into one of the four groups 
defined by two independent variables. The sacredness independent variable involved the 
contrast between an attack on a sacred site versus a military site, and the casualty 
independent variable reflected differences in expected casualties associated with the 
counter attack. Participants in each of the four groups received hypothetical and semi-real 
scenarios that were consistent with the manipulation conditions. For instance, participants 
in the sacred, high casualty group first responded to a sacred, high casualty hypothetical 
scenario, and then a sacred, high casualty semi-real scenario.  
Participants were instructed, “Please read the following scenario carefully. Try as 
hard as you can to imagine yourself being the person described in the scenario. Try to 
feel the feelings of this person. Some of the details of the scenario may or may not apply 
to your current life situation. Nevertheless, try to imaginatively BECOME this person; 
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and as best as you can, experience the events and emotions of this person. Again, in your 
imagination BECOME this person.”  
For the sacredness independent variable, the following paragraphs described the 
two hypothetical scenarios with boldface used in the original study: 
Sacred Condition: You are a citizen of Ourlandia, and your nation has been 
attacked by Theirlandia. Theirlandia has demonstrated strong military prowess and has 
attacked and damaged a sacred site of your nation. This site is sacred to the Spirit of 
Ourlandia. It is a place that symbolizes your identity and heritage. It confers meaning and 
brings a sense of awe into your heart. Your country, Ourlandia, is planning to strike back 
in response to the attack on this sacred site.  
Military Condition: You are a citizen of Ourlandia, and your nation has been 
attacked by Theirlandia. Theirlandia has demonstrated strong military prowess and has 
attacked and damaged a military base of your nation. This site is an important military 
stronghold. It is located in one of the key population areas and is of strategic significance 
for national defense. Your country, Ourlandia, is planning to strike back in response to 
the attack on the military stronghold. 
The following are semi-real scenarios used in the two sacredness conditions.  
Sacred Condition: A group of terrorists carried out an attack on the Washington 
Monument in Washington, D.C. These terrorists found a way to break through the 
security arrangements at this site and drove their car close enough to the Washington 
Monument to attack it with a car bomb. The attack severely damaged the foundation and 
body of the Washington Monument. No American lives were lost. This monument was 
built to commemorate George Washington, commander-in-chief of the Continental Army 
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and the first American president. It is a place that symbolizes your identity and heritage. 
It confers meaning and brings a sense of awe into your heart. The American government 
is planning a violent warfare in response to this terrorist attack.  
Military Condition: A group of terrorists carried out an attack on a major military 
base in Southern California. These terrorists found a way to break down a fence and 
drove their car to a major supply building that they then destroyed with a car bomb. The 
resulting explosion triggered massive secondary explosions in stored ammunition and 
produced major damage to numerous base facilities. No American lives were lost. This 
base is of major strategic importance for national defense because it is a staging area for 
projecting American power toward Asia. The American government is planning a violent 
warfare in response to this terrorist attack. 
For the casualty independent variable, one of the following paragraphs was 
attached after the description of the attack:  
Large Casualty Condition: An estimate from the military intelligence suggests 
that several thousand of our soldiers will die if this violent warfare is adopted, risking 
one of the highest casualty counts in recent violent warfare.  
Small Casualty Condition: An estimate from the military intelligence suggests 
that no more than a dozen of our soldiers will die if this violent warfare is adopted, and 
this casualty count is not high compared to other recent violent warfare.  
Measures of Dependent Variables 
Unless otherwise noted, measures in all studies used a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from “0-absolutely disagree” to “4-absolutely agree”.  
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Immediately following the scenarios, two questions. One asked, “How important 
do you consider this site described in the above scenario to be?” The other asked, How 
sacred do you consider this site described in the above scenario to be?” These questions 
were presented as a manipulation check that the sacred condition was rated as more 
sacred, while not different from the military condition on the rating of importance.  
Dependent variables included two measures involving, first, moral judgment of 
the attackers and, then, support for violent warfare as a response to the attack.  
Moral Judgment: A set of nine items measured moral judgment of the attack, 
dehumanizing and punitive attitudes toward the attacker, and moral justification of 
counterattack. These moralizing processes were found to be crucial building blocks in the 
development of a genocidal mindset (Saucier & Akers, 2015). Instruction said: “Imagine 
yourself being in that scenario, how would you react to Theirlandia’s attack? What was 
your way of thinking in arriving at the choice you made?” The full items are included in 
Appendix A.  
Support for Violent Warfare: Used in a previous study (Shaw et al., 2011), nine 
items served as a measure of support for violent warfare in response to the attack. These 
items tapped into decisions on utilization of violence and killing, and on the levels of 
involvement in the warfare. Instructions said, “Again, imagine yourself being in that 
scenario where your country Ourlandia is planning a counterattack in response to the 
attack on your sacred site/military stronghold. How would you react? What was your way 
of thinking in arriving at the choice you made?” The full scale is included in Appendix B.  
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Moderators and Individual Difference Variables  
Age, sex, and political affiliation information were collected in a separate section 
of demographics before the study. Six psychological scales appeared, in sequence, after 
the dependent variables to measure six constructs related to the current investigation.  
Duke University Religion Index (Koenig & Büssing, 2010) consisted of five items 
that assess a general level of religiosity including questions on religious participation and 
religious belief. In addition to serving as a general measure of religiosity, two of the five 
questions can be used to measure “coalitional religiousness” (e.g., frequency of attending 
religious meetings), with the other three items measuring more of “devotional 
religiousness” (e.g., experience the divine). Appendix C has the full list of items.  
Ethnonationalism (Saucier, 2015) consisted of four items documenting the 
tendency to glorify a shared ethnic heritage. High scorers on this scale take great pride in 
the homeland, ethnic heritage, and achievements of their ancestors. A sample item says, 
“My ancestors once lived in a golden age with glorious and beautiful achievements.” 
Appendix D has the full list of items. 
Moral Absolutism (Peterson et al., 2009) measured, with six items, beliefs in 
categorical moral standards. High scorers on this scale hold adamant, dichotomous 
ethical principles, with one’s conceptions of morality overriding competing values. A 
sample item reads, “There are absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and evil. 
These always apply to everyone, whatever the circumstances.” Appendix E has the full 
list of items. 
Militant Extremism (Saucier et al., 2009) included 10 items capturing belligerent 
thinking patterns that justify the use of violence and extreme measures against enemies. 
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High scorers tend to support war and violence. Exemplar items are, “We have a duty to 
attack and kill the enemies of our people” and “Extreme measures are needed now to 
restore virtue and righteousness in this world.” Appendix F includes the full list of items.  
Sacred versus Rational Duties of Civilization contained six items that we created 
to measure two perspectives on one’s own civilization. A sacred duty entails a belief in 
the assistance of divine power (e.g., “Our civilization has God on its side”) and an 
obligation to carry out the sacred duties (e.g., “It is my sacred duty to develop 
righteousness in my own civilization”). A rational duty, by contrast, fortifies a rational 
way of life and promotion of what is directed by reason (e.g., “I have civic duties to my 
civilization, including the promotion of a rational way of life for all of our citizens”). 
Both duties are self-serving, while those who score higher on sacred duties should be 
more likely to resort to a sacred cause to justify protecting the country. Appendix G has 
the full list of items. 
Meaning in Life (Steger et al., 2006) consisted of 10 items assessing two separate, 
yet related, aspects of meaning in life: presence of meaning (e.g., “My life has a clear 
sense of purpose”) and search for meaning (e.g., “I am seeking a purpose or mission for 
my life”). Appendix H has the full list of items. 
Results 
We first present some preliminary descriptive analyses, and then will test the 
hypotheses sequentially.  
Distributions and Correlations 
Examining the distributional graphs of the dependent variables would help  spot 
violations of normality and existence of outliers – factors that need to be considered 
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before running group comparisons and least squares linear regressions. Figure 2.1 and 
Figure 2.2 present the distributions for moral judgment (blue chart on top) and support 
for violent warfare (red chart at the bottom) across four conditions. Recall that all 
variables were measured on a 5-point scale with a median of 2.  
In general, the distributions were close to normal. Starting with the upper graph in 
Figure 2.1, we observed that the moral judgment variable had a mean around 2 for both 
conditions. There was no obvious mean difference, as suggested by the almost horizontal 
line connecting the means of the two distributions. Moral judgment seemed to have 
greater variance in the sacred condition than in the military condition. Distributions in the 
sacred condition were almost identical in the two casualty conditions. However, 
distributions in the military condition seemed to shift downward as casualty increased. 
When the casualty estimate was small, a majority of the data were distributed around and 
above the middle of the scale; whereas under the large casualty condition, a big cluster 
appeared below the middle. The lower graph in Figure 2.1 shows the distributions of 
support for violent warfare, which had a slightly lower mean in the sacred condition. 
Figure 2.2 shows distributions in the semi-real scenario, which were quite similar 
to those in Figure 2.1. Again, we did not see obvious mean differences across groups. 
Table 2.1 presents the correlations among the variables used in the study. Internal 
reliability coefficients, Cronbach’s alpha, are on the diagonal where internal reliability 
concerns apply. All variables had acceptable reliabilities greater than .70. With this 
sample size, r > .10 is statistically significant at .05 level. To highlight correlations with 
large effect sizes, coefficients less than .25 are dimmed in gray. Rows 8 to 11, labeled 
with “SR”, refer to the variables in the semi-real scenarios.   
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In both hypothetical and semi-real scenarios, dependent variables (DVs) were 
positively correlated, in the order of magnitude, with militant extremism, conservatism 
(also being Republican), ethnonationalism, rational and sacred duties of civilization. 
Ratings of importance and sacredness were strongly correlated with DVs in the semi-real 
scenario, but weakly in the hypothetical scenario. Neither religiosity (also being 
Christian) nor meaning was relevant.  
Sacred duty was positively correlated with ratings of sacredness, conservatism, 
religiosity, presence of meaning, and moral absolutism, whereas correlations with these 
variables were not noticeable of rational duty. Religiosity was one common thread that 
explained these differences. As these correlations make clear, religious people were more 
conservative, had more meaning, and were more morally absolute.   
The two meaning measures did not show much association with the other 
variables. They correlated negatively with each other, suggesting that people with 
abundance of meaning tended to search less. Presence of meaning was correlated with 
religiosity, sacred duty, and moral absolutism, whereas search for meaning did not. 
 
 
 
  
57 
Figure 2.1. Distributions of dependent variables (jittered) across four conditions in the 
hypothetical scenario in Study 1.  
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Figure 2.2. Distributions of dependent variables (jittered) across four conditions in the 
semi-real scenario in Study 1.  
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Table 2.1. Correlations (off diagonal) and reliabilities (on diagonal) of the variables in Study 1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1. Being Female . .12 -.04 .02 .05 -.22 -.38 .02 .02 -.17 -.25 -.08 .11 -.01 -.18 .04 -.16 .11 -.05 .00
2. Being Christian . .30 .22 .19 .14 .05 .15 .16 .15 .13 .28 .53 .10 .27 .39 .10 .20 .00 .23
3. Being Republican . .04 .12 .21 .26 .23 .15 .35 .37 .48 .28 .19 .39 .29 .15 .19 -.01 .25
4. Importance of Site . .36 .13 .14 .25 .15 .13 .17 .11 .17 .19 .11 .16 .05 .14 .01 .11
5. Sacredness of Site . .17 .03 .24 .42 .20 .07 .14 .17 .27 .17 .25 .11 .17 -.01 .05
6. Moral Judgment .74 .53 .15 .26 .58 .45 .29 .10 .30 .47 .29 .26 .07 .12 .20
7. Violent Warfare .81 .21 .13 .51 .78 .38 .05 .25 .45 .17 .27 .02 .04 .14
8. Importance SR . .51 .41 .41 .16 .10 .28 .17 .24 .19 .10 .02 .14
9. Sacredness SR . .41 .32 .14 .10 .37 .25 .31 .14 .07 .09 .09
10. Moral Judgment SR .83 .69 .29 .08 .31 .46 .30 .29 .02 .11 .21
11. Violent Warfare SR .83 .36 .11 .29 .45 .23 .23 .05 .04 .18
12. Conservatism . .33 .23 .41 .38 .17 .24 -.09 .36
13. Duke Religiosity .87 .24 .31 .52 .08 .38 -.10 .41
14. Ethnonationalism .72 .32 .37 .24 .18 .09 .12
15. Militant Extremism .79 .53 .33 .20 .09 .39
16. Sacred Duty .68 .41 .30 -.01 .32
17. Rational Duty .59 .14 .03 .11
18. Presence Meaning .84 -.30 .33
19. Search Meaning .87 -.10
20. Moral Absolutism .71
H1.1, H1.2, H1.3: ANCOVA 
Results from simple group comparisons did not support our hypotheses. There 
was no significant between-group difference, across conditions of sacredness or across 
conditions of casualties, in either moral judgment or support for violent warfare, and 
there was no significant interaction effect. There was no significant difference for the 
semi-real scenario either. 
Table 2.2 presents the means and standard deviations of variables across two 
conditions of sacredness, in both hypothetical and semi-real scenarios. In this and in 
subsequent analyses, the asterisk (*) indicated significance at .05 while double asterisks 
(**) indicated significance at .01 in the table. The only significant difference occurred 
with the rating of sacredness. The sacred site was rated more sacred than the military site 
in the hypothetical scenario, F = 64.5, p = .000, Ș2 = .133, and in the semi-real scenario, F 
= 16.3, p = .000, Ș2 = .037. There was no difference on the rating of importance. Note that 
these ratings were fairly high on a 0 to 4 scale. These preliminary findings lent support to 
the validity of our sacredness manipulation. 
It was also interesting to examine the within-subject effects of semi-real versus 
hypothetical scenarios. Sites in the hypothetical scenario were rated more important (F = 
27.19, p = .000, Ș2 = .061), and more sacred (F = 65.04, p = .000, Ș2 = .134) than sites in 
the semi-real scenario. In particular, the hypothetical sacred site was rated much more 
sacred than the semi-real sacred site, F = 5.84, p = .016, Ș2 = .014. People may have 
mixed feelings about a military base and the National Monument, while the hypothetical 
scenarios were better at focusing on the sacred nature of the site.  
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Table 2.2. Mean comparisons across the sacredness conditions in Study 1. 
 Hypothetical  Semi-Real  
Variables Military Sacred  Military Sacred 
Importance of Site 3.32(.80) 3.32(.76)  3.06(.90) 3.02(1.08) 
Sacredness of Site 2.49(1.15) 3.27(.84)**  2.14(1.30) 2.63(1.20)** 
Moral Judgment 2.04(.56) 2.02(.59)  2.18(.75) 2.15(.75) 
Violent Warfare 1.77(.73) 1.65(.71)  1.84(.77) 1.76(.78) 
Conservatism 3.03(.87) 3.12(.86)    
Duke Religiosity 2.58(1.08) 2.46(1.09)    
Ethnonationalism 2.24(.82) 2.39(.76)    
Militant Extremism 1.64(.67) 1.63(.63)    
Sacred Duty 2.21(.89) 2.22(.81)    
Rational Duty 2.25(.74) 2.27(.64)    
Presence of Meaning 2.55(.87) 2.60(.84)    
Search for Meaning 2.64(.88) 2.49(1.01)    
Moral Absolutism 1.43(.77) 1.31(.76)    
 
Compared to the semi-real scenario, the hypothetical scenario produced lower 
moral judgment, F = 20.62, p = .000, Ș2 = .046, and lower support for violent warfare, F 
= 13.44, p = .000, Ș2 = .031. These differences were in the opposite direction to the 
differences on ratings of importance and sacredness. An explanation would be that semi-
real scenarios were more emotionally involving and better at eliciting actions, although 
hypothetical ones were more focused on target. 
Table 2.3 presents means across two conditions of casualty. Casualty did not 
cause any significant difference in the dependent variables. There was no interaction 
between casualty and within-subject scenario variable either. It seemed that casualties, at 
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least in the vignettes were not a primary concern for ordinary people to entertain the idea 
of supporting for a war (or the manipulation was not effective).  
Table 2.3. Mean comparisons across the casualty conditions in Study 1. 
 Hypothetical  Semi-Real  
Variables Small 
Casualty 
Large 
Casualty 
 Small 
Casualty 
Large 
Casualty 
Importance of Site 3.39(.75) 3.25(.80)  3.11(.94) 2.97(1.06) 
Sacredness of Site 2.94(1.07) 2.89(1.06)  2.41(1.30) 2.40(1.23) 
Moral Judgment 2.03(.58) 2.02(.57)  2.19(.74) 2.15(.77) 
Violent Warfare 1.67(.69) 1.74(.76)  1.79(.73) 1.81(.83) 
Conservatism 3.13(.85) 3.02(.89)    
Duke Religiosity 2.48(1.07) 2.57(1.10)    
Ethnonationalism 2.36(.79) 2.29(.79)    
Militant Extremism 1.63(.67) 1.65(.64)    
Sacred duty 2.27(.87) 2.16(.81)    
Rational duty 2.30(.68) 2.21(.70)    
Presence of Meaning 2.52(.84) 2.64(.87)    
Search for Meaning 2.61(.95) 2.51(.96)    
Moral Absolutism 1.35(.77) 1.38(.75)    
 
 
The group comparisons showed that the manipulations of sacredness and cost did 
not directly influence individual’s moral judgment and support for violent warfare. Nor 
was there an interaction effect between sacredness and casualty. However, effects might 
have been masked by individual difference variables such as militant extremism, which 
had displayed high correlation with the dependent variables. To account for the influence 
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of covariates, we ran analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) controlling for the individual 
difference variables, and found significant effects.  
Table 2.4 presents coefficients from ANCOVA predicting support for warfare 
(left panel) and moral judgment (right panel) in the hypothetical (upper) and semi-real 
(lower) scenarios. The results for predicting support for violent warfare were exactly 
opposite to what H1-H3 hypothesized: support for violent warfare was significantly 
lower with sacred site than with military site in hypothetical scenario, F = 9.22, p = .003, 
Ș2 = .022, and in semi-real scenario, F = 4.59, p = .033, Ș2 = .011; In other words, a 
rational military rather than sacred calculation explained the tendency to counterattack. 
Support for violent warfare was significantly higher for large casualty than for small 
casualty, F = 4.69, p = .031, Ș2 = .011; and the interaction was marginally significant, F = 
3.56, p = .060, Ș2 = .009.  
Results for predicting moral judgment were not different from simple group 
comparisons. None of the two main effects and interaction was significant.  
The multivariate results for the covariates were consistent with bivariate 
correlations. In particular, religiosity was not significantly associated with support for 
war. Sacred view predicted lower support while rational view predicted higher support 
for war.  
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Table 2.4. ANCOVA in Study 1. 
Variables in the 
Equation 
Support for Violent War  Moral Judgment  
Hypothetical Scenario F p Ș2  F p Ș2 
Sacredness 9.22 .003 .022  1.04 .310 .002 
Casualty 4.69 .031 .011  .28 .598 .001 
Interaction 3.56 .060 .009  2.23 .136 .005 
Conservatism 41.61 .000 .091  8.83 .003 .021 
Duke Religiosity 2.37 .125 .006  2.56 .111 .006 
Ethnonationalism 10.30 .001 .024  10.57 .001 .025 
Militant Extremism 54.01 .000 .115  45.89 .000 .100 
Sacred Duty 11.10 .001 .026  .01 .922 .000 
Rational Duty 13.63 .000 .032  3.26 .072 .008 
Presence of Meaning 4.66 .031 .011  .19 .661 .000 
Search for Meaning .33 .568 .001  2.47 .117 .006 
Semi-Real Scenario        
Sacredness 4.59 .033 .011  1.16 .281 .003 
Casualty 1.28 .258 .003  .06 .804 .000 
Interaction 1.21 .272 .003  .00 .947 .000 
Conservatism 26.49 .000 .060  8.56 .004 .020 
Duke Religiosity 1.33 .249 .003  3.73 .054 .009 
Ethnonationalism 15.26 .000 .036  13.86 .000 .032 
Militant Extremism 42.75 .000 .094  39.68 .000 .087 
Sacred Duty 2.30 .130 .006  .38 .533 .001 
Rational Duty 3.50 .062 .008  6.68 .010 .016 
Presence of Meaning 3.01 .083 .007  3.53 .061 .008 
Search for Meaning .31 .577 .001  .67 .415 .002 
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Figure 2.3 plots the interaction effect of sacredness and casualty in predicting 
violent warfare in the hypothetical scenario, after controlling for individual difference 
variables. Covariates appearing in the model were evaluated at their means. Individuals 
tended to support war when the military site was attacked, and when estimated casualty 
was large. Combination of both military and large casualty resulted in the highest support 
for warfare in the hypothetical scenario. Incidentally, the large casualty effect might 
make sense in that within the rational military calculation a higher casualty rate might 
mean a more dangerous enemy that demanded attention. 
 
Figure 2.3. Interaction effect in predicting support for violent warfare in the hypothetical 
scenario.  
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These results also had two implications for understanding the dependent variable. 
First, the sacredness effects in the hypothetical scenario had larger effect size than those 
in the semi-real scenario. Attack on the military site triggered higher levels of support for 
violence than did attack on the sacred site in both scenarios. But the military site was 
associated with even stronger violence in the hypothetical scenario than in the semi-real 
scenario. The semi-real scenario might be too “noisy” to deliver a clear message of 
sacredness. Second, effects in predicting support for violent warfare were stronger than 
effects in predicting moral judgment. Questions in measuring moral judgment might be 
more ambiguous and more difficult to answer than questions on support for war.  
Latent Class Analysis 
It was likely that the sample was divided in the attitude toward sacredness, such 
that one group of people would support the war to protect the sacred while another group 
of people simply discarded the idea of sacredness. To investigate the possibility of 
implicit group membership, we did latent class analysis. The model was specified with a 
measurement model and a path analysis. The measurement model defined two latent 
variables — moral judgment and support for warfare — using their respective items. The 
path analysis regressed these two latent variables on the sacredness grouping variable. A 
2-class model was tested allowing the regression paths to be freely estimated in the two 
classes. This model would provide parameters indicating whether there existed two 
separable groups of individuals in the current sample. The 2-class model was compared 
to a 1-class model (i.e., no hidden subgroups), and it was not significantly better than a 1-
class model. Vuong-Lo-Mendell-Rubin likelihood ratio test yielded p = .08, suggesting 
the decision to retain the null hypothesis that the 1-class model fit the data as well. 
67 
Moreover, the second class contained only 5 individuals, making it too small to be 
interpretable. It seemed obvious that the sample did not include any hidden groups based 
on their response patterns to the sacred versus military conditions.  
Moderated Effects 
Finally, we carried out moderation analyses to examine the conditional effects. 
The broad prediction was that effect of sacredness and casualty on the DVs would be a 
function of individual differences. The predictors in these analyses were sacredness and 
casualty. The response variables would be support for violent warfare. Moderators were 
individual difference variables, which included rating of sacredness, religiosity, meaning, 
ethnonationalism and rational and sacred duties. We also controlled for all the covariates 
that appeared in the ANCOVA.  
Moderation analyses were run with the bootstrap method provided by Hayes’ 
Process module (Hayes, 2013). Statistical significance was informed by the exclusion of 
0 from a parameter’s 95 per cent confidence interval (95% CI). Low and high values for 
quantitative moderators are plus/minus one standard deviation from the mean.  
The rationale for the moderated effects followed from a five-prong conception of 
sacredness. The MAPR model furnished effects associated with the first three variables. 
Sacredness rating represents one’s perception of sacredness, and a greater perception of 
sacredness should reinforce one’s response in protecting the sacred. Religiosity is an 
important component of sacredness, and people high in religiosity should have a better 
understanding of the sacred. People seek and gain meaning from the sacred; the level of 
meaning and the motivation to search for meaning would influence the degree to which 
one would protect the sacred. The other two prongs capitalized on the sacralizing 
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functions of two variables. Ethnonationalism sacralized one’s ethnic heritage, and sacred 
duty for civilization sacralized the current sociopolitical regime.  
H1.4: Sacredness Rating as Moderator 
The moderation effect of sacredness rating was marginally significant, b = .11 
(95% CI = -.01, .23), p = .068. Figure 2.4 shows the moderation effect of sacredness 
rating on sacredness predicting support for violent warfare in the hypothetical scenario. 
The main effect of sacredness was significant, b = -.49 (-.87, -.11), p = .011, suggesting 
that, in general, people were more likely to support violence to protect a military site. 
However, the interaction effect showed that violence associated with protecting the 
sacred site would be amplified by sacredness rating. Military site provoked higher 
violence when sacredness rating was low, b = -.28 (-.46, -.10), whereas no difference 
existed when sacredness rating was high, b = -.04 (-.22, .13). This result supported our 
hypothesis that being able to recognize the sacred enhanced the violence associated with 
sacredness.  
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Figure 2.4. Moderation effects of sacredness rating on sacredness predicting support for 
violent warfare in the hypothetical scenario. 
 
H1.5: Religiosity as Moderator 
Religiosity had a significant moderating effect, b = -.12 (-.23, -.02), in the 
hypothetical scenario. Opposite to what we hypothesized, religiosity mitigated, instead of 
boosting, violence. People of low religiosity supported violence indiscriminate of the 
nature of the site, b = -.03 (-.20, .13), whereas people of high religiosity were less likely 
to endorse violence when the sacred site was attacked, b = -.30 (-.47, -.14). Figure 2.5 
graphs the interaction.  
We further tested the moderating effects of coalitional and devotional 
religiousness, respectively. The two respective effects were in the same direction as the 
total effect. However, the moderating effect of coalitional religiousness was not 
significant, b = -.06 (-.16, .04), whereas the moderating effect of devotional religiousness 
was stronger and significant, b = -.14 (-.24, -.04). Such different effects deserve notice.  
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
Low Sacredness Rating High Sacredness Rating
V
io
le
nt
 W
ar
fa
re
 H
yp
ot
he
tic
al
Military Site Sacred Site
70 
 Figure 2.5. Moderation effect of religiosity on sacredness predicting support for violent 
warfare in the hypothetical scenario. 
 
H1.6: Meaning as Moderator 
We examined the three-way interaction of sacredness moderated by search for 
meaning which was then moderated by presence of meaning. The three-way interaction 
in the hypothetical scenario was not significant, b = -.11 (-.23, .03), p = .116, whereas the 
two-way interaction of sacredness and search for meaning was significant, b = .14 (.01, 
.26), p = .033, and the interaction was plotted in Figure 2.6.  
People of low meaning search were more likely to support violence for the 
military site, b = -.30 (-.47, -.14). However, support for military-driven violence 
decreased as search for meaning increased, b = -.04 (-.21, .12). This finding suggested 
that search for meaning suppressed violence driven by protecting the military site, while 
did not influence sacredness-driven violence. The results was not anticipated by our 
MAPR model which hypothesized that individuals would be more likely to protect the 
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sacred to sustain their meaning system (that is, under high motivation to search for 
meaning).  
 
Figure 2.6. Moderation effect of search for meaning on sacredness predicting support for 
violent warfare in the hypothetical scenario. 
 
H1.7: Ethnonationalism as Moderator 
Ethnonationalism was not significantly moderating the effect, b = .10 (-.05, .24), 
p = .213, in the hypothetical scenario. However, a contrasting pattern emerged for 
different levels of ethnonationalism. People of low ethnonationalism were less likely to 
support violence for the sacred site, b = -.23 (-.40, -.05), whereas no difference existed 
among people of high ethnonationalism, b = -.05 (-.23, .12). This result suggested that, 
when people sacralized their ethnic and cultural heritage, they were more likely to 
support violence in order to protect the sacred.  
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H1.8: Sacred Duty as Moderator 
Sacred or rational duty of civilization did not have any significant moderation 
effects. 
Discussion 
Results offered evidence for the validity of the sacredness manipulations such that 
the sacred site was rated more sacred and as important as the military site. The 
hypothetical scenario had results similar to those in the semi-real scenario, but they also 
displayed clearer patterns.  
The main Hypotheses 1.1-1.3 were not supported with no significant difference 
found in simple group comparisons. ANCOVA results even suggested an opposite pattern 
to what we hypothesized. Some of the individual difference variables moderated the 
effects of sacredness on violence. There was evidence partially supporting Hypothesis 4. 
Hypotheses 5-8 did not receive statistical support. 
Challenges to the Primary Hypotheses 
Sacred site did not generate higher levels of support for violent warfare than did 
the military site. Instead, after controlling for individual difference variables, violence 
associated with protecting the military site was significantly higher than that associated 
with sacred site. The results, taken at its face value, argued for the opposite of our 
sacredness model. Contrary to what we formulated, threat to nation-state can be a much 
more likely cause for war than was threat to sacredness.  
High casualty estimates, contradictory to our hypothesis, encouraged people to 
support the war. The interaction of casualty with sacredness further showed that violence 
associated with protecting the military site would be amplified by higher casualty 
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estimate. It seems that when one has overcome the barrier of supporting a war, cost is no 
longer a concern, and high casualty rates may even justify the war better. Some kind of 
romanticism of heroic death may partially account for this surprising result. Or higher 
casualties might mean a more dangerous enemy that speaks to the rational calculation of 
a nation state needing to use the military to protect itself. More data are needed to 
understand how individuals perceived the costs of attacking military or sacred sites. 
Exploration along this line will come up at Study 2. 
These results may be subject to a floor effect. It could be that scenarios in this 
study failed to effectively influence participants’ attitudes at all. We argued that there 
indeed was a systematic increase in support for war over the baseline militant extremism. 
Comparing the mean of support for violent warfare to the mean scores on the militant 
extremism scale, there was a near significant increase in the hypothetical scenario, t = 
1.86, p = .06; and a significant increase in the semi-real scenario, t = 4.30, p < .000. At 
the least, the scenarios did apparently ramp up the individuals’ violent attitudes.  
Attack on a military stronghold may be too strong to serve as a control condition. 
The attack on a strategic military stronghold poses imminent threat to national security 
and can require an immediate reaction of warfare. Indeed, many other targets are attacked 
in a war but pose less imminent threat. These targets include but are not limited to 
infrastructure such as railway lines and communication stations, industrial sites that 
supply work opportunities for a large number of individuals, and energy plants producing 
gas or electricity (Rado, 2011). The choice of a military stronghold may be too extreme 
in its violence inducing potential for the purpose of demonstrating sacredness-driven 
violence. However, a military site makes a suitable choice to match the sacred site on the 
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level of importance. Destroying a critical bridge for economic reasons might be equally 
important.  
Above all, it could be that people are overestimating the role of sacredness 
associated with violence compared to violence associated with nation state. The results 
revealed the problem with such bias, by suggesting that sacredness did not instigate 
higher levels of violence than the nation state. Anecdotally, a suicide attack was leveled 
near the Prophet's Mosque in Medina - one of Islam's most sacred sites (BBC News, July 
6th, 2016). Although the king of Saudi Arabia has promised to strike with an "iron hand" 
against those terrorists, it didn’t seem likely a war would break out anytime soon. This 
“sacred softness” contrasted with the on-going Saudi use of violence to war against Shite 
influences in Yemen. 
Moderated Effects 
Supporting H4, sacredness rating increased the support for violence under the 
sacred site. Although the interaction effect was non-significant, ethnonationalism 
increased support for violent warfare under the sacred condition (H7). These results 
suggested that a greater concern with the sacred led to a greater likelihood of violence 
associated with the sacred.  
Results testing H5 went against our hypothesis. Religiosity suppressed violence 
for the sacred. Religious people are supposed to have a better understanding of the 
sacred, and it is almost imperative to protect the purity of the sanctity. The prosocial 
teachings of Christianity may account for such effects (Shariff et al., 2016), and for some 
Christian theology – like that of Quaker’s – nonviolence or at least a bias against violence 
is a part of the sacred. Another explanation could be that religion provides a meaning 
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system and can therefore decrease the need for meaning, and decrease the urgency to 
protect the sacred. The lack of correlation of religiosity with support for violence could 
suggest a mix of encouraging and suppressing violence. We have observed the 
differential effects of coalitional and devotional religiousness as reported in literature 
(e.g., Gingers, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009). However, our finding shows more of the 
suppressing violence aspect of devotional religiosity than promoting violence aspect of 
coalitional religiosity. 
Results testing H6 about meaning was not clearly supportive of the MAPR model. 
While the model would predict an enhanced sacredness-violence for people high in 
meaning search, the results only showed a decrease in military-violence as meaning 
search increased. It was unclear what the implication could be, and more studies may be 
needed to test this result against random error.  
Next Questions 
It remains unrevealed what specific attitudes people hold with respect to the 
sacred site. Are sacred sites worth protection at the cost of a war? Are sacred sites 
valuable targets to attack in a war? How does the sacred site compare to the military site 
in terms of costs and benefits in deciding for violent warfare?  
We have also found differential effects of ethnonationalism and religiosity in their 
effects on support for war. It is likely that the sacred site could mean different things to 
those who are concerned with ethnonational identity from those who are into religious 
sacredness. In the following study, we set up scenarios to differentiate these two types of 
sacredness.  
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CHAPTER III  
STUDY 2: DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF ETHNONATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS 
SACREDNESS 
Results of the previous study in the US revealed that sacredness did not trigger 
violence any more than security and military factors. This null effect could have 
reflected a meaningful lack of concern for sacredness in the context of extreme 
violence. To further examine this possible explanation for the null effect, we included 
questions that directly probed individuals’ attitudes toward the cost and benefit of 
attacking a sacred site in comparison to attacking a military site.  
In Study 1, ethnonationalism and religiosity moderated the effect of sacredness 
on the support for violence. Study 2 attempted to further assess possible subtleties in the 
effects of sacredness by comparing conditions of sacredness as a religious sacred site 
with sacredness as an ethnonational sacred site.  
Rationale and Hypothesis 
We retested the same hypotheses in Study 1 for reproducibility. Since the sacred 
condition was split into religious sacredness and ethnonational sacredness, we expected 
differences between the two sacred conditions. In particular, we hypothesized that an 
ethnonational site would be considered as more sacred than the religious sacred site in the 
American sample, and interaction effects would focus on the ethnonational site. 
Specifically, we expected sacred ratings and ethnonationalism (moderators of the sacred 
effect in Study 1) to boost violence associated with ethnonational site. Hypotheses 2.1 
thru 2.8 were the same as those in Study 1.  
In addition, we included questions to explore possible explanations for the null 
effects found in Study 1. The null effect, should it hold in the second study as well, may 
reflect the fact that people undervalued the sacred site as a good target for military 
operations. Additional questions examined attitudes toward attacking a sacred site versus 
attacking a military site. Six variables – estimated costs, estimated benefits, willingness 
to take the risk, possibility of retaliation, effectiveness of submission, and general 
endorsement – measured various aspects of evaluation of an attack on either the military 
or sacred site.  
The basic hypothesis was that people might NOT take sacredness as a motivator 
for war. Previous results from Study 1 revealed that people did not tend to support war as 
a “counterattack” for the sacred site. Inclusion of these evaluation variables would assess 
the degree to which people chose to actively “attack” a sacred site (vs. a military site) in a 
war. Would the findings show that people did not believe attacking the sacred site would 
subordinate the enemy, be beneficial or effective to win the war, it would offer support to 
our hypothesis and would be consistent with findings from previous studies. Hypotheses 
2.9 thru 2.14 explored this possibility.  
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 2.1: (Main Effect) Support for warfare will be highest for 
ethnonational site, followed by religious site and military site. This hypothesis came with 
the assumption that American sample would tend to consider ethnonational site to be 
more sacred.   
Hypothesis 2.2: (Main Effect) High casualty estimate will lead to lower support 
for violent warfare. 
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Hypothesis 2.3: (Interaction) Support for violent warfare will decrease as 
casualties increase when the military stronghold was attacked, but will increase when 
sacred sites were attacked.  
Hypothesis 2.4: (Interaction) Sacredness ratings will boost support for violence 
associated with sacredness, especially the ethnonational site.  
Hypothesis 2.5: (Interaction) Religiosity, especially devotional religiosity, will 
suppress violence associated with sacredness, especially the religious site.  
Hypothesis 2.6: (Interaction) A higher tendency of search for meaning will boost 
violence associated with sacredness. 
Hypothesis 2.7: (Interaction) Ethnonationalism will boost violence associated 
with sacredness, especially the ethnonational site.  
Hypothesis 2.8: (Interaction) Sacred duty will boost violence associated with 
sacredness. The variable sacred duty assesses how strongly one tends to sacralize one’s 
cultural identity. Previous study did not find significant effect with this variable as a 
moderator.  
Hypothesis 2.9: (Main Effect) Estimated cost to attack a military site would be 
higher than that to attack a sacred site.  
Hypothesis 2.10: (Main Effect) Estimated benefit to attack a military site would 
be higher than that to attack a sacred site. 
Hypothesis 2.11: (Main Effect) Evaluations of risk would be higher for an attack 
on a military site than to an attack on a sacred site. 
Hypothesis 2.12: (Main Effect) Estimated retaliation for attacking a military site 
would be higher than for attacking a sacred site. 
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Hypothesis 2.13: (Main Effect) Attacking a military site would be evaluated as 
more effective in subordinating enemies than attacking a sacred site. 
Hypothesis 2.14: (Main Effect) Endorsement would be higher to attack a military 
site than to attack a sacred site. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 349 undergraduate students enrolled at a state university in the 
American South participated. The sample was 64% female, and had an average age of 
19.3 years (SD = 4.5). The sample was predominantly self-identified as Christians (79%), 
and 37% reported being Republican, 28% as Democrats, and 24% as independent.  
Experimental Manipulation 
A 3 sacredness (religious sacred site vs. ethnonational sacred site vs. military site) 
by 2 casualty (large casualty vs. small casualty) between-subject design was carried out 
with vignettes. The military scenario and the casualty conditions were identical to those 
used previously. The religious and ethnonational sacred scenarios added modifiers to the 
previous sacred scenarios in order to make them more specific: 
Religious Sacred: “You are a citizen of Ourlandia, and your nation has been 
attacked by Theirlandia. Theirlandia has demonstrated strong military prowess and has 
attacked a site that is sacred to the people of Ourlandia. It is the religious center and the 
site where people worship and perform rituals. It is a sacred place that symbolizes your 
identity and heritage. It confers meaning and triggers a sense of awe in your heart. Your 
country, Ourlandia, is planning to strike back in response to the attack on this sacred 
site.” 
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Ethnonational Sacred: “You are a citizen of Ourlandia, and your nation has been 
attacked by Theirlandia. Theirlandia has demonstrated strong military prowess and has 
attacked a particular site that is sacred to the people of Ourlandia. It is the national 
monument and the site where people commemorate and celebrate the ancestors, past 
heroes, and history of the country. It is a sacred place that symbolizes your identity and 
heritage. It confers meaning and triggers a sense of awe in your heart. Your country, 
Ourlandia, is planning to strike back in response to the attack on this sacred site.” 
Attitudes toward Attacking Sacredness 
The second study included the same dependent variables and individual difference 
variables as the first study. Two new sections, presented in random order, were added 
after the dependent variables and before the section of individual difference variables. 
One section described a sacred site of Theirlandia, and the other section a military site of 
Theirlandia. Following each section were six questions probing attitudes toward attacking 
that target.  
Participants first read the introduction: “Your country, Ourlandia, is planning to 
strike back in response to Theirlandia’s attack on your military site. A report from 
military intelligence recommends two potential targets for the counterattack. In the 
following sections, you will see a description of each of the two targets, and you will 
respond to several questions associated with attacking these targets.” Then they read one 
of the two scenarios below.  
Target A: “This site is sacred to the Spirit of Theirlandia. It is a place that 
symbolizes their identity and heritage. It confers meaning and brings a sense of awe into 
Theirlandians’ heart.” 
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Target B: “This site is an important military stronghold for Theirlandia. It is 
located in one of the key population areas and is of strategic significance for 
Theirlandia’s national defense.” 
Six questions, used in both sections, followed the scenario. The first two 
questions were cost-benefits calculations. The third question tapped into risk-taking. The 
fourth and fifth questions asked about anticipated outcomes. The last question asked 
general endorsement of attacking this site:  
“Now your country is planning to strike back at Theirlandia’s sacred/military site. 
Please give an estimate of the costs and benefits of this planned counterattack: 
1. In terms of the costs, I would expect the counterattack to be (from “Not at all 
Costly” to “Extremely Costly”) 
2. In terms of the benefits, I would expect the counterattack to be (from “Not at all 
Beneficial” to “Extremely Beneficial”) 
3. If the counterattack on the sacred site is implemented, there is a one-third 
probability that Ourlandia will win the war and a two-third probability that Ourlandia will 
be defeated. How strongly would you support the counterattack? (from “Strongly 
Oppose” to “Strongly Support”) 
4. If your country strikes at Theirlandia’s sacred site, what would be the 
likelihood of massive retaliation from Theirlandia? (from “Highly Unlikely” to “Almost 
Certain”) 
5. What would be the effect of attacking this sacred site in terms of bringing 
Theirlandia under the control of your country? (from “Not at all Effective” to “Extremely 
Effective”) 
82 
6. Taking the costs and benefits into account, please indicate the degree to which 
you agree with the statement: I endorse the military attack on Theirlandia’s sacred site 
regardless of how much it would cost to do so.” 
Results 
The key results supported Hypothesis 2.1. Not only did the ethnonational site 
have a stronger effect, but the previous effect on a sacred site was replicated on 
ethnonational site only (H2.4 and H2.7). It is likely that, for the American sample, the 
sacred site was understood as being more ethnonational than religious.  
The evaluation variables showed that most individuals attached more value to 
attack a military site (H2.9 to H2.14). Retaliation was the only variable on which the 
sacred site was relevant. People believed that attacking a sacred site would incur as much 
retaliation as attacking a military site. 
Distributions and Correlations 
Figure 3.1 displays the distributions of moral judgment and support for violent 
warfare. Distributions for moral judgment were closer to normal, and did not differ much 
across three sacredness conditions. Ethnonational sacredness had a slightly higher mean 
than the other two conditions.  
Distributions were much more spread out for the support for violent warfare 
variable, suggesting a great variability in responses. The distribution of religious sacred 
violence was especially high in variance, reflecting perhaps the variability of religiosity 
within our sample. The military site had a slightly higher mean than the other two 
conditions. Means under the large casualty condition appeared to be higher than the 
means under the small casualty condition. In particular, the large casualty condition 
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“shifted up” the distribution of military violence, but did not shift the distributions of 
sacred violence.  
Table 3.1 presents the correlations among the variables used in the study. The 
internal reliability coefficient, Cronbach’s alpha, is on the diagonal where it applies. All 
variables had acceptable reliabilities. With this sample size, r > .12 is statistically 
significant at .05 level. To highlight the large effect sizes, coefficients less than .25 are 
dimmed.  
The pattern of correlations was similar to those found in Study 1. DVs were 
positively correlated with militant extremism and conservatism. Ratings of importance 
and sacredness were weakly correlated with DVs. Religiosity, again, was not particularly 
relevant.  
Sacred duty was positively correlated with moral judgment, conservatism, 
religiosity (also being Christian), ethnonationalism, militant extremism, presence of 
meaning, and moral absolutism. Correlations with these variables were not noticeable for 
rational duty. These results largely matched those of Study 1, suggesting a hawkish 
tendency of people believing in a sacred duty. A major difference from Study 1 was that 
rational duty did not correlate as strongly with support for violent warfare.  
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Figure 3.1. Distributions of dependent variables across four conditions in Study 2.  
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Table 3.1. Correlations (off diagonal) and reliabilities (on diagonal) of the variables in Study 2.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1. Being Female . .05 -.00 -.02 .10 -.06 -.32 -.07 .20 .03 .02 .14 .01 .12 .05 .05
2. Being Christian . .33 .11 .18 .19 .19 .27 .58 .17 .34 .52 .08 .18 -.07 .30
3. Being Republican . .02 .02 .28 .36 .40 .31 .21 .36 .29 .12 .16 -.07 .27
4. Importance of Site . .42 .16 .14 .09 .14 .26 .12 .22 .09 .16 .04 .05
5. Sacredness of Site . .19 .04 .10 .18 .20 .14 .21 .01 .05 .02 .11
6. Moral Judgment .70 .47 .23 .14 .34 .48 .28 .06 .08 .09 .21
7. Violent Warfare .83 .34 .13 .18 .41 .14 .06 -.04 -.00 .14
8. Conservatism . .36 .18 .29 .28 .05 .15 -.09 .34
9. Duke Religiosity .91 .29 .39 .64 .18 .39 -.12 .46
10. Ethnonationalism .77 .35 .38 .20 .17 .06 .15
11. Militant Extremism .82 .60 .20 .14 .12 .37
12. Sacred Duty of Civilization .69 .30 .35 .00 .38
13. Rational Duty of Civilization .60 .16 .09 .09
14. Presence of Meaning .89 -.29 .40
15. Search for Meaning .88 -.15
16. Moral Absolutism .77
As in Study 1, the two meaning measures correlated negatively with each other, 
suggesting that people with an abundance of meaning tended to search less. The presence 
of meaning was correlated positively with religiosity, sacred duty, and moral absolutism, 
whereas the search for meaning did not. 
H2.1, H2.2, and H2.3: ANCOVA 
Table 3.2 presents the means and standard deviations of variables across three 
conditions of sacredness and two conditions of casualty. The only significant difference 
occurred on the rating of sacredness. The two sacred sites were rated not different from 
each other, but more sacred than the military site, F = 28.86, p = .000, Ș2 = .149. There 
was no main effect for casualty rate at all.  
To account for the influence of covariates, we ran analyses of covariance 
(ANCOVA) controlling for the individual difference variables. Table 3.3 presents 
coefficients from ANCOVA predicting support for warfare (left panel) and moral 
judgment (right panel). The results remained non-significant. This outcome was slightly 
different from Study 1, which found a moderately higher support for violent warfare with 
military site than with sacred site. Evidence from two studies taken together leaned 
toward a null effect in general.  
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Table 3.2. Mean comparisons across manipulation conditions in Study 2.
Sacredness Manipulation Casualty Manipulation
Variables Military Religious Ethnonational Small Casualty Large Casualty
Importance of Site 3.33(.71) 3.43(.76) 3.44(.75) 3.43(.73) 3.37(.75)
Sacredness of Site 2.45(1.18)2 3.36(.91)1 3.34(.94)1 3.08(1.13) 3.05(1.06)
Moral Judgment 2.01(.52) 2.01(.56) 2.08(.51) 2.03(.50) 2.04(.56)
Support for Violent Warfare 1.80(.73) 1.76(.83) 1.65(.75) 1.71(.75) 1.76(.80)
Conservatism 2.99(.86) 3.12(.91) 2.93(.99) 2.96(.91) 3.07(.94)
Duke Religiosity 2.24(1.24) 2.27(1.20) 2.39(1.14) 2.29(1.21) 2.31(1.18)
Ethnonationalism 2.21(.88) 2.25(.85) 2.32(.88) 2.32(.84) 2.20(.89)
Militant Extremism 1.57(.68) 1.56(.74) 1.59(.67) 1.55(.72) 1.60(.68)
Sacred Duty of Civilization 2.10(.90) 2.02(.97) 2.15(.86) 2.08(.88) 2.10(.94)
Rational Duty of Civilization 2.21(.62) 2.08(.78) 2.18(.60) 2.21(.65) 2.10(.69)
Presence of Meaning 2.58(.96) 2.55(.98) 2.54(.86) 2.62(.95) 2.49(.91)
Search for Meaning 2.47(.91) 2.50(1.12) 2.65(.92) 2.47(1.00) 2.61(.97)
Moral Absolutism 1.31(.90) 1.30(.80) 1.32(.67) 1.33(.80) 1.29(.78)
Table 3.3. ANCOVA in Study 2. 
 Support for Violent War  Moral Judgment  
Variables in the 
Equation 
F p Ș2  F p Ș2 
Sacredness 1.23 .294 .011  1.12 .327 .007 
Casualty .06 .811 .004  .04 .842 .000 
Interaction .78 .461 .007  .04 .957 .000 
Conservatism 24.60 .000 .069  5.32 .022 .016 
Duke Religiosity .02 .901 .000  3.89 .050 .012 
Ethnonationalism 2.41 .122 .007  15.85 .000 .045 
Militant Extremism 48.87 .000 .128  49.24 .000 .128 
Sacred Duty 6.11 .014 .018  .01 .942 .000 
Rational Duty .21 .646 .001  1.55 .214 .005 
Presence of Meaning 3.57 .060 .011  .69 .405 .002 
Search for Meaning .21 .243 .004  .59 .444 .002 
 
Moderated Effects 
We wanted to examine whether ethnonationalism would selectively moderate 
effects of the ethnonational site, and whether religiosity would selectively moderate 
effects of the religious site. Also we wanted to replicate moderation effects of sacredness 
rating, sacred duty, and meaning. We sequentially coded the independent variable 
sacredness into two dummy variables, one contrasting religious with military site, the 
other contrasting ethnonational with religious site.  
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H2.4: Sacredness Rating as Moderator 
The overall moderating effect of sacredness rating was not significant; however, 
we observed different patterns for ethnonational sacredness and religious sacredness. 
Previously, we found that the sacredness rating boosted violence in response to attack on 
sacred site. In this study, as Figure 3.2 shows, this effect appeared particularly with the 
ethnonational sacred site. Under low sacredness rating, military violence was 
significantly higher than ethnonational violence, b = .28 (.02, .53); under a high 
sacredness rating, the difference became nonsignificant due to an increase in the 
ethnonational condition, b = .01 (-.25, .27).  
H2.5: Religiosity as Moderator 
There was no significant interaction effect of religiosity. At both low and high 
levels of religiosity, military site had the highest mean, followed by the religious site, 
which was followed by ethnonational site. Devotional religiosity did not significantly 
moderate the effect either. The pattern shown in Figure 3.3 was similar to Figure 2.5 
where religiosity suppressed violence associated with sacredness. Here we saw a decrease 
in both types of sacred sites.    
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Figure 3.2. Moderating effect (nonsignificant) of sacredness rating on sacredness 
predicting support for violent warfare. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Moderating effect (nonsignificant) of devotional religiosity.  
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H2.6: Meaning as Moderator 
The moderating effect of ethnonationalism was not significant.   
H2.7: Ethnonationalism as Moderator 
The moderating effect of ethnonationalism was not significant, but the direction 
of change was in the hypothesized direction, shown in Figure 3.4. Increased level of 
ethnonationalism selectively increased responses to the ethnonational site.  
  
 
Figure 3.4. Moderating effect (nonsignificant) of ethnonationalism. 
 
H2.8: Sacred Duty as Moderator 
As in Study 1, the sacred or rational duty of civilization did not have any 
significant moderation effects. 
Attitudes toward Attacking Military versus Sacred Site 
Previous findings suggested that attack on a sacred site did not provoke stronger 
support for war than attack on military site. This null effect might be associated with a 
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generally low valuation of sacredness in military operations. To investigate how 
individuals valued the sacred site versus military site, we examined individuals’ attitudes 
toward attacking sacred site versus military site in a separate set of scenarios where 
participants made decisions to attack an enemy. Twelve variables measured various 
aspects of evaluation of the attack on either military or sacred site. Again, these variables 
were estimated costs, estimated benefits, willingness to take the risk, possibility of 
retaliation, effectiveness of submission, and general endorsement. In addition, we created 
a binary variable (labeled as “S > M”) with “1” indicating a higher evaluation on the 
sacred site than on the military site.  
H2.9 and H2.10: Costs and Benefits 
The left panel of Table 3.4 displays correlations of estimated costs with the major 
variables in the study. Means are in the last row of the table. The first column records 
correlations associated with estimated costs in attacking a military site; the second 
column records estimated costs in attacking a sacred site; the third column displays the 
correlation associated with S > M. To emphasize correlations of meaningful effect size, 
we dimmed those under .10, which was the cutoff value for two-tailed significance for 
this sample. Test of the difference between two dependent correlations with one variable 
in common followed the procedure provided by Lee and Preacher (2013). 
Estimated costs of attacking military site (“military cost” hereafter) correlated 
with estimated costs of attacking the sacred site (“sacred cost” hereafter) at r = .27, p = 
.000. Military cost was significantly higher than sacred cost, F = 64.87, p = .000, Ș2 = 
.158. This was not surprising as there is often a higher level of security guarding a 
military site, making it costlier to attack.  
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Table 3.4. Correlations of cost and benefit with variables. 
 Cost  Benefit 
Variables Military Sacred S > M  Military Sacred S > M 
Being Female .05 .21 .05  -.21 -.09 .13 
Being Christian .02 -.03 .01  .11 .17 .02 
Being Republican -.02 -.03 .07  .25 .16 -.04 
Importance of Site .04 .01 .04  .13 .02 -.07 
Sacredness of Site .11 .00 -.01  .05 .01 -.03 
Moral Judgment -.17 -.08 .09  .34 .28 .04 
Violent Warfare -.13 -.12 .04  .51 .30 -.02 
Conservatism -.02 -.02 -.00  .17 .17 .02 
Duke Religiosity -.06 .09 .13  .07 .15 .08 
Ethnonationalism -.09 -.03 .04  .09 .12 .05 
Militant Extremism -.13 -.00 .08  .24 .27 .05 
Sacred duty -.04 .02 .03  .15 .12 .01 
Rational duty .00 -.02 .03  .12 .12 .02 
Meaning Presence -.16 .00 .14  .03 .04 .03 
Meaning Search .13 .12 -.07  .01 -.04 -.02 
Moral Absolutism -.20 -.02 .09  .13 .19 .04 
M(SD) 3.27(.83) 2.73(1.20) 15.5%  2.29(1.21) 1.73(1.38) 17.5% 
 
However, several variables displayed selective associations with lower estimate of 
military cost than sacred cost. People of high militant extremism tended to underestimate 
military cost, ǻr = .13, z = 2.03, p = .043. The presence of meaning was associated with a 
lower military cost, ǻr = .16, z = 2.50, p = .012, as was moral absolutism, ǻr = .18, z = 
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2.82, p = .005. The tendency to underestimate costs associated with attacking military site 
may account partially for higher support of attacking military site. 
Only 15.5% of people believed that the cost of attacking a sacred site would be 
higher. These people had higher levels of religiosity (r = .13) and presence of meaning (r 
= .14). Religiosity and presence of meaning, given their associations with conceptions of 
sacredness, may get people to attach more weight to a sacred site.  
The right panel of Table 3.4 displays variable correlations with the estimated 
benefit of attacking the military site and attacking the sacred site. Benefit of attacking 
military site (“military benefit” hereafter) was correlated with the benefit of attacking 
sacred site (“sacred benefit” hereafter) at r = .38, p = .000. Military benefit was 
significantly higher than sacred benefit, F = 53.02, p = .000, Ș2 = .134. Only 17.5% of 
people believed that benefits of attacking a sacred site would be higher. Being female 
was the only significant correlation with such a mindset.  
Being Christian, being republican, moral judgment, conservatism, militant 
extremism, moral absolutism, sacred and rational duty of civilization correlated positively 
with benefit estimates of attacking both sites. The only difference in correlation was with 
support for violent warfare, which correlated more strongly with military benefit than 
with sacred benefit, ǻr = .21, z = 4.01, p = .000.  
These results conformed to expectation H2.10. Our sample assigned a higher 
benefit to attacking a military site. This may be associated with a higher support for war 
when a military site was attacked. In fact, those who believed attacking a military site 
was more beneficial also supported war at a higher level.  
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H2.11 and H2.12: Risk and Retaliation 
The left panel of Table 3.5 compares the variable correlations on perceived risk. 
Willingness to take the risk of attacking a military site (“military risk” hereafter) was 
correlated with willingness to take the risk of attacking sacred site (“sacred risk” 
hereafter) at r = .46, p = .000. Military risk was significantly higher than sacred risk, F = 
5.79, p = .017, Ș2 = .016. Only 18.3% of people would be more willing to take the risk of 
attacking a sacred site. These people scored higher on moral judgment and support for 
violent warfare. There was not a notable difference in correlation patterns between 
military and sacred risk-taking.  
The right panel of Table 3.5 compares the variable correlations on estimated 
possibility of retaliation from the enemy. Possible retaliation from attacking a military 
site (“military retaliation” hereafter) was correlated with retaliation from attacking the 
sacred site (“sacred retaliation” hereafter) at r = .42, p = .000. Military retaliation was not 
significantly different from sacred retaliation, while those who believed that attacking the 
sacred site would more likely incur massive retaliation were still reflective of a minority 
position (24.1%).  
It was interesting to find that our sample believed attacking the sacred site would 
incur as much retaliation as attacking the military site Some unexamined variable 
presumably caused participants to believe that the enemy would value (and thus retaliate 
with respect to) their sacred site as much as military site.  
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Table 3.5. Correlations of risk and retaliation with variables. 
 Risk  Retaliation 
Variables Military Sacred S > M  Military Sacred S > M 
Being Female -.11 -.07 .04  -.01 -.06 .03 
Being Christian .09 .11 .07  .02 -.02 -.03 
Being Republican .10 .18 .09  .14 .08 -.10 
Importance of Site .10 .04 -.03  .04 -.00 -.03 
Sacredness of Site .01 .03 .00  .06 .02 -.01 
Moral Judgment .35 .37 .17  -.04 -.10 .03 
Violent warfare .38 .36 .14  -.04 -.01 -.01 
Conservatism .05 .11 .05  .05 -.01 -.06 
Duke Religiosity .05 .10 .07  -.02 -.09 .00 
Ethnonationalism .14 .17 .04  .02 -.07 -.02 
Militant Extremism .33 .32 .08  -.11 -.12 .07 
Sacred duty .19 .12 -.01  -.05 -.10 .02 
Rational duty .08 .04 -.10  .02 .01 .04 
Presence Meaning -.03 -.04 .06  -.03 -.05 .02 
Search Meaning .08 .00 -.07  .01 .10 .04 
Moral Absolutism .04 .09 .07  -.07 -.06 .00 
M(SD) 1.37(1.15) 1.22(1.16) 18.3%  3.39(.92) 3.46(1.03) 24.1% 
 
H2.13 and H2.14: Subordination and Endorsement 
The left panel of Table 3.6 compares the variable correlations on estimated effect 
of subordinating the enemy by attacking either the military and sacred site. Subordination 
by attacking military site (“military subordination” hereafter) was correlated with 
subordination by attacking the sacred site (“sacred subordination” hereafter) at r = .27, p 
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= .000. Military subordination was significantly higher than sacred subordination, F = 
50.12, p = .000, Ș2 = .127. Only 17.8% believed that attacking the sacred site would be 
more effective than attacking the military site to subordinate the enemy. Those 
individuals were more conservative.  
Support for violent warfare correlated more strongly with military subordination 
than with sacred subordination, ǻr = .15, z = 2.50, p = .013. However, conservatism 
displayed a selective association with sacred subordination, ǻr = .19, z = 2.98, p = .003. 
Conservative people more likely believed that attacking the sacred site was an effective 
measure of subordination. Religiosity was selectively associated with sacred 
subordination, ǻr = .14, z = 2.17, p = .030. Religious people believed in sacred 
subordination more than military subordination.  
Finally, the right panel of Table 3.6 compares the variable correlations on 
endorsement of the attack. Endorsing military attack correlated positively with endorsing 
sacred attack at r = .44, p = .000. Endorsement was higher for attacking the military site 
than for attacking the sacred site, F = 18.27, p = .000, Ș2 = .050. Only 19.2% endorsed 
attacking the sacred site more than attacking the military site. 
Endorsement of military attack overlapped more with being Republican, ǻr = .11, 
z = 2.01, p = .044; moral judgment, ǻr = .11, z = 2.21, p = .027; and support for violent 
warfare, ǻr = .18, z = 3.78, p = .000.  
In summary, main effects appeared for all variables except retaliation. The sample 
rated attacking military site being more costly, more beneficial, and more effective to 
subordinate the enemy; the sample was willing to run a higher risk for and gave higher 
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endorsement of attacking the military site than the sacred site. Conservatism and 
religiosity were related to favoring the sacred site as the target of attack.  
Table 3.6. Correlations of effect and endorsement with variables. 
 Effect of Subordination  Endorsement of Attack 
Variables Military Sacred S > M  Military Sacred S > M 
Being Female -.09 -.05 -.05  -.16 -.07 .02 
Being Christian .03 .14 .06  .17 .17 .03 
Being Republican .13 .11 .07  .29 .18 -.01 
Importance of Site -.00 .07 .08  .16 .05 -.00 
Sacredness of Site .07 .10 .04  .06 .04 .02 
Moral Judgment .28 .28 .06  .48 .37 .08 
Violent Warfare .39 .24 .05  .56 .38 .10 
Conservatism .03 .22 .14  .22 .14 .01 
Duke Religiosity .02 .16 .07  .16 .14 .01 
Ethnonationalism .09 .19 .07  .20 .12 -.03 
Militant Extremism .25 .25 .06  .42 .33 .04 
Sacred duty .10 .15 .00  .21 .16 -.02 
Rational duty .04 .07 .03  .06 .03 -.03 
Presence Meaning .03 .10 .10  .05 .02 -.06 
Search Meaning .00 -.08 -.07  .03 .00 -.04 
Moral Absolutism .08 .16 .03  .14 .14 -.03 
M(SD) 2.05(1.04) 1.51(1.26) 17.8%  1.41(1.19) 1.12(1.22) 19.2% 
 
Discussion 
Results replicated the null effects found in Study 1. An attack on sacred site, 
whether religious or ethnonational, did not provoke stronger support for war than an 
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attack on military site. The casualties associated with a counterattack did not change 
levels of support for war either. Slightly different from Study 1, the null effects remained 
after controlling for the relevant covariates.  
Some evidence from the moderation analyses suggested a distinction of religious 
sacredness from ethnonational sacredness. Ratings of sacredness and ethnonationalism 
selectively boosted the effects of ethnonational sacredness, not religious sacredness. 
These effects matched previous results for the generic sacred site. Such finding implied 
that, at least in the current American sample, sacredness was understood more as 
ethnonational than religious.  
Moderated Effects 
Moderation effects were not statistically significant. However, the patterns were 
consistent with previous results. In particular, rating of sacredness and ethnonationalism 
enhanced violence associated with sacredness, whereas (devotional) religiosity 
suppressed violence associated with sacredness. Meaning and sacred duty did not 
moderate the effects.  
Attitudes toward Attacking Sacredness 
Analyses of attitudes toward attacking the sacred site showed that people attached 
less value to attacking the sacred site than the military site in a war. The only variable on 
which this generalization did not apply was for retaliation. Our sample believed that 
attacking a sacred site would incur as much retaliation as attacking a military site.  
Taking these results together, we found that people tended to discard sacredness 
as a motivating factor for war. Even if our sample believed it would cost less to attack a 
sacred site, support for attacking the sacred site was still lower than support for attacking 
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the military site. (This result also resonated with the finding of H2.2 that people showed 
insensitivity to casualty rate.) Nevertheless, our sample still believed that the sacred site 
was as important as a military site and could mean a great deal to others such that 
attacking a sacred site would generate as much retaliation as attacking a military site.  
Next Questions 
We assumed that sacredness would more strongly work on people’s emotions 
such that they would more likely make irrational decisions that support war. With this 
assumption, we hypothesized that support for violent warfare would be higher for the 
sacred site than for the military site, because one’s decision would be driven more 
strongly by feelings. The null effect perhaps suggested that the emotional level associated 
with the sacred scenario was not high enough. The third study examined whether we 
would observe a difference when individuals were primed to rely on feelings in their 
decisions.  
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CHAPTER IV 
STUDY 3: FEELING- VS. CALCULATION-BASED PROCESSING AND 
SACREDNESS 
Previous studies failed to find a main effect of sacredness on violence. Our 
primary goal for this study was to find out whether priming feelings would increase the 
effect associated with sacredness. To achieve this goal, we primed individuals to 
explicitly rely on feelings versus calculation in their decisions for supporting the war. 
In addition, we wanted to retest the main effect of sacredness along with the moderating 
effects associated with sacredness rating, religiosity and ethnonationalism.  
Rationale and Hypotheses 
The rationale behind this goal was twofold. On one hand, there is a strong 
connection between sacredness and emotion. In the MAPR model, awe is a primary 
emotional component that motivates the experience of sacredness. On the other hand, 
findings from the study of affective psychology suggest that individuals under the 
influence of feelings tend to make qualitative value judgments that lead to higher risk-
taking tendencies (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004). Indeed, empirical studies have found that 
higher levels of emotional involvement and/or reliance on feeling-based processing led 
individuals to prefer risky decisions (Zhang, Chen, Luan, & Li, 2016; Zhang, Chen, & Li, 
2017). We, therefore, expected individuals to take more risks and to support war for 
reasons of sacredness fueled by feeling-based processing.  
To capture the risk-taking tendencies, we included as dependent variables an extra 
set of six items that measured cost-benefit attitudes toward counterattacking. These items 
examined individuals’ general estimate of costs and benefits, and their willingness to take 
the risk if a counterattack were to be implemented. Some of the questions appeared as 
“attitudes toward attacking sacredness” in the previous Study 2.  
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 3.1: (Main Effect) Support for warfare would be higher when sacred 
site was attacked.  
Hypothesis 3.2: (Interaction) A feeling prime would enhance support for violent 
warfare in response to an attack on a sacred site.  
Hypothesis 3.3: (Interaction) Feeling prime would lead to higher levels of risk-
taking for the sacred site.  
Hypothesis 3.4: (Interaction) Sacredness ratings will boost support for violence 
associated with sacredness.  
Hypothesis 3.5: (Interaction) Religiosity, especially devotional religiosity, will 
suppress violence associated with sacredness.  
Hypothesis 3.6: (Interaction) Ethnonationalism will boost violence associated 
with sacredness.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 410 undergraduate students enrolled at a state university in the Pacific 
Northwest participated. The sample was comprised of 68% female, and had an average 
age of 19.6 years old (SD = 2.8). No more than half of the sample was identified as 
Christians (45%), and only 18% identified with the Republican party.  
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Experimental Manipulation 
A 2 sacredness (sacred site vs. military site) by 2 priming (calculation vs. feeling) 
between-subject design was carried out with vignettes. The sacredness manipulation used 
the same hypothetical scenario as in Study 1. For the priming variable, we asked 
individuals to answer five questions before presenting the scenarios. The calculation 
prime asked participants to give answers to a set of five questions that required logical or 
mathematical calculation (e.g., If an object travels at five feet per minute, how many feet 
will it travel in 360 seconds); the feeling prime asked people to describe their feelings in 
response to some objects or names (e.g., a baby). These questions were not explicitly 
related to the research question of sacredness, and have been shown to be effective as 
operational definitions of calculation versus feeling (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004). See 
appendix I for the full list of questions.  
Attitudes toward Counterattacking 
This study included the same dependent variables and individual difference 
variables as those used in Study 1. In addition, we added a set of six items that measured 
attitudes toward counterattacking with a focus on cost-benefit analysis. These items 
examined individuals’ general estimate of costs and benefits, and their willingness to take 
the risk if a counterattack were to be implemented.  
Endorse Cost: I endorse the military attack regardless of the how much money it 
would cost to do so.  
Endorse Casualty: I endorse the military attack regardless of the casualties it 
would cost to do so.  
Benefit: I expect the counterattack to be (not beneficial to extremely beneficial)  
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Cost: I expect the counterattack to be (not costly to extremely costly) 
Risk Casualty: According to a report from military intelligence, if the 
counterattack is implemented, there is a one-third probability that no soldiers will die and 
a two-third probability that over 1000 soldiers of Ourlandia will die. How strongly would 
you support the counterattack?  
Risk Loss: According to a report from military intelligence, if the counterattack is 
implemented, there is a one-third probability that Ourlandia will win the war and a two-
third probability that Ourlandia will be defeated. How strongly would you support the 
counterattack?  
Results 
In general, data did not support our hypotheses. We did not identify any 
interaction effect of sacredness and priming. Feeling-based processing did not increase 
support for war under the sacred condition. There was no effect on risk-taking either.  
Distributions and Correlations 
Figure 4.1 presents the distributions for moral judgment (blue chart on top) and 
support for violent warfare (red chart at the bottom) across four conditions. It was worth 
noting that the distribution of support for war had a thick tail and appeared a little bit 
bimodal for sacred site under the feeling prime (the lower right distribution), whereas the 
distribution was almost perfectly normal for sacred site under the calculation prime (the 
second red distribution).   
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Figure 4.1. Distributions of dependent variables across four conditions in Study 3.  
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Table 4.1 presents the correlations among the variables used in this study. Internal 
reliability coefficients, Cronbach’s alpha, are on the diagonal where it applies. All 
variables had acceptable reliabilities. With this sample size, r > .10 is statistically 
significant at .05 level. To highlight the large effect sizes, coefficients less than .25 are 
dimmed in gray. 
Dependent variables correlated positively and strongly with militant extremism, 
conservatism, ethnonationalism, and moderately with rational and sacred duty of 
civilization. Again, religiosity was not relevant. Slightly different from previous studies, 
sacred ratings did not correlate with the dependent variables.  
Similar to Study 1, sacred duty correlated positively with conservatism (and being 
Republican), religiosity (and being Christian), and moral absolutism, whereas 
correlations with these variables were not noticeable for rational duty. 
The two meaning measures did not show much of an association with the other 
variables. They correlated negatively with each other, suggesting that people with 
abundance of meaning tended to search less. Presence of meaning correlated with 
religiosity, whereas search for meaning did not. 
Despite the fact that the sample was from a different region of the United States 
than previous studies, the correlational patterns remained quite consistent with findings 
from the previous studies in this series.  
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Table 4.1. Correlations (off diagonal) and reliabilities (on diagonal) of the variables in Study 3.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1. Being Female . .07 .03 .04 .23 -.12 -.23 -.08 .04 -.02 -.01 .08 -.05 .05 .02 -.05
2. Being Christian . .28 .02 .09 .11 .12 .38 .61 .27 .32 .47 .11 .16 .12 .28
3. Being Republican . .01 .03 .13 .21 .47 .24 .18 .25 .28 .15 .14 .01 .13
4. Importance of Site . .30 .23 .15 .07 .03 .16 .02 -.03 .02 .05 .07 -.07
5. Sacredness of Site . .20 -.01 .03 .11 .13 .10 .13 .02 .11 .10 -.02
6. Moral Judgment .76 .46 .25 .10 .29 .48 .24 .20 .08 .17 .19
7. Violent Warfare .84 .31 .08 .23 .39 .19 .15 .06 .04 .07
8. Conservatism . .38 .24 .38 .38 .13 .13 .04 .33
9. Duke Religiosity .91 .26 .38 .60 .13 .29 .06 .31
10. Ethnonationalism .76 .43 .43 .33 .16 .23 .12
11. Militant Extremism .82 .60 .31 .17 .17 .35
12. Sacred Duty of Civilization .72 .44 .23 .12 .32
13. Rational Duty of Civilization .72 .00 .11 .08
14. Presence of Meaning .86 -.17 .16
15. Search for Meaning .83 -.07
16. Moral Absolutism .70
 Table 4.2 presents correlations of the attitude with the other variables. A risk-
taking variable (the last column) was created as an average of all six attitude-related 
variables with “cost” reversely scored. This variable indicated a general tendency to take 
the risk of supporting a war.  
All attitudes variables correlated positively with each other, except that cost 
correlated negatively with risk taking. This made sense because a higher estimate of cost 
predict a hesitation to take the risk. Dependent variables correlated with all attitudes 
variables except for cost. The lack of a correlation of cost with the dependent variables 
suggested an explanation for the previous result of no casualty effect. Basically, cost or 
casualties were not a relevant factor when our sample was considering supporting war. 
Manipulating cost, therefore, had very limited effect.  
H3.1, H3.2, and H3.3: ANCOVA 
Table 4.3 presents the means and standard deviations of variables across two 
conditions of sacredness, and two priming conditions. Sacred site was significantly more 
sacred than the military site, F = 107.43, p = .000, Ș2 = .210. The sacred site also 
triggered slightly higher moral judgment, F = 6.07, p = .014, Ș2 = .015. This was 
consistent with previous findings.  
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Table 4.2. Correlations of attitudes variables in Study 3. 
 Cost Benefit Risk 
Casualty 
Risk 
Loss 
Endorse 
Cost 
Endorse 
Casualty 
Risk 
Taking 
Being Female .02 -.06 -.15 .02 -.10 -.03 -.09 
Being Christian -.01 .14 .12 .14 .04 .00 .12 
Being Republican -.01 .11 .13 .13 .10 .19 .17 
Importance of Site .09 .19 .11 .09 .18 .09 .16 
Sacredness of Site -.05 .05 .05 .13 .08 .12 .12 
Moral Judgment -.13 .32 .34 .33 .48 .44 .52 
Violent warfare -.10 .35 .50 .37 .55 .50 .60 
Conservatism -.04 .16 .25 .23 .22 .17 .27 
Duke Religiosity .04 .09 .08 .09 .03 .07 .09 
Ethnonationalism -.04 .18 .18 .17 .23 .27 .27 
Militant Extremism -.11 .26 .32 .34 .36 .43 .46 
Sacred duty -.05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .23 .22 
Rational duty -.03 .08 .08 .09 .10 .14 .13 
Presence Meaning .06 .03 .05 .08 .04 .11 .07 
Search Meaning -.03 .06 .02 .04 .05 .05 .06 
Moral Absolutism -.11 .05 .09 .17 .04 .15 .14 
Cost . -.13 -.05 -.12 -.08 -.13 -.29 
Benefit  . .36 .36 .43 .31 .66 
Risk Casualty   . .46 .52 .51 .74 
Risk Loss    . .43 .53 .73 
Endorse Cost     . .58 .79 
Endorse Casualty      . .77 
Risk Taking       . 
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 Table 4.3. Mean comparisons across manipulation conditions in Study 3. 
 Sacredness Manipulation  Priming 
Variables Military Sacred  Calculation Feeling 
Importance of Site 3.48(.60) 3.59(.55)  3.54(.59) 3.53(.57) 
Sacredness of Site 2.56(.96) 3.46(.78)**  3.02(.96) 2.99(1.00) 
Moral Judgment 1.86(.51) 1.99(.57)*  1.95(.55) 1.89(.54) 
Violent warfare 1.50(.67) 1.46(.68)  1.48(.65) 1.49(.70) 
Conservatism 1.62(.76) 1.60(.72)  1.64(.76) 1.57(.72) 
Duke Religiosity 1.37(1.14) 1.51(1.14)  1.47(1.21) 1.41(1.08) 
Ethnonationalism 2.20(.75) 2.30(.81)  2.25(.74) 2.25(.82) 
Militant Extremism 1.22(.62) 1.20(.62)  1.21(.59) 1.21(.65) 
Sacred duty 1.64(.86) 1.66(.90)  1.67(.85) 1.62(.90) 
Rational duty 2.10(.81) 2.17(.77)  2.21(.74) 2.06(.83) 
Presence of Meaning 2.27(.86) 2.29(.82)  2.34(.86) 2.22(.82) 
Search for Meaning 2.79(.76) 2.78(.70)  2.73(.75) 2.84(.71) 
Moral Absolutism .97(.58) .97(.56)  1.06(.61) .88(.51) 
Cost 3.31(.62)* 3.16(.63)  3.18(.61) 3.29(.65) 
Benefit 2.33(.94)** 2.02(1.03)  2.13(1.01) 2.23(.98) 
Risk Casualty 1.64(1.03) 1.50(1.00)  1.55(1.04) 1.59(.98) 
Risk Loss 1.32(.98) 1.31(1.03)  1.34(1.03) 1.28(.97) 
Endorse Cost 1.66(1.12) 1.54(1.11)  1.56(1.12) 1.64(1.11) 
Endorse Casualty .97(.93) 1.00(.96)  .99(.93) .98(.96) 
Risk-Taking 1.44(.64) 1.37(.67)  1.40(.68) 1.41(.63) 
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There were also significant main effects of sacredness on cost and on benefit. 
Estimated cost was lower when sacred site was attacked, F = 5.14, p = .024, Ș2 = .013. 
Estimated benefit was also lower for sacred site, F = 10.40, p = .001, Ș2 = .025. However, 
there was no main effect on risk-taking. This finding suggested that individuals perceived 
both lower costs and lower benefits to counterattack for the sacred site. Note the 
similarity with previous findings in Study 2 where individuals also indicated lower costs 
and benefits for attacking the sacred site. Results, therefore, have consistently shown the 
low valuation associated with the sacred site.  
There was no interaction effect between priming and sacredness. In addition, 
there was no main effect of priming. 
Table 4.4 presents coefficients from ANCOVA procedures predicting support for 
warfare (left panel), moral judgment (middle panel), and risk-taking (right panel). The 
main and interaction effects in predicting these three dependent variables remained non-
significant.   
These preliminary results, once again, failed to reveal the main effect of 
sacredness in predicting violence (H3.1). More importantly, the priming of feelings did 
not boost the effect of sacredness on violence (H3.2), nor on a willingness to take the risk 
(H3.3). Results thus far have indicated that sacredness did not provoke higher levels of 
violence, even when feelings (i.e. hot cognition) dominated the decision process.  
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Table 4.4. ANCOVA in Study 3. 
 Support for War  Moral Judgment   Risk Taking 
Variables in the 
Equation 
F p Ș2  F p Ș2  F p Ș2 
Sacredness .24 .624 .001  9.59 .002 .024  .63 .427 .002 
Priming .34 .560 .001  1.19 .277 .003  .02 .902 .000 
Interaction .00 .949 .000  2.70 .101 .007  .03 .874 .000 
Conservatism 20.72 .000 .050  6.15 .014 .015  10.01 .002 .025 
Duke Religiosity 2.57 .110 .006  4.55 .034 .011  4.56 .033 .011 
Ethnonationalism 1.60 .206 .004  1.73 .190 .004  4.62 .032 .012 
Militant Extremism 38.39 .000 .088  64.79 .000 .141  58.71 .000 .129 
Sacred Duty 2.34 .127 .006  1.28 .259 .003  .82 .365 .002 
Rational Duty .92 .337 .002  1.17 .280 .003  .13 .720 .000 
Presence of Meaning .05 .825 .000  .86 .354 .002  .01 .939 .000 
Search for Meaning 1.33 .249 .003  3.66 .057 .009  .76 .385 .002 
 
Moderated Effects 
We wanted to replicate the three moderating effects with sacredness rating, 
religiosity, and ethnonationalism found in previous studies.  
H3.4: Sacredness Rating as Moderator 
There was a nonsignificant moderating effect of sacredness rating on sacredness 
predicting moral judgment, b = .11 (-.03, .25), p = .109. However, the pattern was similar 
to previous results. When sacredness rating was low, violence associated with sacredness 
was lower, b = -.13 (-.33, 08); when sacredness rating was high, sacred violence 
increased over military violence, b = .09 (-.09, .28). Figure 4.2 shows this pattern.  
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Figure 4.2. Moderation effects of sacredness rating on sacredness predicting support for 
violent warfare. 
 
H3.5: Religiosity as Moderator 
Different from previous results, religiosity did not display a significant 
moderation effect, b = .02 (-.09, .12), p = .307; nor did devotional religiosity, b = .02 (-
.09, .12), p = .353.  
H3.6: Ethnonationalism as Moderator 
Ethnonationalism did not significantly interact with sacredness either, b = .01 (-
.14, .17), p = .161.  
Discussion 
This study included a feeling prime in order to turn up the emotional volume of 
the sacredness condition. However, we did not find any significant interaction of 
sacredness with priming. It turned out that the decision with respect to supporting the war 
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for sacredness had little to do with whether feeling or calculation was a dominant mode 
of information processing.  
It should be pointed out that we did not assume that the emotions in general 
would prime aggressive emotions of attack. Instead, the theory of affective psychology of 
value furnished our hypothesis that a feeling-dominated decision process would catalyze 
a feeling-susceptible sacredness-driven violence. In other words, we have focused on the 
interaction effect of feeling and sacredness, and not the main effect of the feeling prime. 
However, it would not be surprising that priming of a more specific subset of emotions –
anger, shame, fear – might be more likely to encourage violence. The media, for 
example, essentially prime emotions in these conditions, and often very specific negative 
emotions. It is possible that some of the more specific emotional primes might be more 
effective for sacred than for military site counterattack. 
In addition, counterattacking for the sacred site was considered as less costly and 
less beneficial; these results paralleled those of Study 2 where sacred site was 
undervalued as a target to attack. These findings, again, suggested that the sacred site was 
not a major motivator for launching a war.   
Moderated Effects 
Different from previous studies, sacredness rating, religiosity, and 
ethnonationalism all failed to demonstrate significant moderating effects, although the 
patterns were similar to previous ones. Failure to achieve statistical significance was 
partly due to the large standard errors in the test. Compared to the samples in the previous 
two studies, the current sample was more liberal, less religious, and more ideologically 
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heterogeneous. This demographic difference might be a factor contributing to the 
different results.  
Next Questions 
The population of American students may introduce bias by being more secular 
and less violent than the general population. Such characteristics may have put a cap on 
how much participants would support war to protect a sacred site. Samples from a 
different political and religious background would be useful to test the generalizability of 
the current results. In Study 4, we recruited a sample of Iranian Muslim students to 
further test the robustness of our results. 
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CHAPTER V 
STUDY 4: MORAL JUDGMENT AND SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT WARFARE 
INFLUENCED BY SACREDNESS AND CASUALTY IN IRAN 
Study 4 aims to extend the findings from Study 1 to a Muslim population. The 
inclusion of an Iranian sample not only adds a cross-cultural component to the current 
study, but has a direct implication for our primary hypotheses. American society is 
relatively secular with no established national religion, and the Christian religion is only 
one of many social rationalities that direct people’s beliefs. In contrast, Iran is a 
traditionally religious society, and Shiite Islam permeates social life. Compared to 
American students, Iranian individuals were expected to have a different, if not deeper, 
understanding of sacredness, and Muslim beliefs should exert a greater impact on how 
people interact with the sacred.  
Rationale and Hypothesis 
It was possible that the Iranian sample would have a different understanding of 
the sacred than the American sample in Study 1. It was also possible that the moral 
implications of Islamic theology in the context of theocratic Iran would differ noticeably 
from those of Christian theology in the secular US. Given these important differences, we 
would test all of the hypotheses as first proposed in Study 1.  
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 4.1: (Main Effect) Attacking the sacred site (vs. military stronghold) 
will cause greater moral judgment and support for violent warfare. This hypothesis, 
central to our interest, follows naturally from the “P” component of MAPR — protection 
against violation. People resort to extreme measures in response to violation of the 
sacred.  
Hypothesis 4.2: (Main Effect) High casualty estimate will lead to lower support 
for violent warfare. This hypothesis taps into an important factor in the cost-benefit 
analysis for warfare.  
Hypothesis 4.3: (Interaction) Support for violent warfare will decrease as 
casualties increase when the military stronghold was attacked. However, when the sacred 
site was attacked, support for violence will not be as influenced by casualty concerns. 
This follows from the argument that the obligation of protecting the sacred overwhelms 
cost-benefits calculations. 
Hypothesis 4.4: (Interaction) The effect in Hypothesis 1 will be stronger for those 
who rate the sacred site sacred. This resonates with the “A” component of MAPR — 
perceiving the sacredness. It is suggested that those who can perceive sacredness would 
be more likely to respond to the violation of sacredness.  
Hypothesis 4.5: (Interaction) The effect should be stronger for those who are high 
in religiosity. Argued as the “R” component of MAPR, religious people should be more 
familiar with the idea of sacredness. Higher awareness of sacredness, as in Hypothesis 2, 
may enhance a response to violation of the sacred. 
Hypothesis 4.6: (Interaction) The effect will be stronger for those who are high in 
meaning search and low in meaning presence. This is the prediction from the “M” 
component of MAPR, which recapitulates the meaning-offering function of sacredness. A 
meaning searcher would protect the sacred more vehemently as they need to gain 
meaning from it.  
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Hypothesis 4.7: (Interaction) The effect would be stronger for those who are high 
in ethnonationalism. Ethnonationalism sacralizes one’s ethnic heritage. High scores on 
this variable would accentuate one’s devotion to sacredness. 
Hypothesis 4.8: (Interaction) The effect would be stronger for those who take a 
sacred duty for their civilization. The variable sacred duty assesses how strongly one 
tends to sacralize one’s cultural identity. High score on this variable would accentuate 
one’s devotion to sacredness. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 257 undergraduate students enrolled at a public university in 
Tehran, Iran. The sample was comprised of 54% female, and had an average age of 22.3 
years old (SD = 4.6). The sample was predominantly identified as Muslim (93%). 
Experimental Manipulation 
Similar to Study 1, A 2 sacredness (sacred site vs. military site) by 2 casualty 
(large casualty vs. small casualty) by 2 scenario (hypothetical vs. semi-real) mixed design 
was carried out with vignettes. All participants responded to two scenarios in a within-
subject design — first a hypothetical scenario, followed by individual difference 
variables, and then a semi-real scenario. The hypothetical scenario describes a situation 
where a hypothetical country of the research participants called “Ourlandia” is attacked 
by a hypothetical enemy called “Theirlandia,” and a counterattack is in preparation. The 
semi-real scenario describes a situation where the Iran is attacked by terrorists, and a 
counterattack is in preparation. A between-subject design randomly assigned individuals 
into one of the four groups defined by two independent variables. The sacredness 
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independent variable involved the contrast between an attack on a sacred site versus a 
military site, and the casualty independent variable reflected differences in expected 
casualties associated with the counter attack. Participants in each of the four groups 
received hypothetical and semi-real scenarios that were consistent with the manipulation 
conditions. For instance, participants in the sacred, high casualty group first responded to 
a sacred, high casualty hypothetical scenario, and then a sacred, high casualty semi-real 
scenario.  
The hypothetic scenarios were identical to those used in Study 1. The difference 
existed in the adaptation of two semi-real scenarios to the Iranian context. The sacred 
condition in Iran described an attack on a holy, historical mosque Masjed-e Jāmp located 
in the ancient city of Isfahan. Masjed-e Jāmp is the oldest Friday mosque in Iran. The 
mosque is not only a sacred place for worshipping and holding memorial ceremonies, but 
an outstanding example of Iranian Islamic architectural style spanning over 12 centuries. 
Given its distinctive cultural value, Masjed-e Jāmp was inscribed as a UNESCO world 
heritage site in 2012. The military condition involved an attack on a military base in the 
Isfahan area.  
Sacred condition: A group of terrorists carried out an attack on the Masjed-e Jāmp 
of Isfahan. These terrorists found a way to break through the security arrangements at this 
site and drove their car close enough to the holy mosque to attack it with a car bomb. The 
attack severely damaged the foundation and body of the Masjed-e Jāmp. No Iranian lives 
were lost. The Masjed-e Jāmp is the oldest Friday (congregational) mosque in Iran. It is a 
place that symbolizes the identity, nobility, and heritage of the Iranian civilization. The 
Iranian government is planning a violent warfare in response to this terrorist attack.  
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Military condition: A group of terrorists carried out an attack on a major military 
base in the Isfahan area. These terrorists found a way to break down a fence and drove 
their car to a major supply building that they then destroyed with a car bomb. The 
resulting explosion triggered massive secondary explosions in stored ammunition and 
produced major damage to numerous base facilities. No Iranian lives were lost. This base 
is of major strategic importance for national defense because it is a staging area for both 
military logistics and civil aviation in the western part of the country. The Iranian 
government is planning a violent warfare in response to this terrorist attack. 
Dependent and individual difference variables used the same measures as in 
Study 1. We followed the procedures of translation and back-translation to adapt the 
English-language measures into Farsi (the Persian language spoken in Iran). In this 
translation process, a Farsi native speaker first translated a measure from English to Farsi 
and another unaffiliated Farsi speaker translated the Farsi measure back to English. 
Differences between the back-translation and original measures were resolved and used 
to update the Farsi translation. Appendix has full versions of most of the scales used in 
this study in Farsi.  
Results 
In general, the results in Iran were consistent with previous results from the US. 
There was no significant main effect of sacredness promoting violence.    
Distributions and Correlations 
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 present the distributions for moral judgment (blue chart 
on top) and support for violent warfare (red chart at the bottom) across four conditions in 
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the hypothetical and semi-real scenarios. Recall that all variables were measured on a 5-
point scale with a median of 2.  
Distributions in the hypothetical scenario (Figure 5.1) were close to normal. 
Distribution of the support for violent warfare variable seemed to have a greater variance 
than that of moral judgment. The moral judgment variable in the semi-real scenario, 
upper graph in Figure 5.2, showed a negative skew. Majority of the sample scored at mid-
to-high range of the scale, with quite a few at the ceiling, and the scale mean hit nearly 3. 
Support for violent warfare variable was less skewed.  
Table 5.1 presents the correlations among the variables used in the study. Internal 
reliability coefficients, Cronbach’s alpha, are on the diagonal where it applies. All but the 
moral absolutism variables had acceptable reliabilities. With this sample size, r > .15 is 
statistically significant at .05 level. To highlight the large effect sizes, coefficients less 
than .25 are dimmed in gray. Rows 8 to 11, labeled “SR”, refer to the variables in the 
semi-real scenarios.   
In both scenarios, DVs were strongly and positively associated, in the order of 
magnitude, with militant extremism, sacred duty, and religiosity. Being Muslim, 
ethnonationalism, rational duty, presence of meaning, and search for meaning were 
selectively associated with moral judgment but only weakly with support for violent 
warfare. Rating of sacredness was associated with DV only in the semi-real scenario.  
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Figure 5.1. Distributions of dependent variables (jittered) across four conditions in the 
hypothetical scenario in Study 4.  
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Figure 5.2. Distributions of dependent variables (jittered) across four conditions in the 
semi-real scenario in Study 4.   
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Table 5.1. Correlations (off diagonal) and reliabilities (on diagonal) of the variables in Study 4.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1. Being Female . .03 .01 -.04 .03 -.07 -.01 -.00 -.12 -.10 .01 .05 .03 -.03 .01 .02 -.05 .00 -.13
2. Being Muslim . .32 .23 .36 .18 .26 .13 .45 .12 .05 .27 .35 .02 .13 .10 .33 .34 -.10
3. Importance of Site . .58 .28 .25 .57 .44 .36 .31 -.08 .39 .35 .19 .26 .31 .36 .30 -.08
4. Sacredness of Site . .35 .22 .36 .56 .35 .32 .05 .44 .37 .30 .31 .26 .31 .20 .12
5. Moral Judgment .83 .47 .37 .39 .58 .40 .10 .31 .37 .43 .34 .29 .33 .26 .15
6. Violent Warfare .76 .26 .34 .34 .67 .23 .33 .19 .43 .34 .18 .14 .08 .25
7. Importance SR . .57 .42 .38 -.01 .29 .35 .21 .28 .32 .38 .30 -.02
8. Sacredness SR . .39 .44 .13 .35 .34 .34 .39 .34 .30 .20 .07
9. Moral Judgment SR .89 .49 .10 .39 .41 .42 .36 .37 .42 .30 .12
10. Violent Warfare SR .77 .23 .32 .25 .44 .32 .21 .24 .14 .23
11. Conservatism . .18 .00 .24 .29 .11 .01 -.11 .24
12. Duke Religiosity .84 .42 .41 .38 .34 .33 .13 .24
13. Ethnonationalism .79 .22 .31 .35 .36 .31 .05
14. Militant Extremism .79 .65 .46 .10 .07 .39
15. Sacred Duty .69 .58 .18 .13 .30
16. Rational Duty .78 .25 .14 .12
17. Presence Meaning .78 .33 -.05
18. Search Meaning .84 -.10
19. Moral Absolutism .39
The pattern parted from what we found in the US. First of all, religiosity and 
sacred duty were not correlated with support for violent warfare in the US but became 
major predictors in Iran. Secondly, conservatism as a major predictor of the DV in the US 
became irrelevant in Iran. Thirdly, meaning had some effect on moral judgment in Iran 
but was irrelevant in the US. The major discrepancy was in the role that religion and 
attitudes toward tradition (i.e., conservatism) played in promoting violence. In the US, 
conservatism was associated with more violence, whereas in Iran religiosity was. In the 
US, conservative people also reported high levels of religiosity (rs > .33); in Iran, the 
correlation was much weaker (r = .18, p < .05).  
Sacred and rational duties were very similar in their correlational patterns except 
that sacred duty was strongly correlated with support for violence, conservatism, and 
moral absolutism whereas rational duty was not. It was interesting to see that both sacred 
and rational duties strongly correlated with religiosity. In the US, only sacred duty did. 
Rational duty in Iran may be interpreted through a religious lens which is the mainstream 
ideology for the Iranian society.  
Presence of meaning was positively correlated with search for meaning, in 
contrast with the negative correlation in the US. Presence of meaning was more strongly 
associated with rating of sacredness and religiosity while both were associated with being 
Muslim, moral judgment, and ethnonationalism. In the US, meaning was not strongly 
associated with ethnonationalism or being Christian. This suggested that ethnic and 
religious tradition were important sources of meaning for Iranians. 
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H4.1, H4.2, H4.3: ANCOVA 
Table 5.2 presents the means and standard deviations of variables across two 
conditions of sacredness, in both hypothetical and semi-real scenarios. The only 
significant difference occurred on the rating of sacredness. The sacred site was rated 
more sacred than the military site in the hypothetical scenario, F = 8.04, p = .005, Ș2 = 
.034. There was no difference on the rating of importance.  
Table 5.2. Mean comparisons across the sacredness conditions in Study 4. 
 Hypothetical  Semi-Real  
Variables Military Sacred  Military Sacred 
Importance of Site 2.98(1.26) 3.09(1.21)  3.01(1.19) 2.83(1.23) 
Sacredness of Site 2.50(1.34) 2.98(1.31)**  2.40(1.30) 2.69(1.23) 
Moral Judgment 2.41(.83) 2.42(.81)  2.89(.80) 2.84(.79) 
Violent Warfare 2.14(.83) 2.06(.80)  2.22(.83) 2.13(.79) 
Conservatism 2.07(.93) 1.97(1.03)    
Duke Religiosity 2.37(.99) 2.34(1.08)    
Ethnonationalism 3.00(.76) 2.93(.87)    
Militant Extremism 2.25(.68) 2.22(.81)    
Sacred Duty 2.48(.87) 2.53(.89)    
Rational Duty 2.88(.87) 2.76(.94)    
Presence of Meaning 2.90(.78) 2.88(.72)    
Search for Meaning 3.18(.76) 3.04(.77)    
Moral Absolutism 1.56(.59) 1.64(.65)    
 
It was also interesting to examine the within-subject effects of semi-real versus 
hypothetical scenarios. There was no significant difference in rating of importance 
between the sites in the hypothetical scenario and the sites in the semi-real scenario. The 
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site in the hypothetical scenario was rated more sacred, F = 7.09, p = .008, Ș2 = .026. 
This suggested that the hypothetical scenario was better than the semi-real scenario in 
manipulating levels of sacredness. The specific examples used in the semi-real scenarios, 
a military base and the Masjed-e Jāmp, may have introduced confounding variables. That 
hypothetical scenario performed better was similar to what we found in Study 1.  
Moral Judgment was significantly higher in the semi-real scenario, F = 90.74, p = 
.000, Ș2 = .256. Support for violent warfare was marginally higher in the semi-real 
scenario, F = 3.71, p = .055, Ș2 = .014. These patterns were similar to the findings in the 
US in Study 1.  
Table 5.3 presents means across two conditions of casualty. Small casualties 
caused a significantly higher support for violent warfare in the semi-real scenario, F = 
4.46, p = .036, Ș2 = .017. Other than that, casualty did not influence any other variables 
with statistical significance. The general direction in the dependent variables favored for 
small casualties. This was opposite to what we have observed in the US where large 
casualties increased violence. It suggested that in Iran, casualties could indeed be a factor 
when deciding for war. This sensitivity to casualties in Iran might be partly associated 
with knowledge of the relevantly recent event of the Iran-Iraq War.  
The group comparisons showed that the manipulations of sacredness and cost did 
not directly influence individual’s moral judgment and support for violent warfare. Nor 
was there an interaction effect between sacredness and casualty. Table 2.4 presents 
coefficients from ANCOVA predicting support for warfare (left panel) and moral 
judgment (right panel) in both the hypothetical and semi-real scenarios. There was only 
one significant effects pertaining to H4.1-H4.3: Support for war in the semi-real scenario 
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was significantly lower for high casualties, F = 7.84, p = .006, Ș2 = .032. Religiosity was 
still significantly associated with support for war in the hypothetical scenario. 
Table 5.3. Mean comparison across the casualty conditions in Study 2. 
 Hypothetical  Semi-Real  
Variables Small 
Casualty 
Large 
Casualty 
 Small 
Casualty 
Large 
Casualty 
Importance of Site 3.01(1.22) 3.01(1.25)  2.99(1.18) 2.79(1.22) 
Sacredness of Site 2.83(1.30) 2.65(1.35)  2.70(1.22) 2.41(1.24) 
Moral Judgment 2.43(.80) 2.30(.86)  2.86(.88) 2.80(.84) 
Violent Warfare 2.12(.80) 2.10(.79)  2.29(.75)* 2.08(.82) 
Conservatism 2.03(1.01) 2.06(.98)    
Duke Religiosity 2.31(1.06) 2.42(1.01)    
Ethnonationalism 2.94(.82) 2.87(.90)    
Militant Extremism 2.23(.77) 2.28(.72)    
Sacred Duty 2.52(.93) 2.58(.83)    
Rational Duty 2.88(.93) 2.77(.88)    
Presence of Meaning 2.86(.76) 2.81(.82)    
Search for Meaning 3.03(.81) 3.07(.80)    
Moral Absolutism 1.59(.61) 1.64(.61)    
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Table 5.4. ANCOVA in Study 4. 
Variables in the 
Equation 
Support for Violent War  Moral Judgment  
Hypothetical Scenario F p Ș2  F p Ș2 
Sacredness .07 .792 .000  .19 .663 .001 
Casualty .37 .546 .001  2.09 .149 .009 
Interaction .41 .524 .002  .20 .659 .001 
Conservatism 2.26 .134 .009  .02 .895 .000 
Duke Religiosity 4.46 .036 .018  .04 .834 .000 
Ethnonationalism .18 .671 .001  3.56 .060 .015 
Militant Extremism 19.87 .000 .075  32.59 .000 .119 
Sacred Duty 2.17 .142 .009  .24 .626 .001 
Rational Duty 3.57 .060 .014  .08 .783 .000 
Presence of Meaning .32 .572 .001  3.91 .049 .016 
Search for Meaning .48 .489 .002  1.56 .212 .006 
Semi-Real Scenario        
Sacredness .25 .618 .001  .00 .960 .000 
Casualty 7.84 .006 .032  .09 .762 .000 
Interaction .31 .580 .001  1.2 .281 .005 
Conservatism 3.77 .053 .016  .08 .783 .000 
Duke Religiosity .79 .375 .003  .58 .446 .002 
Ethnonationalism 2.63 .106 .011  4.37 .038 .018 
Militant Extremism 29.51 .000 .111  26.02 .000 .097 
Sacred Duty .07 .798 .000  .02 .900 .000 
Rational Duty 2.46 .118 .010  4.08 .044 .017 
Presence of Meaning 4.80 .030 .020  9.78 .002 .039 
Search for Meaning 2.03 .156 .008  1.10 .296 .005 
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Moderated Effects 
The broad prediction was that effect of sacredness and casualty on the DVs would 
be a function of individual differences. The predictors in these analyses were sacredness 
and casualty. The response variables would be support for violent warfare. Moderators 
were individual difference variables, which included rating of sacredness, religiosity, 
meaning, ethnonationalism and rational and sacred duties. We also controlled for all the 
covariates that appeared in the ANCOVA.  
H4.4: Sacredness Rating as Moderator 
Rating of sacredness marginally moderated the effect of sacredness on support for 
violence in the hypothetical scenario, b = -.11 (-.24, .03), p = .084. The moderated effect 
was stronger in the semi-real scenario, b = -.13 (-.26, .00), p = .057. 
As shown in Figure 5.3, sacredness rating increased support for violence in both 
conditions, while the increase in the military condition was higher than the increase in the 
sacred condition. Support for violent warfare was equally low when sacredness rating 
was low, b = .06 (-.18, .29), but was higher for military site when sacredness rating was 
high, b = -.27 (-.50, -.03). This pattern was different from that in the US, where 
sacredness rating selectively boosted support for violence in the sacredness condition.  
H4.5: Religiosity as Moderator 
The moderating effect of religiosity, shown in Figure 5.4, was not significant, b = 
-.07 (-.24, .10), nor did devotional religiosity, b = -.10 (-.27, .07) or coalitional religiosity, 
b = -.10 (-.27, .07). Results in the semi-real scenario was similarly not significant, b = -
.07 (-.24, .10). The findings did not show the pacifying effect of religiosity as found in 
the US. In particular, sacredness-driven violence did not decrease as religiosity increased.    
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Figure 5.3. Moderation effect of sacredness rating on sacredness predicting support for 
violent warfare in the semi-real scenario. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Moderation effect (nonsignificant) of religiosity on sacredness predicting 
support for violent warfare in the hypothetical scenario. 
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H4.6: Meaning as Moderator 
There was no significant moderating effect with neither presence of meaning, b = 
-.07 (-.29, .15), nor search for meaning, b = -.03 (-.25, .19).  
H4.7: Ethnonationalism as Moderator 
There was no significant moderating effect with ethnonationalism, b = -.15 (-.69, 
.38).  
H4.8: Sacred Duty as Moderator 
There was no significant moderating effect with neither sacred duty, b = .05 (-.15, 
.25), nor rational duty, b = -.09 (-.28, .10). 
Differences across Three Populations 
We carried out a series of studies on sacredness-driven violence in three quite 
different cultures. Study 1 involved student samples at University of Tennessee at 
Chattanooga (UTC), Study 3 included student samples at University of Oregon (UO), and 
Study 4 benefited from participation of Iranian students in Tehran. As many of the major 
variables consistently appeared in all of these studies, it would be of interest to compare 
means of these variables across three populations. Table 5.5 displays the means with 
superscripts indicating rank.  
UO students had highest importance rating of the hypothetical site, followed by 
UTC and then by Iran, F = 28.67, p = .000, Ș2 = .051. UO and UTC also had higher 
sacredness rating than Iran, F = 4.79, p = .009, Ș2 = .009. However, higher rating of 
sacredness or importance did not translate to higher support for war. Iran was highest on 
moral judgment, F = 49.91, p = .000, Ș2 = .085, and highest on support for violent 
133 
warfare, F = 57.07, p = .000, Ș2 = .096. Taken together, these data offered another piece 
of indirect evidence for the lack of association between sacredness and violence.  
The remaining variables suggested that our samples from UTC and Iran scored 
higher on traits that correlated positively with higher levels of violence than the sample 
from UO. In particular, Iran was highest on militant extremism, followed by UTC, and 
followed by UO, F = 187.01, p = .000, Ș2 = .258. UTC was highest on conservatism, F = 
324.53, p = .000, Ș2 = .376. Iran was higher on ethnonationalism than UTC and UO, F = 
69.62, p = .000, Ș2 = .114. Iran was highest on moral absolutism, followed by UTC and 
then by UO, F = 77.21, p = .000, Ș2 = .125. 
In addition, UTC and Iran were higher on religiosity than UO, F = 112.73, p = 
.000, Ș2 = .173. Iran was highest on sacred duty, F = 88.31, p = .000, Ș2 = .141, and on 
rational duty, F = 64.86, p = .000, Ș2 = .107. Iran was both higher on presence of 
meaning, F = 42.63, p = .000, Ș2 = .073, and on search for meaning, F = 32.97, p = .000, 
Ș2 = .058.  
Discussion 
Putting together what we have found in the four studies, we came to the consistent 
finding that there was NOT a clear connection between violation of sacredness and 
greater violence. Precisely, attack on the sacred site did not provoke higher levels of 
support for war than attack on a military site. This major finding held true for two 
American samples, varying in levels of conservatism, and for an Iranian sample. In 
addition, we found that estimated casualties of the war did not influence people’s 
decisions.  
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Table 5.5. Mean comparisons across Study 1 UTC, Study 3 UO, and Study 5 Iran. 
Variables Study 1 UTC Study 2 Iran Study 4 UO 
Importance of Site 3.32(.78)2 3.04(1.23)3 3.53(.58)1 
Sacredness of Site 2.91(1.07)1 2.74(1.34)2 3.01(.98)1 
Moral Judgment 2.03(.58)2 2.41(.82)1 1.92(.55)3 
Support for Violent Warfare 1.70(.72)2 2.10(.82)1 1.48(.68)3 
Conservatism 3.08(.86)1 2.02(.99)2 1.61(.74)3 
Duke Religiosity 2.52(1.09)1 2.36(1.03)1 1.44(1.14)2 
Ethnonationalism 2.32(.79)2 2.96(.82)1 2.25(.78)2 
Militant Extremism 1.63(.65)2 2.23(.75)1 1.21(.62)3 
Sacred Duty of Civilization 2.21(.85)2 2.51(.87)1 1.65(.88)3 
Rational Duty of Civilization 2.26(.69)2 2.82(.91)1 2.13(.79)2 
Presence of Meaning 2.57(.85)2 2.89(.75)1 2.28(.84)3 
Search for Meaning 2.56(.96)3 3.11(.77)1 2.78(.73)2 
Moral Absolutism 1.36(.76)2 1.60(.62)1 .97(.57)3 
 
Cultural Differences 
One stark contrast between the US and Iranian data was the role religiosity and 
conservatism played in people’s support for violence. Religiosity showed a pacifying 
effect in the US while it was a booster for violence in Iran. Conservatism was irrelevant 
in Iran while serving as a major predictor of violence in the US. Relatedly, people 
endorsing that they had a sacred duty for their civilization in Iran supported warfare more 
while people with high rational duty in the US supported warfare more.  
Differences in the ideologies of the two societies may help explain such a 
contrast. Both societies would resort to violence if doing so maximizes their interests. 
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What differs is the rationale behind violence. US is a secular society and justification of 
violence comes from what is reasonable. Iran is a theocratic society under the strong 
influence of Islam. Violence is then justified by what religion and the sacred would 
demand.  In Islam, the lesser outer jihad is the defensive war one is warranted to wage in 
response to attack. The greater inner jihad is the war one wage against sin within oneself 
(Post, 2009). The data seemed to point toward a lesser jihad effect.  
One might likely form a (mis)conception that in a traditionally religious society, 
protection of the sacred site would be more urgent than protection of the military site. 
Data from these two societies showed otherwise. Sacredness is important but may not be 
more important than protecting the integrity of a military site when it comes to be a 
matter of national security. The thesis that sacredness motivates violence is partially true 
at best. People can use sacredness to rationalize violence, but an attack no the sacred site 
does not necessarily provoke violence.  
Methodological Challenges 
We have addressed some of the possible challenges. Inclusion of the manipulation 
check questions showed that the scenarios indeed varied in level of sacredness but 
remained constant in level of importance. The strong correlation of militant extremism 
with the dependent variables was evidence that the dependent variables indeed measured 
a tendency to violence. Although the use of college student as participants may have 
introduced biases to the results, drawing samples from three cultures partially addressed 
this bias and demonstrated a certain level of generalizability.   
Another possible challenge was that our control condition, military site, might be 
confounded with sacred elements. A military site, although not explicitly rated as sacred, 
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may have indeed tapped into sacred spots such as national security or sovereignty. In the 
next study, we address this possibility by substituting a manufacturing plant for the 
military site.  
These studies so far have suggested that only in the rare cases do individuals 
support violent warfare for a sacred site more than for a military site. As a follow-up, we 
explore the characteristics of those individuals who would prefer sacred site to attack, and 
who would prioritize the sacred site to defend.  
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CHAPTER VI  
STUDY 5: ADDRESSING METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS 
This chapter will serve as a follow-up to the results from previous studies. Three 
sub-studies will address the methodological challenge that the use of a military site as the 
control condition introduced potential confounds, and will investigate the psychological 
characteristics of those who endorsed violence protecting or attacking the sacred site 
versus the military site.  
Rationale and Hypothesis 
A key finding from previous studies was that violation of sacredness did not 
motivate violence more than an attack on a non-sacred but equally important target. A 
military site was used in previous studies as the control target. A possible challenge was 
that the military site might have triggered some sacred concepts with its relevancy to 
national security. To address this challenge, Study 5a used as the control an attack on a 
manufacturing plant, which supposedly carries less connotation of sacredness.  
Study 5b explored the characteristics of people who would support war for a 
sacred site more than for a military site. To achieve this goal, we asked participants to 
respond to both the sacred and military conditions, and examined closely the 
characteristics of those for whom sacredness-driven violence was higher than military-
driven violence.   
Study 5c used a within-subject design to examine directly the characteristics of 
individuals who would support attacking a sacred site more than attacking a military site 
in a war. Recall that Study 2 partially examined this question and found that being 
female, high religiosity, and high conservatism were associated with assigning higher 
value to attacking a sacred site.  
Method  
Participants 
Study 5a included a total of 451 undergraduate students enrolled at a state 
university in the Southeast US. The sample was comprised of 64% female, and had an 
average age of 18.5 years old (SD = 1.6). The sample was predominantly self-identified 
as Christians (87%). 
Study 5b included 272 undergraduate students from the same institution. The 
sample was comprised of 60% female, and had an average age of 19.2 years old (SD = 
2.4). The sample was predominantly self-identified as Christians (78%). 
Sample 5c included a total of 372 undergraduate students from the same 
institution. The sample was comprised of 69% female, and had an average age of 18.6 
years old (SD = 1.2). The sample was predominantly self- identified as Christians (86%). 
Study 5a Measures 
A 2 sacredness (sacred site vs. manufacturing plant) by 2 casualty (large casualty 
vs. small casualty) by 2 scenario (hypothetical vs. semi-real) mixed design was carried 
out with vignettes. The major difference from the Study 1 scenarios appeared in the 
“control condition” being changed to a manufacturing plant. Previously, it was a military 
site. In contrast to Study 1, the semi-real scenarios used the Lincoln Memorial instead of 
the Washington Monument, and used an automobile manufacturing plant instead of a 
military camp. For the sacredness independent variable, the following paragraphs 
described the two hypothetical scenarios: 
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Sacred Condition: You are a citizen of Ourlandia, and your nation has been 
attacked by Theirlandia. Theirlandia has demonstrated strong military prowess and has 
attacked and damaged a sacred site of your nation. This site is sacred to the Spirit of 
Ourlandia. It is a place that symbolizes your identity and heritage. It confers meaning and 
brings a sense of awe into your heart. Your country, Ourlandia, is planning to strike back 
in response to the attack on this sacred site.  
Manufacture Condition: You are a citizen of Ourlandia, and your nation has been 
attacked by Theirlandia. Theirlandia has demonstrated strong military prowess and has 
attacked and damaged a manufacturing center in your nation. No Ourlandians lost their 
lives. This manufacturing center is located in one of the key population areas and is of 
strategic significance for the national economy. Your country, Ourlandia, is planning to 
strike back in response to the attack on this manufacturing center. 
The following described the semi-real scenarios: 
Sacred Condition: A group of terrorists carried out an attack on the Lincoln 
Memorial in Washington, D.C. These terrorists found a way to break through the 
security arrangements at this site and attacked the statue of Abraham Lincoln with a 
bomb. The attack severely damaged the statue. No American lives were lost. The Lincoln 
Memorial is a national monument built to honor and enshrine the legacy of the 16th 
president Abraham Lincoln who led our nation through its civil war and preserved the 
Union. It is a place that symbolizes your identity and heritage. It confers meaning and 
brings a sense of awe into your heart. The American government is planning to strike 
back in response to this terrorist attack.  
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Manufacture Condition: A group of terrorists carried out an attack on a big 
automobile manufacturing plant in the Midwest. These terrorists found a way to break 
down a fence and drove their car to a major supply building that they then destroyed with 
a car bomb. The resulting explosion triggered massive secondary explosions and 
produced major damage to numerous manufacturing facilities. No American lives were 
lost. This factory provides tens of thousands of jobs, and is a major source of tax revenue 
for the country. The American government is planning to strike back in response to this 
terrorist attack. 
The same casualty descriptions used in Study 1 followed each of the scenarios 
making a total of 2*2*2 = 8 different conditions. Each participant responded to two 
scenarios in one of the four sacredness by casualty conditions: one scenario describing 
the hypothetical situation and the other scenario describing the semi-real situation. After 
reading each scenario, participants answered three questions whose composite score 
served as a measure of the dependent variable support for violence: 1) How much do you 
support the US involvement in this war? 2) How much do you support using violence in 
the war? 3) Would it be acceptable for civilians from the terrorist country to die as a 
result of this war? Following the three questions were two questions asking how 
important and how sacred the participant believed the site in the scenario was.  
Study 5b Measures 
We included the same hypothetical sacred and military scenarios as used in Study 
1. Following each scenario, participants answered one questions, “How much do you 
support Ourlandian involvement in this war”. Each participant responded to both 
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scenarios in random order of presentation. Half the sample received the military site first 
whereas the other half received the sacred site first. 
In addition, we measured several constructs marking psychological adaptiveness 
and maladaptiveness of those who endorsed attacking military or sacred site.  
First of all, the Dark Triad measured three personality traits: Machiavellianism, 
Narcissism and Psychopathy (Jones & Paulhus, 2014). Narcissism is characterized by 
grandiosity and egotism. Machiavellianism includes manipulation and exploitation of 
others, a cynical disregard for morality, and use of deception to gain power. Psychopathy 
broadly captures antisocial behavior, impulsivity, and emotional callousness.  
Secondly, we recorded positive psychological processes with the variables of self-
esteem (Roserberg, 1965) and satisfaction with life (Diene, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 
1985). Two measures recorded negative psychological functioning, depression and 
anxiety (Costello & Comrey, 1967).  
Study 5c Measures 
We included the same two scenarios used in Study 2, in which the participants 
were to attack a military site or a sacred site. The six evaluation measures – cost, benefit, 
risk, retaliation, subordination, and endorsement – were included after each scenario. 
Each participant responded to both scenarios in random order of presentation.  
In addition, we measured several constructs marking psychological adaptiveness 
and maladaptiveness of those who endorsed attacking the military or the sacred site.  
First of all, the Dark Triad – Machiavellianism, Narcissism and Psychopathy 
(Jones & Paulhus, 2014) – was included as in Study 5b.  
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Secondly, two measures recorded positive psychological process, self-esteem 
(Rosenberg, 1965) and satisfaction with life (Diene, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). 
Two measures recorded negative psychological functioning, depression and anxiety 
(Costello & Comrey, 1967).  
Finally, we recorded three basic religious orientations or motivations (Gorsuch & 
McPherson, 1989). The intrinsic religious orientation involved treating religion as the 
master motive in life Extrinsic personal and extrinsic social religious orientations used 
religion as the means to attain personal comfort for the former and social advantage for 
the latter.  
Results for Study 5a 
Table 6.1 summarizes the group comparisons. Compared to the manufacture 
plant, the sacred site was rated more sacred in both hypothetical, F = 84.18, p = .000, Ș2 = 
.176, and semi-real scenarios, F = 20.38, p = .000, Ș2 = .053. However, in the 
hypothetical scenario, the sacred site was also more important, F = 19.72, p = .000, Ș2 = 
.048, and this resulted in a small but significant main effect, F = 4.21, p = .041, Ș2 = .011. 
We argue that this main effect was due to a higher rating of importance for the sacred 
site. Indeed, this effect disappeared after controlling for importance. There was not a 
main effect for sacredness in the semi-real scenario either.  
Small casualty encouraged higher support for war in the hypothetical scenario, F 
= 5.39, p = .021, Ș2 = .013. This result was reasonable and had appeared in Study 4 with 
the Iranian sample. However, there was no interaction effect.  
The hypothetical scenario once again demonstrated better performance than the 
semi-real scenario. It was rated as both more sacred, F = 45.58, p = .000, Ș2 = .110, and 
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more important, F = 12.55, p = .000, Ș2 = .033, than the semi-real scenario. People may 
have held different opinions and feelings towards an automobile manufacture and the 
Lincoln Memorial; these idiosyncratic opinions and feelings could have confounded the 
manipulation conditions and blurred their focus.  
Table 6.1. Mean comparisons across the sacredness and casualty conditions in Study 5a. 
 Hypothetical  Semi-Real  
Variables Manufacture 
Plant 
Sacred  
Site 
 Manufacture 
Plant 
Sacred  
Site 
Importance of Site 2.75(1.02) 3.20(1.00)*  2.69(1.06) 2.89(1.09) 
Sacredness of Site 2.08(1.27) 3.12(1.00)*  1.96(1.23) 2.54(1.19)* 
Support for War 1.72(1.03) 1.93(1.00)*  1.84(1.04) 1.73(1.06) 
 Small 
Casualty 
Large 
Casualty 
 Small 
Casualty 
Large 
Casualty 
Importance of Site 3.03(1.01) 2.98(1.06)  2.68(1.07) 2.90(1.08) 
Sacredness of Site 2.63(1.27) 2.69(1.21)  2.28(1.15) 2.32(1.29) 
Support for War 1.97(.99)* 1.73(1.03)  1.80(1.03) 1.76(1.07) 
 
Results for Study 5b 
As in Study 3, we created a variable, S>M indicating those who supported war for 
sacred site (sacred war) more than for military site (military war). Table 6.2 reports the 
means and correlations of support for war for the military site, for the sacred site, and for 
S>M. Military correlated significantly with sacred war, r = .56. There was no within-
subject difference between support for military war and support for sacred war. Only 
20.3% of people supported sacred war more than military war.   
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These results were consistent with the no-difference findings in the between-
subject designs. An average person would not support war for the sacred site more than 
for the military site. Those who would did so were only 1/5 of the population.    
People who supported military war were more conservative, more Machiavellian, 
less anxious, and higher in self-esteem. People who supported war for sacred site were 
more likely to be Christian and conservative.  
These results suggested that a major motivation for supporting sacred warfare was 
being Christian, which may be related to higher perception of sacredness.  
Results for Study 5c 
Left panel of Table 6.3 compares the variable correlations on perceived cost. 
Recall that “cost” measured how costly the individual estimated attacking a 
Table 6.2. Correlations of support for violence with other variables. 
Variables Military War Sacred War S > M 
Being Female -.15 -.19 -.06 
Being Christian .05 .17 .05 
Conservatism .18 .22 -.00 
Machiavellianism .15 .11 -.03 
Narcissism .10 .02 -.10 
Psychopathy .10 .02 .04 
Depression -.05 -.04 .08 
Anxiety -.13 -.03 .10 
Self-Esteem .18 .08 -.11 
M(SD) 2.49(1.16) 2.50(1.16) 20.3% 
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military/sacred site would be. Military cost (i.e., estimated cost of attacking a military 
site) was not significantly correlated with sacred cost, r = .06. Military cost was 
significantly higher than sacred cost, F = 81.26, p = .000, Ș2 = .181. Only 17.2% of 
people perceived higher cost of attacking the sacred site.  
Conservatism was associated with higher sacred cost than military cost, ǻr = .19, 
z = 2.67, p = .008. Extrinsic social religious orientation was associated with higher sacred 
cost, ǻr = .19, z = 2.67, p = .008.  
Table 6.3. Comparing correlations of cost and benefit with variables. 
 Cost  Benefit 
Variables Military Sacred S > M  Military Sacred S > M 
Being Female .07 -.01 -.11  -.03 -.03 -.07 
Being Christian .02 -.05 -.04  .03 .09 .03 
Conservatism -.07 .12 .01  .09 .17 .06 
Intrinsic .05 -.05 -.05  .04 .15 .01 
Extrinsic Social -.08 .11 .09  -.01 .05 .04 
Extrinsic Personal .06 .01 -.02  .08 .09 .01 
Machiavellianism .01 .08 .03  .03 .09 .05 
Narcissism -.05 .01 .06  .03 .07 .07 
Psychopathy -.05 .10 .10  -.04 .12 .11 
Depression -.07 -.02 .02  -.12 .03 .06 
Anxiety -.02 -.02 -.03  -.08 .06 .00 
Self-Esteem -.01 .01 .04  .08 -.02 -.04 
Life Satisfaction .02 .10 .09  .08 -.04 -.05 
M(SD) 2.93(.84) 2.27(1.19) 17.2%  2.69(.98) 1.79(1.10) 13.7% 
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The right panel of Table 6.3 compares the variable correlations on estimated 
benefit. Military benefit (i.e., the estimated benefit associated with attacking a military 
site) was not significantly correlated with sacred benefit at r = -.01. Military benefit was 
rated significantly higher than sacred benefit, F = 136.50, p = .000, Ș2 = .271. Only 
13.7% people believed that attacking the sacred site would be more beneficial. These 
people tended to score higher on psychopathy.  
The left panel of Table 6.4 compares the variable correlations on willingness to 
take the risk. Military risk was significantly correlated with sacred risk, r = .18, p = .000. 
Military risk was significantly higher than sacred risk, F = 94.58, p = .000, Ș2 = .204. 
Only 15.3% of people would be more willing to run higher risk attacking the sacred site. 
These people scored higher on Machiavellianism and psychopathy. In addition, they 
tended to be depressed and low in self-esteem. By contrast, those who were more willing 
to run the risk of attacking the military site were less anxious, ǻr = .20, z = 3.03, p = 
.002. These results suggested that motivation to attack the sacred was associated with 
psychological maladaptation.  
The right panel of Table 6.4 compares the variable correlations on expected 
retaliation. Military retaliation was significantly correlated with sacred retaliation at r = 
.14, p = .009. Attacking the sacred site was believed to be significantly more likely to 
trigger massive retaliation, F = 94.10, p = .000, Ș2 = .203. Over half (51.1%) believed that 
retaliation associated with attacking the sacred site would be higher than that attacking 
the military site. These people tended to score lower on psychopathy, and also lower in 
anxiety, ǻr = .14, z = 2.05, p = .040. These results suggested that fearing to attack the 
sacred site was associated with healthy psychological functioning.  
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 Table 6.4. Comparing correlations of risk and retaliation with variables. 
 Risk  Retaliation 
Variables Military Sacred S > M  Military Sacred S > M 
Being Female -.15 -.10 -.09  -.05 -.06 .03 
Being Christian .05 .07 .02  -.09 -.07 .05 
Conservatism .23 .18 -.06  .07 .05 -.02 
Intrinsic .13 .10 -.08  -.03 .00 .04 
Extrinsic Social -.02 .10 .07  .08 -.03 -.03 
Extrinsic Personal -.03 .04 .03  -.08 -.13 .01 
Machiavellianism -.00 .08 .12  .06 .03 .00 
Narcissism .10 .13 .01  .00 -.07 .02 
Psychopathy .10 .19 .11  .14 -.04 -.10 
Depression -.10 .03 .15  .02 -.08 -.07 
Anxiety -.20 .00 -.01  .03 -.11 -.08 
Self-Esteem .09 .00 -.11  -.02 .04 .09 
Satisfaction Life .09 -.01 -.10  -.04 .01 .07 
M(SD) 2.05(1.11) 1.36(1.04) 15.3%  2.39(1.22) 3.14(1.03) 51.1% 
 
The left panel of Table 6.5 compares the variable correlations on perceived effect 
of subordinating the enemy. The military effect correlated significantly with sacred 
effect, r = .10, p = .045. The military effect was significantly higher than sacred risk, F = 
99.72, p = .000, Ș2 = .214. Only 15.6% of people believed that attacking the sacred site 
would be more effective to subordinate the enemy. These people scored higher on 
Machiavellianism and depression.  
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Those who believed that attacking the military site was more effective in 
subordinating the enemy were less depressed, ǻr = .16, z = 2.30, p = .021, and less 
anxious, ǻr = .18, z = 2.62, p = .009. This was similar to the results of willingness to run 
the risk.   
Table 6.5. Comparing correlations of effect and endorsement with variables. 
 Effect for Subordination  Endorsement 
Variables Military Sacred S > M  Military Sacred S > M 
Being Female -.11 -.03 -.05  -.15 -.14 -.08 
Being Christian -.01 .00 -.02  -.04 .09 .08 
Conservatism .14 .11 -.01  .10 .23 .07 
Intrinsic .05 .09 .02  -.01 .05 -.03 
Extrinsic Social -.09 .13 .09  -.02 .16 .09 
Extrinsic Personal .04 .03 -.01  .00 .06 .04 
Machiavellianism .15 .13 .01  .11 .09 -.00 
Narcissism .09 .10 .01  .08 .08 -.01 
Psychopathy .09 .19 .10  .15 .22 .06 
Depression -.14 .02 .11  -.07 .05 .12 
Anxiety -.22 -.04 .07  -.13 .00 .00 
Self-Esteem .09 -.05 -.06  .03 -.05 -.10 
Satisfaction Life .06 -.02 -.02  -.01 -.00 -.03 
M(SD) 2.45(1.03) 1.76(1.03) 15.6%  2.01(1.05) 1.34(1.09) 12.1% 
 
The right panel of Table 6.5 compares the variable correlations on endorsement of 
attack. Military endorsement was significantly correlated with sacred endorsement at r = 
.29, p = .000. People endorsed attacking the military site significantly more than sacred 
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site, F = 103.35, p = .000, Ș2 = .219. Only 12.1% endorsed attacking the sacred site more 
than attacking the military site. These people tended to be more depressed.  
Endorsement for attacking the sacred site was more strongly associated with 
conservatism, ǻr = .13, z = 2.14, p = .033. These people were more likely to use religion 
to enhance their social status, ǻr = .18, z = 2.92, p = .004. By contrast, those who 
endorsed attacking the military site were less anxious, ǻr = .13, z = 2.10, p = .036.  
In summary, support for actively attacking a sacred site was associated with a 
range of psychological maladaptation, including Machiavellianism, psychopathy, 
depression, and anxiety. These people were also more conservative, and more likely to 
use religion as a means for achieving social goals instead of taking faith as ends. These 
results corresponded with those found in Study 2, and completed the picture that people 
were less likely to associate violence with the sacred.  
Discussion 
Results from Study 5a lent further support to the null effects consistently found in 
Study 1 through Study 4. No significant difference existed in support for war between an 
apparently non-sacred manufacture site and a sacred site.  
In Study 5b and Study 5c, we investigated two situations using within-subject 
designs. The first situation asked individuals to support warfare in response to an attack 
on either a military site or a sacred site. The second situation asked individuals opinions 
about attacking either an enemy country’s military site or sacred site.  
In both situations, counterattacking for the sacred site or attacking the sacred site 
was associated with psychological maladaptation, including higher levels of anxiety and 
depression, lower levels of self-esteem, and psychopathy. These results suggested an 
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explanation for the lack of sacredness-related violence among psychologically healthy 
individuals.  
In summary, there was not a necessary association between violation of 
sacredness with violence at the population level. Violating the sacred did not trigger 
higher levels of violence. However, this result did not rule out the possibility that a 
minority of the population indeed could be motivated for aggression in the name of 
sacredness. These people tended to be more psychologically maladjusted. The 
correlational pattern suggested two possibilities: sacredness-related violence may appeal 
particularly to people with certain psychological maladaptation; and/or engagement with 
sacredness-related violence exacerbated existing psychological challenges. Future 
research could explore these possibilities.    
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CHAPTER VII 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This dissertation primarily hypothesized that a violation of sacredness would lead 
to higher levels of violence than other non-sacred forms of violation. Tests of this 
hypothesis rested upon the assumption of an MAPR (meaning, awe, protection, and 
religion) model that sacredness symbolizes identity and heritage, confers meaning and 
brings a sense of awe.  The major independent variable was an attack on a sacred versus 
an attack on a non-sacred site, and the main dependent variable assessed support for war 
in counterattack. Samples included students from the American South (Study 1, Study 2, 
Study 5a), students from the Pacific Northwest (Study 3), and students from Tehran in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran (Study 4). The experimental design utilized vignettes to 
operationalize the independent variable, and a self-report of support for war (Appendix 
B) operationalized the dependent variable.  
For the sacred condition, the hypothetical vignette described an attack on a sacred 
site in the following terms: “You are a citizen of Ourlandia, and your nation has been 
attacked by Theirlandia. Theirlandia has demonstrated strong military prowess and has 
attacked and damaged a sacred site of your nation. This site is sacred to the Spirit of 
Ourlandia. It is a place that symbolizes your identity and heritage. It confers meaning 
and brings a sense of awe into your heart. Your country, Ourlandia, is planning to strike 
back in response to the attack on this sacred site.” This scenario focused on the M 
(meaning) and A (awe) components of the MAPR model, leaving out R (religiousness). 
The rationale for this omission was that sacredness serves as a more fundamental 
psychological process than religiousness, and many seemingly non-religious values can 
also be sacred, for instance in this study, the value of nationalism. By testing the 
hypothesis on an areligious sacredness, these studies aimed at a broader level of 
generalizability that could apply to violence associated with both religious and secular 
causes.  
In addition, however, we also examined possible differences between religious 
sacredness and non-religious sacredness. In Study 2, we refined sacredness into two 
separate scenarios. One scenario described an important place of religious worship, “It is 
the religious center and the site where people worship and perform rituals;” and the other 
described a monument of ethnonational significance, “It is the national monument and 
the site where people commemorate and celebrate the ancestors, past heroes, and history 
of the country”.  
For the non-sacred control condition, the hypothetical vignette described an attack 
on a military base that emphasized its strategic importance without any reference to 
sacredness, meaning, or awe. The non-sacred condition replaced the italicized part of the 
vignette above with “attacked and damaged a military base of your nation. This site is an 
important military stronghold. It is located in one of the key population areas and is of 
strategic significance for national defense.” The rest of the narratives remained 
unchanged.  
We later considered the possibility of a non-religious yet sacred confound with 
this manipulation given that people might take a military base as a symbol of national 
sovereignty which could have inspired a sense of sacredness. To address this issue, in 
Study 5a we adopted a new non-sacred condition describing an attack on “a 
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manufacturing center in your nation. This manufacturing center is located in one of the 
key population areas and is of strategic significance for the national economy.” 
In addition to these hypothetical vignettes, we also included semi-real vignettes 
that described a real-life site as a within-subject manipulation of the independent 
variable. That is, participants first responded to a hypothetical sacred/non-sacred scenario 
and then responded to similar semi-real scenarios.  For the sacred real-life site, Study 1 
used the Washington Monument, Study 4 used the Jame Mosque in the city of Esfahan in 
Iran, and Study 5a used the Lincoln Memorial Monument in Washington, DC. For the 
non-sacred real-life site, Study 1 used a military base in Southern California, Study 4 
used a military base outside of Esfahan, and Study 5 used an automobile manufacturing 
plant in the Midwest of the US. It is worth noting that these real-life sites also 
demonstrated variability in terms of religious and ethnonational significance. For 
instance, the Washington Monument was more relevant to ethnonational sacredness 
while the Jame Mosque had a stronger religious connotation.  
Main Findings  
Results from all five studies consistently showed no statistically significant effect 
of a violation of sacredness in comparison to non-sacredness as a support for greater 
violence. The null effect occurred in both hypothetical and semi-real scenarios, with two 
variants of sacredness (ethnonational and religious), under two variants of the control 
condition (military and manufacture), and across three geocultural locations (American 
South, American Pacific Northwest, Iranian). Summarizing the sample means of support 
for war across all studies, Figure 7.1 shows that a violation of sacredness did not promote 
higher levels of violence. The black bar in each of the boxes was the mean with the top 
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boundary showing the first quartile and the bottom boundary showing the third quartile of 
the distribution of sample means.  
The proposed effects did not exist even after controlling for individual difference 
variables that included conservatism, religiosity, ethnonationalism, militant extremism, 
and meaning.  
Figure 7.1. Mean support for violent warfare between sacred and non-sacred groups from 
Study 1 to Study 5.  
 
Moderated Effects 
This dissertation proposed several interaction effects associated with sacredness. 
It hypothesized that large casualties of counterattacking would discourage people’s 
support for war. Since sacredness defies rational analysis, we hypothesized that casualties 
would not influence decisions under the sacredness condition. Results showed that 
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casualty levels did not influence support for war in the sacred or control conditions. In 
short, no interaction was observed.  
Drawing on theories from decision-making research that emotion-oriented 
processing leads to higher risk preference in decisions (Zhang et al., 2016), we 
hypothesized that emotion-oriented processing could increase support for war associated 
with sacredness. We manipulated emotional-oriented processing by priming individuals 
with affect-laden questions, such as “what do you feel when you think of a baby.” 
However, we found no support for this hypothesis in Study 3. A priming of emotion did 
not increase support for war associated with the sacred site.  
The effect of sacredness might depend on how much an individual perceived 
sacredness. Therefore, we hypothesized that people giving higher sacredness rating 
would be more likely to support violence for the sacred site. We did indeed observe a 
marginally significant effect in Study 1, and in Study 2 an effect selectively for the 
ethnonational sacred site. However, such an effect did not show up in Study 3, and was 
reversed in Study 4. We reasoned that the sample in Study 3 from the Pacific Northwest 
was more liberal and less supportive of war in general than the other samples form the 
American South, thus attenuating this effect. On the other hand, the Iranian sample in 
Study 4 scored higher on ethnonationalism than the other two samples, which perhaps 
explained why support for war was higher for the military site.  
Another two hypotheses reflected assumptions of the MAPR model. The 
hypotheses were that religiosity and a search for meaning would boost violence 
associated with sacredness. However, results from Study 1 showed that religiosity 
actually suppressed violence associated with the sacred site. Devotional religiousness, 
156 
calculated with items indicating internalization of religion (e.g., “My religious beliefs are 
what really lie behind my whole approach to life”) was responsible for this suppression 
effect; coalitional religiousness, represented by items measuring participation in  
religious activities, did not show a moderating effect. Results in Study 2 and 3 were in the 
same direction, but not significant. The differential effects of devotional versus 
coalitional religiousness have been well documented in psychological research (Preston, 
Ritter, & Hernandez, 2010). Religion as a coalition activates a mindset of ingroup versus 
outgroup which can facilitate competitiveness against outsiders. On the other hand, 
devotional religiousness as internalization of supernatural principles can promote 
compliance with moral rules, and thus reduce violence. 
Search for meaning did not show any significant effect. We hypothesized that 
people would protect the sacred site as a source of meaning. However, people high in 
search for meaning did not indicate higher support for war when the sacred site was 
attacked.  
Attitudes toward Attacking and Counterattacking Sacredness 
The lack of a support for sacredness as a prompting stimulus for war could have 
had something to do with a low evaluation of sacred sites in general. Results in Study 2 
and Study 3 supported that possibility. Our sample believed that a counterattack for the 
sacred site would be less costly and less beneficial than a counterattack for the military 
site. When asked to choose a target for attacking the enemy, the sample indicated that 
attacking a sacred site was less costly, less beneficial, and less useful than attacking a 
military site. The sacred site received low valuation in both situations of attack and 
counterattack.  
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Then, who supported violence for sacredness? Study 5b showed that those who 
supported counterattacking for the sacred site were more likely to be Christian and 
politically conservative in the US. Study 5c showed that those who favored attacking a 
sacred site over a military site scored higher in psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and 
depression, and lower in self-esteem. On the other hand, religion did not correlate with 
poorer mental health. Religion and mental health factors, therefore, seemed to operate 
independently to influence violence. 
In short, these preliminary results suggested that individual difference variable did 
motivate sacredness-related violence Such motivations appeared in people who were 
Christian, psychologically maladaptive, and politically conservative.  
Sacred Duty, Conservatism, and Violence 
We created two original short scales measuring justification of ones’ civilization 
in terms of sacred and rational duty (see Appendix G). Sacred duty entails a belief by 
persons that God is on their side, and this form of duty dictates that interactions with 
other cultures be guided by what is sacred. Rational duty entails a commitment to a 
rational way of life, and it dictates that interactions with other cultures be guided by what 
is rational. Correlational results showed that both forms of duties predicted militant 
extremism and justified support for war in the US. In Iran, sacred duty had a much 
stronger association with violence. Hence, different ideological heuristics may function to 
justify violence in different societies.  
Worth emphasis was the robust positive correlation between political 
conservatism and militant extremism (and also, support for war) in the US (rs > .30), and 
less so in Iran. Literature in political psychology suggested that uncertainty avoidance 
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and threat management (e.g., perceptions of a dangerous world) contributes 
independently to conservatism (Jost et al., 2007), which in turn predicts aggression (De 
Zavala, Cislak, & Wesolowska, 2010). The cultural difference between American and 
Iranian data might be related to the different levels of threats people of the two cultures 
were perceiving. More importantly, it reflects the extent to which people of these two 
culture dovetails perceived stress with aggression.  
Possible Methodological Challenges 
Methodological challenges may deserve consideration from at least three angles.  
The first angle examines the face validity of the independent variable 
manipulations. Did individuals find the site described in the sacred scenario more sacred 
than that in the control scenario? The answer is positive. Manipulation checks across all 
five studies showed that individuals rated the sacred site as being more sacred than the 
non-sacred control. In addition, both sites were rated as important as each other, reducing 
the possible influence of “importance” on decisions. Indeed, the sacred site in the 
hypothetical scenario of Study 5a was rated more important, and that perhaps accounted 
for the higher level of support for war.  
It is always possible that demand characteristics played a role in the manipulation 
checks. However, the inclusion of real-life sacred sites and the rating of those sites – 
Washington Monument, Lincoln Memorial Monument, and Jame Mosque – as being 
more sacred showed that it was not mere demand characteristics of people to find 
sacredness in the scenario. Sacredness as an empirical reality appeared in the evaluations 
of sacredness, and thus these evaluations could not be reduced to merely demand 
characteristics on the manipulations. 
159 
The second angle pertains to the validity of the dependent variable measure. A 
competing argument is that support for war could have failed to capture violent responses 
to an attack on the sacred site, thus failing to differentiate the sacred from the non-sacred. 
However, we found that support for war correlated strongly and positively with militant 
extremism and conservatism, giving evidence to its face validity. The distributions of this 
variable in most studies were close to normal (see Figure 2.1, 3.1, 4.1 and 5.1), showing 
no obvious signs of ceiling or floor effects. Finally, this measure was indeed sensitive to 
manipulating conditions: Study 5a showed that support for war was significantly higher 
when the site was rated more “important.” 
War might be a disproportionately strong action in response to attack at a physical 
site. For many of our student subjects, human life (both the soldiers and the citizens of 
enemy’s country) may be more sacred than any sacred monument. One would be less 
likely to risk something that is more sacred (human lives) to retaliate for a strike that 
killed no one. Diplomacy may be considered a better path forward that might prevent loss 
of life with military escalation. 
Another possible explanation for the lack of support for war is that participants 
may not believe that a retaliatory military attack accomplishes anything in service of the 
sacred, once it has been destroyed. It is worth exploring the possibility of using violence 
to recapture a sacred site that had been occupied and was threatened with destruction. A 
related research interest might investigate, in a 2 (protect vs. avenge) by 2 (site target vs. 
human target) factorial design, support for war for the purpose of either protecting or 
revenging while varying the target as either a sacred physical site or human lives. Our 
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preliminary prediction is that people would support revenge for attack on human lives 
whereas protection for attack on a sacred site.  
The third angle delves deeper into the symbolic value of the manipulation 
scenarios. To what degree does the attack on a sacred site represent the idea of violating 
sacredness? Sacred land has been a major concern in many real-life conflicts. For 
instance, Israelis refer to their country as “The Land” (Ha-Aretz), whereas for 
Palestinians, land and honor are two sides of the same coin (Atran & Axelrod, 2008). 
Land can be a strong embodiment of sacredness, according to recent development of 
embodiment theory in psychology (Glenberg, 2010; Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, & Bargh, 
2012). In this sense, an attack on sacred land demonstrates, at least, face validity as 
representing a violation of sacredness.  
Having these methodological caveats in mind, the uniform null effects uncovered 
from four studies might call for either a major modification of the theoretical MAPR 
model of sacredness or forgoing the connection between violation of sacredness and 
violence. We have sufficient evidence showing that meaning, awe, and religion are major 
constituents of sacredness, and the manipulations with respect to these three factors have 
indeed increased the level of sacredness as measured through self-report. We are left to 
seriously entertain the possibility that our hypothesis about violent protectors of 
sacredness might be ill-advised in the first place, and the reproducible null effects may 
indeed point toward a true lack of connection between sacredness and violence. 
Misconception of Sacredness and Violence 
The unfortunate marriage of sacredness and violence finds its place not only in 
wars and global terrorism, but also in noble fights for freedom and dignity. The 
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Declaration of Independence concluded with the words: “And for the support of this 
Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually 
pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.” We have also 
learned from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that protectors of sacred values take 
unyielding positions against mundane tradeoffs like that of material benefits (Atran & 
Axelrod, 2008).  
The co-occurrence or correlation of sacredness and violence in historical events, 
however, does not prove that sacred values drive or cause people to kill and die. Findings 
from this dissertation offered no support for such a possibility, even when sacredness was 
placed under attack. In fact, the hypothesized causality between violence and the sacred 
may be a misconception created by political powers. In the following sections, I will 
analyze the possible misconception of sacredness as a cause of violence in two 
interrelated sections. In the first section, I will argue that violence leads to sacredness, not 
the other way around. Often taking the form of war and heroic death, violence gives rise 
to a sense of sacredness, which in turn justifies the violent act. In the second section, I 
will examine the myth of religious violence and argue that no clear-cut boundary exists 
between religion and the secular when considering the motivations for violence 
(Cavanaugh, 2009). Combined with empirical findings about the differential effects of 
coalitional versus devotional religiousness, this leads to the argument that threats to 
group identity rather than sacredness may be a more direct cause for violence (Preston, 
Ritter, & Hernandez, 2010).  
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Violence as Sacred Sacrifice 
To say that sacredness causes violence may be confusing cause with effect. 
Perhaps it is violence that gives rise to a sense of sacredness (e.g., the blood rites; 
Ehrenreich, 1998). Death and terror are, essentially, forms of sacred sacrifice (Kahn, 
2008). Within a given society, death in the defense of beliefs is what makes beliefs sacred 
(Marvin & Ingle, 1996). In this sense, warfare constitutes a central ritual allowing the 
society to discover its faith with the shedding of blood.  Violence defines the sacred, and 
it is not the sacred that defines the violence. 
Warfare can function like psychotherapy to cure societies of the triviality of 
mundane daily life. War infuses life with passion. In one of his most famous speeches, 
The Soldier’s Faith, delivered on Memorial Day 1895, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (later 
chosen as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States) extolled the 
obedience of soldiers in offering their life in the American Civil War. Their sacrifice 
drove away doubt and reconstituted the nation’s threatened beliefs, “We have shared the 
incommunicable experience of war; we have felt, we still feel, the passion of life to its 
top” (Holmes, 1992, p. 94). 
War also has a cleansing power and comes with a fantasy of redemption. This 
fantasy is fueled by the flow of blood as self-sacrifice. The greater the losses suffered in 
the war, the greater its cleansing power. War seems to save a civilization from steep 
decline, as in World War I, and fulfills the task of societal rejuvenation and regeneration 
(Griffin, 2007). 
Such rhetoric culminates in an absolutism of death. There is no higher purpose for 
dying than dying itself. Braender (2009) argues that the latent function of this sacrifice is 
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that by dying, soldiers prove that something is worth dying for. This is, of course, totally 
irrational, as dying violates two fundamental social norms: self-preservation and the 
prohibition against killing. Violence sanctifies the cultural structures that prompt the 
violation of these social norms. Facts and fact-based logic no longer apply (Victoria, 
2010).  
With these implicit functions of war and the irrationality of its justification in 
mind, we can find abundant examples in a variety of cultural contexts of how the act of 
dying and killing gives rise to a sense of sacredness. German Nazis, for instance, 
transformed carnage into national revelation. The themes of struggle, battle, and death 
pervaded both high culture and popular culture in Germany during the World War II 
(Baird, 1990). Death, without reference to any other entity, took on the ennobling force of 
a sacrament. The blood of the martyrs became a cornerstone of Hitlerian “religion,” 
preaching a doctrine of violence in which heroic death was seen as more beautiful than 
life.  
Death in war receives sanctification by being either a personal sacrifice or a 
sacrifice for the common good. In Nepal People’s War, the warrior maintains a unique 
relationship with the divine by making a personal sacrificial gift, the bali dân, a gift that 
results in a noble death (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2006). By comparison, the Chinese 
communist martyrs, during the Korean War, exalted revolutionary heroism against 
individual heroism with a focus on sacrificing for the masses (Zhu, 2014).  
The irony of death being the cause rather than the effect of the sacred is that it 
annihilates all meaning, yet fashions meaning ex nihilo. Massive casualties, like that of 
the over 620,000 soldiers lost in the American Civil War, presented powerful 
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discontinuities and significant changes in many war survivors’ assumptions about death 
(Faust, 2009). On the other hand, destruction of the old meaning system marked a sacred 
rite to the rise of new ones (Linderman, 1987). In that sense, death and war live in 
harmony with sacredness, despite their destructive nature.  
In summary, one has to recognize that the connection between violence and 
sacredness is not as simple as unidirectional. Despite the assumption that protection of 
sacredness breeds violence, people can actually obtain a sense of sacredness from 
engaging in violent behaviors. This is especially relevant in times of turbulence and 
uncertainties that call for reconstruction of meaning systems. Sacrifice through death and 
killing fills in the vacuum of meaning for the society (Vlahos, 2008). Since our data did 
not offer any support to the likely false stereotype that sacredness breeds violence, the 
idea that violence breeds sacredness becomes a more reasonable explanation for the 
sacredness-violence dialectic.  
Religion, Group Identity, and Violence 
Any suggestion that violence is a cause of the sacred rather than vice versa, of 
course, goes against the idea that religion expresses a sacredness as a special cause that 
demands violence as an effect. The shedding of blood is viewed in many religions as a 
creative force of history, and martyrdom answers the call of what faith demands. One 
example appears in the extreme views on religious martyrdom championed by Global 
Jihadism. This perspective appears in the work of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian 
Sunni Islamic scholar and founding member of al-Qaeda. Azzam (2002) once preached 
the necessity of blood in creating history. “History does not write its lines except with 
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blood. Glory does not build its lofty edifice except with skulls, Honor and respect cannot 
be established except on a foundation of cripples and corpses.”   
On the other hand, such an understanding of jihad and shahid, an Islamic term 
designating those who die only for Allah, may reflect only a partial, and perhaps 
distorted, reading of the Quran. A historical and holistic study of jihad contextualizes and 
challenges the military jihad and martyrdom in Islam. The term “jihad,” in combination 
with the phrase fi sabil Allah, translates literally to “striving in the path of God,” and 
takes on multiple and sometimes inconsistent connotations in the development of Quranic 
scholarship. The specifically belligerent and militant interpretations may not preserve the 
authentic understanding of jihad and shahid (Afsaruddin, 2013). It is not true that the 
theology of jihad unambiguously makes Islam a religion prone to violence.  
Similar ambiguities in the readings of scripture are also not uncommon within in 
the Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Abraham’s preparations for sacrificing his son in 
response to God’s command, in Genesis 22 of the Hebrew Bible, is used to both justify 
and protest war (Delaney, 2006). The Old Testament draws, in many places, an analogy 
between destroying the corporal body and establishment of the communal Body. For 
instance, the first murderer Cain was also the builder of the first city. This analogy has 
been interpreted to advance the argument for necessity of sacrifice in the process of 
generating the new (Bryson, 2003). As much as jihad can imply holy war against non-
believers, Christians can interpret Scriptures as calls for killing and sacrifice as well.  
Just as some Islamic scholars would oppose the militant interpretation of jihad 
and shahid, some New Testament theologians have cautioned that war is anti-Christian. 
Hauerwas (2011) argues that Christians who at least implicitly worship war have 
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confused the sacrifice of war (giving up personal lives) with the sacrifice of Jesus Christ 
for the salvation of all. As described in Christian traditions, these are two very different 
sacrifices, one losing and taking life and the other gaining life. The reality of Church is 
centered on the sacrifice of Jesus as the beginning of a new kind of life that stands against 
the sacrifice of war.  
As these contrasting perspectives make clear, little consensus exists among 
theologians on the role religion plays in violence. The connection of religion and violence 
is even more dubious when examined empirically. It all depends on what one means by 
“religion”. If one means the supernatural principle – to live up to the moral standards set 
by supernatural agents – then religion can activate a goal of virtue (Preston, Ritter, & 
Hernandez, 2010), and religious priming reliably elicits prosociality (Shariff, Willard, 
Andersen, & Norenzayan, 2015). If one means belief in God(s), an idealized persecuting 
divine figure can be a major trigger of violent responses, whereas a loving God may not 
(Jones, 2006). Finally, if one means by religion a cultural coalition, a religious ingroup 
versus outgroup, then activating the religious principle can both facilitate co-operation 
with fellow group members while encouraging competitions against outsiders (Preston, 
Ritter, & Hernandez, 2010). Results from the current study showed some mitigating 
effect of religion, and broadly speaking, did not find evidence that sacredness (one of the 
foundations of religion) would encourage violence at all.  
If it was not sacredness that explained violence, what did? A plausible 
explanation would identify group identity as a major motivation behind violence 
(Feldman, 2010). The connection between group identity and violence is reciprocal. Men 
do not go to war just to kill and win, but through their sacrifice to keep the society united. 
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In this sense, martyrs die at the hands of the group itself (Marvin & Ingle, 1999). Identity 
cultivates one’s willingness to sacrifice for the group (Atran, Sheikh, & Gomez, 2014). 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, individuals go to war to help the group survive the 
projection of an internal danger in the face of an alleged threat (Fornari, 1975).  
The symbiosis of violence and sacredness may also fulfill a human need of 
immortality. By abandoning their separate selves, mortal beings can partake in the 
immortality of the nation (Skya, 2009). “As the soldier dies, so the nation comes alive” 
(Koenigsberg, 2009). Perhaps scapegoating theory can support this alternative 
explanation (Girard, 1979). The maintenance of group unity requires that violence be 
projected outward. Acts of communal violence and the resulting shock and collective 
repression generate our very sense of the sacred.  
Conclusion 
Even though the present data suggest that sacredness is not an explanation of 
violence, sacredness is often used to justify violence and exonerate people from their 
violent crimes. “Whenever a society must motivate its members to kill or to risk their 
lives, thus consenting to being placed in extreme marginal situations, religious 
legitimations become important” (Berger, 1967, p.44). A recent example is Cliven Bundy 
and the militia occupiers of the federal building at Malheur National Wildlife Refuge. 
These people romanticized a violent way of life but elevated it in the name of protecting 
their constitutional rights where none had been taken away. By contrast, the Standing 
Rock Sioux protesters against the building of Dakota Pipeline did not engage in violence. 
An obvious sacred object (i.e., burial sites and water) was at the risk of being destroyed, 
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while no armed violence broke out. This, again, resonates with our argument that 
protection of sacredness does not necessarily give rise to violence.  
I would like to end this dissertation with a Sioux prayer, wishing for peace by 
invoking everlasting and unitary sacredness.  
“Grandfather Great Spirit 
All over the world the faces of living ones are alike. 
With tenderness they have come up out of the ground 
Look upon your children that they may face the winds 
And walk the good road to the Day of Quiet. 
Grandfather Great Spirit 
Fill us with the Light. 
Give us the strength to understand, and the eyes to see. 
Teach us to walk the soft Earth as relatives to all that live.” 
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APPENDIX A 
MORAL JUDGMENT 
Original Scale Farsi Translation 
1. Theirlandia should be morally 
condemned to attack Ourlandia’s sacred 
site.  
1. » ِﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ نآﺎھ« ياﺮﺑ ﮫﻠﻤﺣ ﮫﺑ نﺎﮑﻣ 
 ِسﺪﻘﻣ » ِﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ ﺎﻣ« ﺪﯾﺎﺑ زا ﺮﻈﻧ ﻲﻗﻼﺧا 
مﻮﮑﺤﻣ .دﻮﺸﺑ 
2. It is morally imperative for Ourlandia to 
attack back in response to Theirlandia 
attacking the sacred site. 
2. زا ﺮﻈﻧ ﻲﻗﻼﺧا مزﻻ ﺖﺳا » ِﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ ﺎﻣ« 
رد ﺦﺳﺎﭘ ﮫﺑ ﮫﻠﻤﺣ »ﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ نآﺎھ« ﮫﺑ نآ 
نﺎﮑﻣ سﺪﻘﻣ ﮫﺑ نآﺎھ ﮫﻠﻤﺣ .ﺪﻨﮐ 
3. Ourlandia is good.  3. » ِﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ ﺎﻣ« بﻮﺧ .ﺖﺳا 
4. Theirlandia is evil.  4. »ﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ نآﺎھ« ﺮﺷ .ﺖﺳا 
5. Theirlandia deserves punishment.  5. »ﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ نآﺎھ« راواﺰﺳ تازﺎﺠﻣ .ﺖﺳا 
6. People in Theirlandia are not really 
human.  
6. مدﺮﻣ »ﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ نآﺎھ« ﺎﻌﻗاو نﺎﺴﻧا 
.ﺪﻨﺘﺴﯿﻧ 
7. Ourlandia must crush and annihilate 
Theirlandia.  
7. »ﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ ﺎﻣ« ﺪﯾﺎﺑ »ﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ نآﺎھ« ار 
رد ﻢھ ﺪﻨﮑﺸﺑ و زا ﻦﯿﺑ .دﺮﺒﺑ 
8. Violent warfare is justified to deal with 
Theirlandia.  
8. ماﺪﻗا ﻲﻣﺎﻈﻧ ياﺮﺑ ﻲﮔﺪﯿﺳر ندﺮﮐ ﮫﺑ 
»ﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ نآﺎھ« ﮫﺟﻮﻣ .ﺖﺳا 
9. Ourlandia cannot be blamed if they 
destroy Theirlandia.  
9. ﻲﻤﻧناﻮﺗ »ﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ ﺎﻣ« ار ﺶﻧزﺮﺳ دﺮﮐ 
ﺮﮔا ﮫﮐ »ﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ نآﺎھ« ار دﻮﺑﺎﻧ .ﺪﻨﮐ 
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APPENDIX B 
SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT WARFARE  
Original Scale Farsi Translation 
1. How much do you support using 
violence in the war?  
1. ﮫﭼ هزاﺪﻧا زا هدﺎﻔﺘﺳا زا ﺖﻧﻮﺸﺧ رد ﻦﯾا 
ﮓﻨﺟ ﺖﯾﺎﻤﺣ ﻲﻣ؟ﺪﯿﻨﮐ 
2. How much time do you think Ourlandia 
should commit to this war?  
2. ﺮﮑﻓ ﻲﻣﺪﯿﻨﮐ ﮫﭼ تﺪﻣ نﺎﻣز »ﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ 
ﺎﻣ« ﺪﯾﺎﺑ ﺖﺳد ﮫﺑ ﻦﯾا ﮓﻨﺟ ؟ﺪﻧﺰﺑ 
3. To fund this war, the president tells the 
Ourlandian people that he will increase 
their taxes. Would you support this tax 
increase?  
3. ياﺮﺑ ﻲﻧﺎﺒﯿﺘﺸﭘ ﻲﻟﺎﻣ ﻦﯾا ،ﮓﻨﺟ ﺲﯿﺋر رﻮﮭﻤﺟ ﮫﺑ 
مدﺮﻣ »ﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ ﺎﻣ« ﻲﻣﺪﯾﻮﮔ ﮫﮐ تﺎﯿﻟﺎﻣيﺎھ نآﺎھ ار 
ﺶﯾاﺰﻓا ﺪھاﻮﺧ .داد رﺪﻘﭼ لﺎﻤﺘﺣا دراد ﺎﻤﺷ زا ﻦﯾا 
ﺶﯾاﺰﻓا تﺎﯿﻟﺎﻣ ﺖﯾﺎﻤﺣ ؟ﺪﯿﻨﮑﺑ 
4. How likely would you be to join the 
military to fight in this war?  
4. رﺪﻘﭼ لﺎﻤﺘﺣا دراد ياﺮﺑ هزرﺎﺒﻣ رد ﻦﯾا 
ﮓﻨﺟ ﮫﺑ ﺶﺗرا ؟ﺪﯾﺪﻧﻮﯿﭙﺑ 
5. How likely would you support a family 
member’s decision to fight in this war?  
5. رﺪﻘﭼ لﺎﻤﺘﺣا دراد زا ﻢﯿﻤﺼﺗ ﻲﮑﯾ زا 
يﺎﻀﻋا هداﻮﻧﺎﺧ ياﺮﺑ هزرﺎﺒﻣ رد ﻦﯾا ﮓﻨﺟ 
ﺖﯾﺎﻤﺣ ؟ﺪﯿﻨﮐ 
6. Would it be acceptable to kill 
Theirlandian attackers in this war? 
6. ﺎﯾآ ﻦﺘﺸﮐ ﯿﻤﺟﺎﮭﻣ ِﻦ » ِﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ نآﻲﺋﺎھ« 
رد ﻦﯾا ﮓﻨﺟ ﻞﺑﺎﻗ لﻮﺒﻗ ؟ﺖﺳا 
7. Would it be acceptable for Theirlandian 
civilians to die as a result of this war? 
7. ﺎﯾآ ﻞﺑﺎﻗ لﻮﺒﻗ ﺖﺳا ﮫﮐ ناﺪﻧوﺮﮭﺷ 
»ﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ نآﺎھ« رد ﮫﺠﯿﺘﻧ ﻦﯾا ﮓﻨﺟ 
؟ﺪﻧﺮﯿﻤﺑ 
8. Would it be acceptable for innocent 
people to die as a result of this war?  
8. ﺎﯾآ ﻞﺑﺎﻗ لﻮﺒﻗ ﺖﺳا داﺮﻓا ﻲﺑهﺎﻨﮔ رد ﮫﺠﯿﺘﻧ 
ﻦﯾا ﮓﻨﺟ ؟ﺪﻧﺮﯿﻤﺑ 
9. Overall, how much do you support the 
Ourlandia involvement in this war? 
9. رد ،عﻮﻤﺠﻣ رﺪﻘﭼ زا يﺮﯿﮔرد »ﻦﯿﻣزﺮﺳ 
ﻲﺋﺎﻣ«ﺎھ رد ﻦﯾا ﮓﻨﺟ ﺖﯾﺎﻤﺣ ﻲﻣ؟ﺪﯿﻨﮐ 
Shaw, Quezada, & Zárate, 2011 
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APPENDIX C 
DUKE RELIGIOSITY  
Original Scale Farsi Translation 
1. How often do you attend 
church/temples/mosques or other religious 
meetings? 
1. Never  
2. Once a year or less  
3. A few times a year  
4. A few times a month 
5. More than once per week 
  ﺮﮕﯾد ﺎﯾ ﺪﺒﻌﻣ/ﺎﺴﯿﻠﮐ/ﺪﺠﺴﻣ ﮫﺑ رﺎﺒﮑﯾ ﺖﻗو ﺪﻨﭼ ﺮھ .1
؟ﺪﯾورﻲﻣ ﻲﻨﯾد ﻊﻣﺎﺠﻣ 
ﺰﮔﺮھ .1 
لﺎﺳ رد رﺎﺒﮑﯾ زا ﺮﺘﻤﮐ ﺎﯾ رﺎﺒﮑﯾ .2 
لﺎﺳ رد رﺎﺑ ﺪﻨﭼ .3 
هﺎﻣ رد رﺎﺑ ﺪﻨﭼ .4 
ﮫﺘﻔھ رد رﺎﺑ ﮏﯾ زا ﺶﯿﺑ .5 
2. How often do you spend time in private 
religious activities, such as prayer, 
meditation or Bible study/scriptures?  
1. Rarely or never 
2. A few times a month 
3. Once a week 
4. Two or more times per week 
5. More than once a day  
2. ﺮھ ﺪﻨﭼ ﺖﻗو رﺎﺒﮑﯾ رد ﻌﻓﺖﯿﻟﺎيﺎھ ﻲﻨﯾد 
ﻲﺻﻮﺼﺧ ﺪﻨﻧﺎﻣ ،زﺎﻤﻧ ،ﮫﺒﻗاﺮﻣ ﺎﯾ ﮫﻌﻟﺎﻄﻣ 
نﻮﺘﻣ سﺪﻘﻣ ﺖﮐﺮﺷ ﻲﻣ؟ﺪﯿﻨﮐ 
1. ترﺪﻨﺑ ﺎﯾ ﺰﮔﺮھ 
2. ﺪﻨﭼ رﺎﺑ رد هﺎﻣ 
3. رﺎﺒﮑﯾ رد ﮫﺘﻔھ 
4. ود ﺎﯾ ﮫﺳ رﺎﺑ رد ﮫﺘﻔھ 
5. ﺶﯿﺑ زا ﮏﯾ رﺎﺑ رد زور 
Please indicate your agreement with the 
statements below using the scale:  
1 = I strongly disagree    
2 = I tend to disagree    
3 = I am not sure  
4 = I tend to agree   
5 = I strongly agree 
ﺎﻔط ﺖﻘﻓاﻮﻣ دﻮﺧ ار ﺎﺑ تارﺎﮭظا ﺮﯾز ﺎﺑ 
هدﺎﻔﺘﺳا زا ﻦﯾا سﺎﯿﻘﻣ ﺺﺨﺸﻣ :ﺪﯿﻨﮐ 
1 = اﺪﯾﺪﺷ ﻢﻔﻟﺎﺨﻣ 
2 = ﺎﺗ هزاﺪﻧايا ﻢﻔﻟﺎﺨﻣ 
3 = ﻦﺌﻤﻄﻣ ﻢﺘﺴﯿﻧ 
4 = ﺎﺗ هزاﺪﻧايا ﻢﻘﻓاﻮﻣ 
5 = اﺪﯾﺪﺷ ﻢﻘﻓاﻮﻣ 
3. In my life, I experience the presence of 
the Divine (i.e., God).  
3. رد ﻲﮔﺪﻧز،ما رﻮﻀﺣ ﻲﮭﻟا ﻲﻨﻌﯾ) (اﺪﺧ 
ار ﮫﺑﺮﺠﺗ ﻲﻣ.ﻢﻨﮐ 
4. My religious beliefs are what really lie 
behind my whole approach to life. 
4. ﮫﻤھ دﺮﮑﯾور ﻦﻣ ﮫﺑ ﻲﮔﺪﻧز ﺎﻌﻗاو ﺮﺑ 
سﺎﺳا يﺎھروﺎﺑ ﻲﻨﯾدما .ﺖﺳا 
5. I try hard to carry my religion over into 
all other dealings in life. 
5. رﺎﯿﺴﺑ ﻲﻣﻢﺷﻮﮐ ﻢﻨﯾد ار رد ﮫﻤھ تﺎﯿﺋﺰﺟ 
ﻲﮔﺪﻧزما دراو .ﻢﻨﮐ 
Koenig & Büssing, 2010 
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APPENDIX D 
ETHNONATIONALISM  
Original Scale Farsi Translation 
1. The homeland of my people is sacred 
because of its monuments to our ancestors 
and heroes. 
1.  ِﻦطو مدﺮﻣ ﻦﻣ سﺪﻘﻣ ﺖﺳا ﮫﺑ ﺖﻠﻋ رﺎﺛآ 
ﻲﺨﯾرﺎﺗ طﻮﺑﺮﻣ ﮫﺑ داﺪﺟا و نﺎﻣﺮﮭﻗيﺎھ .ﺎﻣ 
2. I honor the glorious heroes among my 
people who sacrificed themselves for our 
destiny and our heritage. 
2. ﻦﻣ ياﺮﺑ نﺎﻣﺮﮭﻗيﺎھ هﻮﮑﺷﺎﺑ رد نﺎﯿﻣ 
ﻢﻣدﺮﻣ ﮫﮐ نﺎﺸﻧﺎﺟ ار ياﺮﺑ ﺖﺷﻮﻧﺮﺳ و 
ثاﺮﯿﻣ ﺎﻣ اﺪﻓ هدﺮﮐﺪﻧا ماﺮﺘﺣا .ﻢﻠﺋﺎﻗ 
3. My ancestors once lived in a golden age 
with glorious and beautiful achievements. 
3. يرﺎﮔزور داﺪﺟا ﻦﻣ رد ﮏﯾ ﺮﺼﻋ 
ﻲﺋﻼط ﺎﺑ يﺎھدروﺎﺘﺳد هﻮﮑﺷﺎﺑ و ﺎﺒﯾز 
ﻲﮔﺪﻧز .ﺪﻧدﺮﮐ 
4. My first loyalty is to the heritage of my 
ancestors, their language and their religion. 
4.  ِيرادﺎﻓو ﺖﺴﺨﻧ ﻦﻣ ﮫﺑ ثاﺮﯿﻣ ،مداﺪﺟا 
نﺎﺑز نآ،ﺎھ و ﻦﯾد نآ.ﺖﺳﺎھ 
Saucier, 2015  
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APPENDIX E 
MORAL ABSOLUTISM  
Original Scale Farsi Translation 
1. Right and wrong are not usually a 
simple matter of black and white; there are 
many shades of gray. (R) 
1. بﻮﺧ و ﺪﺑ ﻻﻮﻤﻌﻣ ﮏﯾ ﮫﻟﺎﺴﻣ ةدﺎﺳ ﺪﯿﻔﺳ و هﺎﯿﺳ 
؛ﺖﺴﯿﻧ ﮫﯾﺎﺳيﺎھ يﺮﺘﺴﮐﺎﺧ يدﺎﯾز دﻮﺟو .دراد 
2. There are absolutely clear guidelines 
about what is good and evil. These always 
apply to everyone, whatever the 
circumstances. 
2. يﺎھدﻮﻤﻨھر ﻼﻣﺎﮐ ﻲﻨﺷور هرﺎﺑرد ﮫﭽﻧآ ﺮﯿﺧ و ﺮﺷ 
ﺖﺳا دﻮﺟو .دراد ﻦﯾا ﺎھدﻮﻤﻨھر ،ﮫﺸﯿﻤھ هرﺎﺑرد 
،نﺎﮕﻤھ و رد ﺮھ ﻲﺘﯿﻌﻗﻮﻣ قﺪﺻ ﻲﻣ.ﺪﻨﻨﮐ 
3. There is really only one proper way to 
think and behave morally. 
3. ﺎﻌﻗاو ﺎﮭﻨﺗ ﮏﯾ ةﻮﯿﺷ ﺐﺳﺎﻨﻣ ﺮﮑﻔﺗ و رﺎﺘﻓر ندﺮﮐ 
دﻮﺟو .دراد 
4. “Morality” is relative to each person —
there is no truly ‘‘correct’’ set of rules that 
should govern one’s conduct. (R) 
4. »قﻼﺧا« ياﺮﺑ ﺮھ يدﺮﻓ ﻲﺒﺴﻧ ﺖﺳا ﭻﯿھ) 
ﮫﻋﻮﻤﺠﻣ ﺪﻋاﻮﻗ ﺎﻌﻗاو »ﺖﺳرد« ﮫﮐ ﺪﯾﺎﺑ کﻮﻠﺳ دﺮﻓ ار 
ﺖﯾاﺪھ ﺪﻨﮐ دﻮﺟو .(دراﺪﻧ 
5. Any other moral values or ways of 
thinking and behaving that conflict with 
my conception of morality are wrong. 
5. ﺮھ شزرا ﺎﯾ هﻮﯿﺷ يﺮﮕﯾد زا ﺮﮑﻔﺗ و رﺎﺘﻓر ﮫﮐ ﺎﺑ 
ﺖﺷادﺮﺑ ﻦﻣ زا قﻼﺧا رﺎﮔزﺎﺳﺎﻧ ﺪﺷﺎﺑ ﺖﺳردﺎﻧ .ﺖﺳا 
6. The moral values and beliefs that help to 
enrich my life may not necessarily work 
for everyone. (R) 
6. ﺎھروﺎﺑ و شزرايﺎھ ﻲﻗﻼﺧا ﮫﮐ ﮫﺑ ﻦﻣ ﮏﻤﮐ 
ﻲﻣﺪﻨﮐ ﻲﮔﺪﻧزما ار ﺮﭘ رﺎﺑ ﻢﻨﮐ ﺎﻣوﺰﻟ ياﺮﺑ ناﺮﮕﯾد 
ﺮﺛﻮﻣ ﻊﻗاو ﻲﻤﻧ.دﻮﺷ 
Peterson, Smith, Tannenbaum, & Shaw, 2009 
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APPENDIX F 
MILITANT EXTREMISM  
Original Scale Farsi Translation 
1. Our enemies are more like animals than 
like humans. 
1. نﺎﻨﻤﺷد ﺎﻣ ﺮﺘﺸﯿﺑ ﮫﯿﺒﺷ ناﻮﯿﺣﺪﻧا ﺎﺗ .نﺎﺴﻧا 
2. We have a duty to attack and kill the 
enemies of our people. 
2. ﺎﻣ ﮫﻔﯿظو ﻢﯾراد ﮫﺑ نﺎﻨﻤﺷد مدﺮﻣنﺎﻣ ﮫﻠﻤﺣ ﻢﯿﻨﮐ و 
نآﺎھ ار .ﻢﯿﺸﮑﺑ 
3. If you are protecting what is sacred and 
holy, anything you do is moral and 
justifiable. 
3. ﺮﮔا دﺮﻓ رد لﺎﺣ ﺖﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ زا يﺰﯿﭼ سﺪﻘﻣ ،ﺪﺷﺎﺑ 
ﺮھ يرﺎﮐ ﺪﻨﮑﺑ ﻲﻗﻼﺧا و ﮫﯿﺟﻮﺗ ﺮﯾﺬﭘ .ﺖﺳا 
4. Government is illegitimate unless based 
strictly on God’s authority as found in the 
holy book. 
4. ،ﺖﻣﻮﮑﺣ عوﺮﺸﻣﺎﻧ ﺖﺳا ﺮﮕﻣ ﮫﮑﻧآ ﺎﻘﯿﻗد ﻲﻨﺘﺒﻣ ﺮﺑ 
ترﺪﻗ ﺪﻧواﺪﺧ ﮫﻧﻮﮕﻧآ ﮫﮐ رد بﺎﺘﮐ سﺪﻘﻣ ﺖﺳا .ﺪﺷﺎﺑ 
5. Foreigners have stolen land from our 
people and they are now trying to steal 
more. 
5. ﻲﺟرﺎﺧﺎھ ﻦﯿﻣز ار زا مدﺮﻣ ﺎﻣ هﺪﯾدزدﺪﻧا و نﻮﻨﮐا 
ﻲﻣﺪﻨﺷﻮﮐ ﺮﺘﺸﯿﺑ .ﺪﻧدزﺪﺑ 
6. If necessary, we should use force to 
cleanse the world of corruption. 
6. رد ترﻮﺻ ،موﺰﻟ ياﺮﺑ کﺎﭘ ندﺮﮐ نﺎﮭﺟ زا دﺎﺴﻓ 
ﺪﯾﺎﺑ زا روز هدﺎﻔﺘﺳا .ﻢﯿﻨﮐ 
7. Going to war can sometimes be sacred 
and righteous. 
7. ﮫﺑ ﮓﻨﺟ ﻦﺘﻓر ﻲھﺎﮔ ﻲﻣﺪﻧاﻮﺗ سﺪﻘﻣ و 
ﮫﻧارﺎﮑﺘﺳرد .ﺪﺷﺎﺑ 
8. We should become warriors in the army 
of righteousness. 
8. ﺎﻣ ﺪﯾﺎﺑ ﻲﻧﺎﯾﻮﮕﻨﺟ ﻢﯾﻮﺷ رد ﺶﺗرا .يرﺎﮑﺘﺳرد 
9. The best way to die is defending your 
beliefs. 
9. ﻦﯾﺮﺘﮭﺑ هار ،ندﺮﻣ عﺎﻓد ندﺮﮐ زا ﺖﯾﺎھروﺎﺑ .ﺖﺳا 
10. Extreme measures are needed now to 
restore virtue and righteousness in this 
world. 
10. ﮫﺑ تﺎﻣاﺪﻗا يﺪﯾﺪﺷ زﺎﯿﻧ ﺖﺳا ﺎﺗ ﺖﻠﯿﻀﻓ و 
يرﺎﮑﺘﺳرد ار رد ﻦﯾا ﺎﯿﻧد ﮫﺑ لﺎﺣ لوا .ﺪﻧادﺮﮔﺮﺑ 
Saucier, Akers, Shen-Miller, Kneževié, & Stankov, 2015 
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APPENDIX G 
SACRED AND RATIONAL DUTIES OF CIVILIZATION 
Original Scale Farsi Translation 
Sacred Duty  
1. Our civilization has God on its side. 1. اﺪﺧ راﺪﻓﺮط نﺪﻤﺗ .ﺖﺳﺎﻣ 
2. It is my sacred duty to develop 
righteousness in my own civilization. 
2. ،ﻦﯾا ﮫﻔﯿظو سﺪﻘﻣ ﻦﻣ ﺖﺳا ﮫﮐ يرﺎﮑﺘﺳرد ار رد 
نﺪﻤﺗ مدﻮﺧ شﺮﺘﺴﮔ .ﻢھد 
3. Our interactions with other cultures 
must be guided by what is sacred to our 
civilization. 
3. تﻼﻣﺎﻌﺗ ﺎﻣ ﺎﺑ ﺮﮕﯾد ﮓﻨھﺮﻓﺎھ ﺪﯾﺎﺑ ﻂﺳﻮﺗ ﮫﭽﻧآ 
ياﺮﺑ نﺪﻤﺗ ﺎﻣ سﺪﻘﻣ ﺖﺳا ﺖﯾاﺪھ .دﻮﺸﺑ 
Rational Duty  
4. Our civilization is committed to a 
rational way of life. 
4. نﺪﻤﺗ ﺎﻣ مﺰﺘﻠﻣ ﺖﺳا ﮫﺑ ﮏﯾ هﻮﯿﺷ ﻲﮔﺪﻧز .ﮫﻧﻼﻗﺎﻋ 
5. I have civic duties to my civilization, 
including the promotion of a rational way 
of life for all of our citizens. 
5. ﻦﻣ ﺖﺒﺴﻧ ﮫﺑ ﻢﮕﻨھﺮﻓ ﻒﯾﺎظو يﺪﻧوﺮﮭﺷ ،مراد زا 
ﮫﻠﻤﺟ ءﺎﻘﺗرا ﮏﯾ هﻮﯿﺷ ﻲﮔﺪﻧز ﮫﻧﻼﻗﺎﻋ ياﺮﺑ ﮫﻤھ 
.نﺎﻤﻧاﺪﻧوﺮﮭﺷ 
6. Our interactions with other cultures 
must be guided by what is regarded as 
rational within our civilization. 
6. تﻼﻣﺎﻌﺗ ﺎﻣ ﺎﺑ ﺮﮕﯾد ﮓﻨھﺮﻓﺎھ ﺪﯾﺎﺑ ﻂﺳﻮﺗ ﮫﭽﻧآ 
نورد نﺎﻤﮕﻨھﺮﻓ ﮫﻧﻼﻗﺎﻋ ﺖﺳا ﺖﯾاﺪھ .دﻮﺸﺑ 
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APPENDIX H 
MEANING IN LIFE SCALE  
 
Original Scale Farsi Translation 
1. I understand my life’s meaning. 1. يﺎﻨﻌﻣ ﻲﮔﺪﻧزما ار کرد ﻲﻣ.ﻢﻨﮐ 
2. I am looking for something that makes 
my life feel meaningful. 
2. ﮫﺑ لﺎﺒﻧد يﺰﯿﭼ ﻲﻣمدﺮﮔ ﮫﮐ ﺐﺟﻮﻣ دﻮﺷ 
ﻲﮔﺪﻧزما رادﺎﻨﻌﻣ سﺎﺴﺣا .دﻮﺸﺑ 
3. I am always looking to find my life’s 
purpose. 
3. ﻦﻣ ﮫﺸﯿﻤھ رد يﻮﺠﺘﺴﺟ ﻦﺘﻓﺎﯾ فﺪھ 
ﻲﮔﺪﻧزما .ﻢﺘﺴھ 
4. My life has a clear sense of purpose. 4. ﻲﮔﺪﻧزما ياراد ﮏﯾ ﺲﺣ ﻦﺷور فﺪھ 
.ﺖﺳا 
5. I have a good sense of what makes my 
life meaningful. 
5. ﻲﺴﺣ بﻮﺧ مراد زا ﮫﭽﻧآ ﻲﮔﺪﻧزما ار 
رادﺎﻨﻌﻣ ﻲﻣ.ﺪﻨﮐ 
6. I have discovered a satisfying life 
purpose. 
6. ﮏﯾ » ِفﺪھ ﻲﮔﺪﻧز« ﻒﺸﮐ هدﺮﮐما ﮫﮐ 
ﺖﯾﺎﺿر ﺶﺨﺑ .ﺖﺳا 
7. I am always searching for something 
that makes my life feel significant. 
7. هرﺎﻤھ رد لﺎﺣ يﻮﺠﺘﺴﺟ يﺰﯿﭼما ﮫﮐ 
ﺐﺟﻮﻣ دﻮﺷ ﻲﮔﺪﻧزما رادﺎﻨﻌﻣ .دﻮﺸﺑ 
8. I am seeking a purpose or mission for 
my life. 
8. رد يﻮﺠﺘﺴﺟ ﮏﯾ فﺪھ ﺎﯾ ﺖﯾرﻮﻣﺎﻣ 
ياﺮﺑ ﻲﮔﺪﻧزما .ﻢﺘﺴھ 
9. My life has no clear purpose. 9. ﻲﮔﺪﻧزما فﺪھ ﻲﻨﺷور .دراﺪﻧ 
10. I am searching for meaning in my life. 10. رد يﻮﺠﺘﺴﺟ ﺎﻨﻌﻣ ياﺮﺑ ﻲﮔﺪﻧزما .ﻢﺘﺴھ 
Presence: 1, 4, 5, 6, & 9 (R); Search:  2, 3, 7, 8, & 10  
(Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006)  
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APPENDIX I 
STUDY 3 PRIMING CONDITIONS 
Calculation Priming Feeling Priming 
1. If an object travels at five feet per 
minute, then by your calculations how 
many feet will it travel in 360 seconds? 
1. When you hear the name “Mother 
Teresa,” what do you feel? Please use one 
word to describe your predominant feeling. 
2. If a consumer bought 10 books for $540, 
then, by your calculations, on average, 
how much did the consumer pay for each 
book? 
2. When you hear the word “baby,” what 
do you feel? Please use one word to 
describe your predominant feeling. 
3. On a farm, the number of chicken is 
twice the number of goats; there are 10 
goats. How many animals (chickens plus 
goats) does this farm have?  
3. When you hear the words “pine trees,” 
what do you feel? Please use one word to 
describe your predominant feeling. 
4. Josh takes a train from New York City 
to Boston which runs for 4 hours and 30 
minutes. If the train leaves at 7 AM, when 
will Josh arrive at Boston if the train runs 
on time? 
4. When you hear the word “universe,” 
what do you feel? Please use one word to 
describe your predominant feeling. 
5. A shirt is on sale with 20% off of its 
listed price, and you have a coupon that 
will take an additional 10% off. If the shirt 
originally costs $10, how much does it cost 
after the discount? 
5. When you hear the word “honesty,” 
what do you feel? Please use one word to 
describe your predominant feeling. 
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